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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This research was conducted to explain the underlying rationale for Chinese 
investments and aid in Cambodia’s energy sector, and explore how these 
financial injections affect the livelihood and development of local communities. 
This topic is highly relevant to Cambodia in a number of ways. 
 
First, energy is a critical development challenge in Cambodia. Currently, only 
35% of the population has access to reliable electricity. Due to its dependence 
on the import of diesel for power generation, Cambodia’s electricity price is one 
of the highest in the world. Such high cost of energy negatively affects 
Cambodia’s competitiveness, as it imposes a heavy financial burden on the 
majority of low-income households, and drives potential investors away. Unless 
proper policies are put in place, Cambodia’s energy security will be at risk as 
energy demand is predicted to rise in years to come. To solve the current energy 
shortage and to meet future electricity demand, the government has prioritized 
the development of hydropower, which according to the national power 
development plan (2008-2020), will contribute more than 50% to the total 
power supply by 2020. While hydropower has the potential to help boost 
domestic electricity generation, contribute to improving electricity access, and 
accelerate economic growth, there are contentious debates on the social and 
environmental consequence of such development projects. 
 
Secondly, the controversy of Cambodia’s energy development is fueled by the 
dominant involvement of China in this sector. China is currently the largest 
foreign investor, and a major donor in Cambodia. China is also the chief 
financer of the energy sector, spending billions of dollars in investment and aid 
in local power generation and distribution systems. Noticeably, China is 
responsible for financing and building of at least six dams across the country. 
While Chinese investment and aid is much needed for this under-developed 
sector, China’s unquestioning approach to how its aid and investment money is 
used has triggered corruption, worsened governance and human rights, and 
contributed to the destruction of Cambodia’s resources and natural 
environment. Civil society organizations in Cambodia argue that many Chinese 
investments, especially in hydropower, lack transparency, fail to meet 
international standards, and cause social and environmental harm.  
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Given the urgency to develop Cambodia’s energy sector and the controversial 
role that China plays in this regard, careful research attention on the topic is 
needed. Literature on the impact of investment and aid at global, a regional and 
country level is abundant, but at a local level is scarce. There is a gap between 
the results of aggregate data at the macro level and what happens at the local 
level. This research, therefore, aims to contribute to narrowing this gap by 
focusing in particular on the community when exploring the ways in which 
Chinese investment and aid are affecting the development of local 
communities in Cambodia. The research investigates China’s role in 
Cambodia’s energy sector and uses the China-funded Kamchay hydropower 
project as a case study to explore the impact on local community. To realize 
its objectives, the research raises four specific questions: 
 
 
• What are the economic, political and social implications of  Cambodia-
China relations? 
• What role does China play in Cambodia’s energy sector? 
• How has  the China-funded Kamchay Dam project affected the 
livelihood of local community? 
• In the context of China’s  global resource diplomacy, what motives does 
China have for its relations with Cambodia? 
 
To answer the above questions, this research employs a qualitative method and 
adopts a theoretical framework built upon a range of literature including foreign 
direct investment (FDI), energy, and sustainable development. The following 
sections summarize the finding to each research question.  
 
First, this research uses expert interviews, media analysis and an extensive 
literature review to study the extent and implications of China-Cambodia 
relations. The finding suggests that the relationship between Cambodia and 
China is mutually beneficial, but good leadership and accountable governments 
with a long-term vision of achieving sustainable development are required to 
ensure that such relationship result in a win-win situation. Currently, 
Cambodian benefits economically from China’s inflow of investment and 
generous donations, while China benefits politically and strategically for having 
Cambodia as an ally. However, there is evidence to suggest that Cambodia’s 
economic gains from China are taking place at the expense of social dislocation 
and environmental destruction. Cambodia’s dependence on Chinese investment 
 
and aid has resulted in the loss of its autonomy, the deterioration of good 
governance, and permanent damage to the environment. 
 
The second question requires the research to examine China’s controversial role 
in Cambodia’s under-developed energy sector. Using a sustainable development 
framework, the research assesses China’s contribution to the sector and finds 
that its multimillion-dollar investment is transforming the country’s energy 
sector, helping to reduce reliance on foreign energy, increase the rate of 
electrification, and potentially reduce energy costs. However, China-funded 
energy projects, particularly hydropower dams, have met with widespread 
suspicion and harsh criticism for failing to meet international standards and for 
imposing social and environmental damages. Only when China fully embraces 
international best practices and drastically improves the transparency of its 
investment projects will it become a real catalyst for sustainable energy 
development in Cambodia. 
 
To answer the third question the study investigated the impact of a hydropower 
project constructed by a Chinese firm. The US$ 280 million Kamchay dam, the 
first large-scale dam in Cambodia, was selected as a case study. This study 
found that the dam had reduced the price of electricity, created short-term 
employment opportunities and improved local infrastructure. However, 
inadequate planning and stakeholder consultation have caused the project to fall 
short of international standards. While the economic gains from the dam have 
not yet materialized, local communities have seen their income reduced and 
their livelihood disturbed. It is clear that if hydropower is to contribute to 
solving Cambodia’s energy problems in a sustainable way, a comprehensive 
and inclusive mechanism for good hydropower development must be 
developed and rigorously implemented. China, in this regard, should play a 
vital role in enhancing and enforcing its environmental and social safeguards if 
it wants to contribute to the poverty reduction in Cambodia. 
 
The last research question discusses Cambodia-China relation in the global 
context of China’s resource diplomacy. The mainstream literature tends to 
suggest that China uses its resource diplomacy, which include outward 
investment, no-strings-attached economic assistance, and political support to 
resource-rich developing nations to obtain energy and other importance 
resources, but this paper finds that, in the context of Cambodia, China’s motives 
are more strategic than economic. China charms Cambodia not for short term 
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economic benefits, but rather for long term strategic and political gains. China 
is indifferent to Cambodia’s limited resources, but finds Cambodia’s strategic 
geographical location vitally important to increase its influence in the region.  
 
The empirical findings of this research contribute significantly to the existing 
theoretical debate and policy development in Cambodia. On a theoretical level, 
this research contributes to narrowing the gap in the literature on the impact of 
China’s investment and aid by emphasizing the impact on local communities. 
Building on relevant theories, this study proposes a useful and replicable 
framework to study the impact of hydropower by focusing on the community 
and linking the livelihood of the affected people directly to the impact of the 
dam. This research also contributes to the theoretical debate among economists 
about the type of development that China brings to Cambodia by examining the 
positive and negative aspects of a dam and by focusing on the local 
communities affected. The findings of this research in the Cambodian context 
also offer another angle of analysis of the way China employs its diplomacy and 
soft power in different countries around the world. 
 
On a policy level, this research contributes to the development of the national 
sustainable energy policy. Cambodia’s energy insecurity is harming its 
competitiveness and constraining growth. The government needs to put in place 
proper policy to remedy the situation. This research used scientific methods to 
study the pros and cons of hydropower, the most important source of energy 
which, according to the national plan, will contribute more than 50% to the total 
power supply by 2020. The findings of this research provide concrete evidence 
from the community level and offer useful input and recommendations for 
policy makers to promote sustainable energy development in Cambodia. 
 
 
CHAPTER 1:  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Background  
 
As a result of war and internal conflict, the lack of good governance, and poor 
natural resource management, Cambodia has remained one of the poorest 
countries in the world.  The country has experienced multiple political and 
social changes that have served as a stumbling block to development. It was 
only after the restoration of peace and stability in 1993 that serious efforts have 
been made to develop its economy. Since then, Cambodia has enjoyed 
remarkable economic growth and poverty reduction. Its GDP per capita has 
more than doubled for the past 10 years from just US$ 406 in 2004 to US$ 
1,007 in 2013 (World Bank, 2014). The poverty rate more than halved, 
from 53% in 2004 to 20.5% in 2011 (World Bank, 2014). 
 
Foreign investment inflows and foreign aid are the drivers of economic 
development and liberalization in Cambodia. Cambodia started to receive an 
inflow of foreign investment in 1994 and has since been a popular destination 
for investors from China, South Korea, the United States, Malaysia and 
Thailand due mainly to its favorable investment climate and low labor costs. 
The investment projects approved rose rapidly, increasing from just US$2.3 
billion in 1995, to US$10.89 billion in 2008 (CDC, 2011). By September 2011, 
China’s investment had reached US$8.8 billion, making it the largest investor in 
the Kingdom, followed by South Korea (US$ 4 billion), Malaysia (US$ 2.6 
billion), the United Kingdom (US$ 2.3 billion) and the United States of 
America (US$1.2 billion) (CDC, 2012). 
 
Development assistance has also contributed significantly to the development 
process of Cambodia. Over the period 1992 to 2011, a total of US$ 12.13 
billion has been disbursed to Cambodia by development partners such as the 
EU, Japan, USA, ADB, the World Bank (CDC, 2012). In recent years, non 
traditional donors have played an increasingly important role. Among them, 
China is the largest emerging donor for Cambodia, providing about US$2.7 
billion in loans and grants since 1992 (CDC, 2012). Unlike development aid 
from the West, which often comes with conditions attached, China offers aid 
without any reform requirements and is pledged to states regardless of their 
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human right record, political transparency and any environmental consequences 
that might occur. While most Western aid comes in the form of direct financial 
support, the majority of Chinese aid is in the form of concessional loans and 
mainly concentrates on infrastructure projects which are built by Chinese firms 
bringing laborers from China. 
 
China’s different style of providing development cooperation has challenged 
the traditional policies and influenced the reassessment of the Washington 
Consensus1. The flexibility of China’s aid to meet developing countries’ 
specific conditions has been well received and questions are being asked 
whether China provides a new model for development and growth for 
developing countries. This research contributes to the assessment of this 
proposition using Cambodia as a case study. 
 
1.1.1. China’s investment and aid in Cambodia 
China is one of the most prominent foreign players in Cambodia. A century-old 
relationship between China and Cambodia has allowed the two nations to 
establish close diplomatic, political and economic ties. Presently, China is 
Cambodia’s top foreign investor, a major donor, and an increasingly important 
trading partner. However, its strong dominance is not without controversies 
(Pheakdey, 2012). 
 
The Cambodian government warmly welcomes China’s investment and aid, 
claiming it has contributed to the country’s growth. Chinese investment in 
Cambodia’s garment industry has boosted exports and generated local 
employment (Ouch, Saing and Phann, 2011). Investment in hydropower can 
potentially provide electricity to some, if not all, of the 65 per cent of the 
population who currently do not have access to reliable electricity (MIME, 
2014). The government is also expected to benefit financially through tax and 
royalties from Chinese investment in mining, oil and gas. China’s so-called, ‘no 
strings attached’, aid has also been used to build roads and bridges, helping to 
improve the country’s much needed infrastructure. 
                                                      
1 Washington Consensus is a set of specific economic policy prescriptions that constituted the 
"standard" reform package promoted by the Western countries.  Development aid under this 
consensus is conditional coming with reform requirements for good governance. 
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But critics argue that behind these generous money injections lie hidden 
agendas and serious social and political implications (Pheakdey, 2012; Dahles, 
2013; Khun, 2014). While Chinese investment and aid is much needed for 
economic development, China’s unquestioning approach to how its aid and 
investment money is distributed and used has exacerbated corruption, 
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1 Washington Consensus is a set of specific economic policy prescriptions that constituted the 
"standard" reform package promoted by the Western countries.  Development aid under this 
consensus is conditional coming with reform requirements for good governance. 
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Cambodia. Due to insufficient domestic energy production Cambodia relies 
almost entirely on the import of diesel and heavy oil, for electricity generation. 
Apart from Burma, Cambodia has the lowest electrification rate in the region—
only 35 percent of its entire population has access to reliable electricity, while 
its electricity price is one of the highest in the world. The high cost of energy 
imposes a heavy financial burden on the majority of low-income households, 
deprives the poor rural population of access to electricity and drives potential 
investors away. Cambodia’s woefully inadequate supply of power is one of the 
main structural problems affecting the country’s competitiveness. To solve the 
current energy shortage and to meet future electricity demand, which has been 
predicted to increase fivefold by 2020 (World Bank, 2006), Cambodia states in 
its power development plan (2008-2020) to improve domestic hydropower 
production so that it will contribute more than 50% to total power supply by 
2020 (MIME, 2012). 
 
The second reason for choosing hydropower as the main focus of this study is 
the dominance of Chinese investment in this sector. China has now become a 
leading investor in natural resources and the energy sector. In fact, 92% of total 
energy investment approved from 1998-2008 came from China (CDC, 2011). 
According to the Ministry of Mines and Energy, so far Chinese firms have 
invested more than US$ 1.6 billion to build six dams with a total capacity of 
928 megawatts. These include the recently completed 193 megawatt Kamchay 
dam in Kampot province, the 18 megawatt Kirirom III dam, the 246 megawatt 
Stung Tatay dam and the 338 megawatt Russei Chrum Krom dam, the 108 
megawatt Chhay Areng da in Koh Kong Provice, and the 120 megawatt Stung 
Atay dam in Pursat province. Strong political and financial support from both 
governments is believed to be the explanations for the prevalence of Chinese 
investment in this sector.  
 
Finally, investment in hydropower deserves to be studied because it is currently 
one of the most contentious issues in Cambodia. Different stakeholders hold 
differing views. The government justifies the investment in this sector with the 
economic benefits it is projected to bring. Hydropower projects help boost 
domestic electricity generation, contribute to improving electricity access, 
accelerate investment and create jobs for the local people. This in turn translates 
into an economic gain for the community and households. Civil society, on the 
other hand, has voiced concerns over the social and environmental 
consequences of the investment. For instance, a US-based NGO International 
 
River and local NGO Forum has warned that “Poorly conceived hydropower 
development could irreparably damage Cambodia’s natural resources and 
environment.” They added that “Chinese companies …. are racing to exploit 
Cambodia’s hydropower resources whilst paying little regard to international 
best development practices” (Middleton, 2008, p. 5).  
 
1.2. Research Aims and Objectives 
The overall aim of this study is to analyze the roles and motives of China’s 
investment and aid in Cambodia’s energy sector and explore its impact on and 
implications for the development of local community. The specific objectives 
are:  
- Explore the implications of China’s large inflow of large scale 
investment and aid in Cambodia. 
- Examine the role that China plays in Cambodia’s under-developed 
energy sector. 
- Identify the impact of a China-funded hydropower dam on the 
livelihood of a local community. 
- Analyze China’s motive for its diplomacy in Cambodia in the broader 
context of China’s global rise. 
 
1.3. Research Questions 
To address the above objectives, the following questions will be raised:  
 
Main question: 
 What is the underlying rationale for Chinese investments and aid in 
Cambodia’s energy sector and how do these financial injections affect 
the sustainability of local communities?  
 
Sub-questions: 
• What are the economic, social and political implications of the 
Cambodia-China relation? 
• What role does China play in Cambodia’s energy sector? 
• How has  the China-funded Kamchay Dam project affected the 
livelihood of local community? 
• In the context of China’s global resource diplomacy, what motives does 
China have for its relations with Cambodia? 
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1.4. Theoretical Framework 
This study investigates the impact of Chinese investments in hydropower on the 
livelihood of local community by proposing a framework that is built on the 
literature of foreign direct investment (FDI), stakeholder theory and sustainable 
development. I started with a review of literature on the link between FDI and 
the three pillars of sustainable development (economic, environment and 
society). But because different types of FDI have different effects depending on 
a range of variables, I focus on FDI in the energy sector and in hydropower, in 
particular.  The literature review found one recurring issue. In the context of 
hydropower project, one of the key stakeholders, the community, is often 
ignored in the consultation process, although there is abundant evidence 
suggesting that stakeholder engagement is critical for any development project. 
The proposed framework in this study, which integrates stakeholder theory and 
the principles of sustainable hydropower, adds to the existing literature, and is 
useful in ensuring that the community as a stakeholder is placed in the forefront 
in the hydropower development projects. 
 
 
1.4.1. FDI and sustainable development 
 
Foreign direct investment and sustainable development is an emerging 
paradigm in the literature. In the 1990s, when global overseas development 
assistance (ODA) dropped by more than half, FDI became the largest 
alternative source of private capital to finance national development 
(Gardiner, 2002). In the late 1990s, the world saw an unprecedented surge of 
FDI flow.  In 2000, global FDI inflows soared to US$1.5 trillion (four percent 
of global GDP) compared to a mere US$58 billion annual average from 1970 
to 1990 (Gallagher and Zarsky, 2007).  
 
The relationship between FDI and sustainable development is no less 
contentious than the concept of sustainable development. A literature review 
reveals mixed and often contradictory findings. On the one hand, FDI is seen 
as a useful tool in creating an enabling environment for ecologically sound 
economic and social development (Granger, 2003). On the other hand, FDI 
has been blamed for the environmental degradation of the host countries 
(Herman, Chisholm, Leavell, 2004). Since it is virtually not possible to 
estimate precisely the net impact of FDI on sustainable development, scholars 
 
and researchers turn to study the relationship of FDI with the three pillars of 
sustainable development (i.e. economy, society and environment). The 
following sections review the main discussion on these aspects. 
 
1.4.2. FDI and economic growth 
 
Endogenous growth theory suggests that FDI helps promote economic growth 
of the host country. Firstly, FDI provides additional capital to supplement 
local savings for investment, thus helping to fill the savings gap and the 
foreign exchange gap of the host country.2 Secondly, FDI generates positive 
externalities and spillovers. Multinational Corporations (MNCs) bring to 
recipient countries new technology, management methods and help stimulate 
competition and improve the allocation of resources, all of which may 
contribute to an increase in local productivity and consumer welfare. It is for 
the above reasons that FDI is claimed to be able to break the vicious circle of 
poverty: low levels of productivity lead to low wages, which lead to low 
levels of saving, which lead to low levels of investment, which perpetuate low 
levels of productivity (Moran, 1998). Thirdly, with the opening of new 
subsidiaries or branches, foreign investment creates local employment and 
with modern organizational and managerial techniques they bring along, FDI 
has the potential to improve the labor standards and human resource 
development styles of the host countries.  
 
However, empirical evidence has shown that the relationship between FDI 
and economic growth is far less definitive than the theory predicts. There is a 
plethora of literature on the economic impact of FDI, producing mixed results 
depending on the data, variables and method used in the study. 
Macroeconomic country studies generally find a positive role of FDI in 
accelerating economic growth (see Graham, 1995; De Mello, 1999; Li and Liu, 
2005). Several country-specific studies have produced similar results (see 
Kohpaiboon, 2003; Marwah and Tavakoli, 2004; Vu, Gannes and Noy, 2008; 
Cuyvers, Soeng, Plasmans and Bulcke, 2008). 
 
                                                      
2 According to the two-gap model in development economics, the development of less 
developed countries (LDCs) is constrained by two gaps: the saving gap (the difference between 
domestic savings and the investment) and the foreign exchange gap (the difference between 
imports and exports). For details, see Chenery and Strout (1966) 
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Other cross-countries studies suggest that FDI is beneficial for economic 
growth only under certain conditions (see Blostrom et al.,1994;  
Balasubramanyam  et  al.,1996; Borensztein et al., 1998; Hermes and Lensick, 
2000; Alfaro et al., 2004; Azman-Saini et al., 2010; Durham (2004). Other 
studies find no robust relationship between FDI inflows and economic growth 
(see: Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Hanson, 2001; Lensink and Morrissey, 2006; 
Carkovic and Levine, 2005; Herzer, Klasen and Lehmann, 2008). 
 
1.4.3. FDI and the environment 
 
Two conflicting theories address the link between FDI and the environment. 
One theory suggests that FDI has the potential to bring environmental benefits 
to host economies. The main argument of this theory, known as “pollution 
haloes”, lies in the technology spillover to the host countries (Blackman and 
Vu, 1998; Zarsky,1999; and OECD, 2002). It is generally believed that 
multinational corporations have more environmentally friendly technologies 
and advanced environmental management systems which they diffuse to host 
countries. Seeing the improved efficiency, on the one hand, and to remain 
competitive on the other hand, the domestic firms will imitate the foreign firms 
and adopt similar practices. The process of which will increase the overall 
environmental standards in the country. The “pollution haven” theory, on the 
other hand, postulates that FDI may have detrimental impacts on host country’s 
ecosystem. Seeking comparative advantage for maximum profit, MNCs will 
seek to locate their investment in countries where the environmental policies are 
less stringent. As a consequence, host countries are either tempted to relax their 
environmental standard to attract more FDI, the phenomenon known as “race to 
the bottom”, or refrain from enacting stricter environmental standards in 
response to fears of losing a competitive edge against other countries in 
obtaining FDI, the concept referred to as “regulatory chill” (Sandbrook and 
Mehta, 2002; Cole, Elliott and Fredriksson, 2006). 
 
Empirically, the conclusion as to which theory is correct remains ambiguous. 
There is little evidence to support the pollution haloes theory. Blackman and Vu 
(1998), Zarsky (1999), and OECD (2002) suggest that pollution haloes may 
exist in sectors where the adoption of environmentally friendly technology 
leads to considerable economic saving. Warhust (1999) concludes from his 25 
case studies that the technological spillover of FDI does not occur 
automatically; effect mechanisms need to be jointly established by both 
 
suppliers of technologies and recipients to capture the improvement in 
environmental performance. Evidence in favor of the “pollution haven” 
hypothesis exists but is just as unconvincing. Case studies in resource and 
pollution-intensive industries such as mining and oil, generally find severe 
environmental degradation and pollution (See Sandbrook and Mehta, 2002) and 
suggest that lower environmental regulations do influence locational preference 
of the investors (Mabey and McNally, 1999). Using panel data from 33 
countries, Cole, Elliott and Fredriksson (2006) find FDI to affect environmental 
policy, leading to less stringent regulations, thus contributing to the creation of 
a pollution haven when the local government has high degree of corruptibility.  
 
1.4.4. FDI and social development 
 
The social impacts of FDI are probably the least explored aspects of the FDI-
sustainable development nexus. Mainstream economists generally assume a 
positive interaction between economic and social development. In such 
assumption, if FDI is believed to contribute to economic growth then it should 
also be positively related to social development of the host countries. The 
social impacts of FDI may occur through job creation, investment in human 
capital, wage increases, and poverty alleviation (Kitenge Kingombe, 2002). 
However, this hypothesis has not been thoroughly tested; the empirical 
evidence of the social consequences of FDI is far from abundant, while 
existing studies generate mixed findings. 
FDI in certain sectors, especially labor intensive and infrastructure sectors, 
can make a substantial direct and indirect contribution to poverty reduction 
(Aaron, 1999). With regard to income equality and FDI, there are two 
competing hypotheses: the “modernization” hypothesis and the “dependency” 
hypothesis. According to the former hypothesis, investment fosters growth 
and its benefits, although not equally distributed at the early stage of 
development, will eventually spread throughout the whole economy (see Tsai, 
1995). There is, however, little empirical evidence to support this claim. The 
dependency theory, on the other hand, suggests that FDI from developed 
countries is harmful to the long-term economic growth of developing nations. It 
argued that developing countries are inadequately compensated for their natural 
resources, and are thereby sentenced to conditions of continuing poverty. This 
causes distortion, hinders growth, and increases income inequality in 
developing countries (See Choi, 2006; Stringer, 2006;). Other studies, 
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however, find no strong association between FDI and income inequality 
(Hemmer, Krüger & Seith, 2005; Sylwester, 2005). 
FDI may also affect other social aspects of the host country. Braunstein (2006) 
conducts a review of research and policy on the gender impact of FDI and 
concludes that there exists a positive relationship between women’s 
employment and FDI in semi-industrialized countries, but there is also 
mounting evidence that women either lose jobs to more highly qualified men as 
industries upgrade, or get pushed down the production chain into subcontracted 
work as competition forces firms to continually lower costs. OECD (2008) 
assesses the effects of FDI on wages and working conditions for workers of 
foreign affiliates of MNCs and those of their independent supplier firms and 
claims that MNCs tend to provide better pay than their domestic counterparts, 
especially when they operate in developing and emerging economies, but not 
necessarily better non-wage working conditions. On another social aspect, Pinto 
and Zhu (2008) find that FDI is associated with lower corruption levels in 
developed and democratic countries, and with higher levels of corruption levels 
in less developed and non-democratic countries. 
 
Summing up, the review of the literature above shows that the relationship 
between FDI and sustainable development is complicated and multi-faceted. 
On the one hand, there are conflicting theories; on the other, empirical 
evidence is mixed, leaving no clear-cut link between the two concepts. The 
impact of FDI differs greatly depending on the many variables, such as type 
and size of investment, the host country’s policy and level of development. 
Moran, Graham and Blomstrom (2005, p. 375) put it this way: “….a search 
for a universal result of FDI on developing country economy is simply 
misguided.” FDI can have dramatically differing impacts. Given the great 
diversity of FDI it is more useful to study the impacts of FDI on a case-by-
case basis or at least on sector basis (agriculture, service, industry or 
infrastructure). Therefore, to gain a better understanding on the topic of this 
research, it is necessary to review the current debate on FDI in energy sector 
and its contribution to sustainable development.  
 
1.4.5. Energy and sustainable development 
 
The WCED (1987) report recognizes energy as a human basic need that must 
be fulfilled to achieve sustainable development. Energy is important for 
 
growth because production is a function of capital, labor, and energy. Most of 
the economic activities including production, distribution and service require 
energy in some form. Energy alone is clearly not sufficient for creating the 
conditions for economic growth, but it is certainly necessary. The 
International Energy Agency studied the factors contributing to the rapid 
growth of several countries during 1980-2001 and found that energy 
contributes significantly to economic growth in all of the sample countries and 
was the leading driver of growth in Brazil, Turkey and Korea (IEA, 2004). 
They also found that the lack of investment in public utilities, inefficient 
management, under-pricing and unattractive climate for private investment 
cause energy shortages and hinder economic growth and development in 
many developing countries.   
 
The production and consumption of energy place a wide range of pressure on 
the environment. The use of fossil fuel, which accounts for 82 per cent of 
global primary energy consumption, creates a range of environmental 
problems (IEA, 2013).  The burning of oil, for example, produces a large 
amount of CO2 which causes global warming. During oil production, harmful 
gasses and waste materials are produced, contaminating groundwater and 
causing air pollution. Incidents such as oil spills during the transportation of 
oil pose additional damage to ecology. Similarly, coal mining creates toxic 
wastes, water and air pollution. Coal and coal waste products release toxic 
chemicals which kill approximately one million people annually across the 
world.  To reduce the environmental impact, there is a concerted effort to 
promote the use of renewable energy (wind, water, the sun, biomass and 
geothermal energy), and enhance energy efficiency. The UN’s “Sustainable 
Energy for All” initiative has already laid out plans to double the use of 
renewable energy and double the global rate of improvement of energy 
efficiency by 2030.  Increasing the share of energy from renewable sources 
not only reduces greenhouse gas emissions, but also fosters economic growth 
and improves the energy security of developing countries. Similarly, investing 
in energy efficiency increases global resource productivity, supports economic 
growth, and reduces costs for all citizens. 
 
Energy services contribute to social development by improving education, 
public health and enabling basic human needs to be met. Access to electricity 
allows children to study after dark and increases a household’s overall 
productivity. Agricultural yields can be improved because electricity allows 
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water to be pumped for crops; foods and medicines can last longer because 
electricity makes refrigeration possible. Electricity also relieves women from 
the time-consuming and dangerous task of traveling long distances to gather 
wood for cooking and heating. Currently, 1.3 billion people globally still lack 
electricity (IEA, 2014). Not having access to electricity not only deprives 
people of such basic necessities as lighting and communication, but also 
hampers productivity and economic development. The WHO predicts that if 
half of the global households could have access to cleaner cooking sources, 
families would save US$ 34 billion per year, generating an economic return of 
US$ 105 billion per year over a ten-year period (WHO, 2006).   
Today over 80% of world energy is provided from thermal sources, i.e. coal, 
gas and oil (IEA, 2010) but there are growing global concerns regarding the 
lack of sustainability of these forms of energy. The significant environmental 
consequences of thermal energy sources have placed greater emphasis on 
sustainable energy policies that include the development of renewable energy 
supplies. Renewable energy technology exists in many forms, but among them, 
hydropower represents more than 92 percent of all renewable energy generated, 
and continues to stand as one of the most viable sources of new generation into 
the future (IEA, 2010). Over the past two decades, hydropower has been an 
important renewable energy source to response to the rapid increase in global 
energy demand. Hydropower generated 3,288 TWh of electricity, accounting 
for 17% of world electricity production, making it by far the most important 
renewable energy for global power generation (IEA, 2010). However, attitudes 
towards hydropower have changed as result of the changes in society’s values. 
At the present, the increased awareness in environmental and social issues has 
led to a growing debate on the benefits and consequences of hydropower. This 
study focuses on the link between hydropower and sustainable development. 
On the positive side, hydropower is claimed to make a significant contribution 
to sustainable development in many ways. Economically, hydropower produces 
reliable energy, with low operating costs, helps foster industrial development, 
generates revenues for the government through sale of electricity and, in 
essence, offers energy independence for many countries. Unlike the traditional 
energy sources which pollute the environment, hydropower provides clean and 
renewable energy, contributing to the reduction of air pollution and the fight 
against climate change. Hydropower may also provide many social benefits.  In 
addition to generating electricity, dams can be used to improve irrigation and 
 
build flood control systems. The construction of dams creates jobs for local 
people and may improve local infrastructure. Hydropower also enhances equity 
between present and future generations because it does not deplete natural 
resources, leaving them for the future generations (IHA, 2003).  
 
On the negative side, hydropower is blamed for causing negative environmental 
impacts and social disruption, including the loss of vital components of 
ecosystems, loss of livelihood for local communities, involuntary 
resettlement, and undermining indigenous and minority groups (McCully and 
Wong, 2004). According to the World Commission on Dams3, which 
reviewed 125 large dams in 56 countries, “dams have made a significant and 
considerable contribution to human development, … but in too many cases an 
unacceptable and often unnecessary price has been paid to secure those 
benefits, especially in social and environmental terms, by people displaced, by 
communities downstream, by taxpayers and by the natural environment” 
(WCD, 2000, p. 7). Furthermore, the Commission found that as many as 40-
80 million people have been forced from their homes and lands as result of 
large dams. Displaced people frequently face extreme economic hardship, 
community disintegration, and an increase in mental and physical health 
problems. Large dams also cause great environmental damage, including the 
extinction of many fish and other aquatic species, huge losses of forest, 
wetlands and farmland. The benefits of large dams have largely gone to the 
rich while the poor have borne the costs (WCD, 2000).  
 
To maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of dams, the World 
Commission on Dams and the International Hydropower Association (IHA) 
have published a set of guidelines to promote greater consideration of 
environmental, social and economic aspects in the sustainability assessment of 
new hydro projects and the management and operation of existing power 
schemes. Among other things, comprehensive stakeholder participation is the 
focus of recommendations. Both organizations place the importance on the 
need to engage all stakeholders, recognize entitlements and share benefits 
with directly affected people.  The goal is to minimize the risk and to ensure 
that all individuals and communities affected by these developments gain 
sustainable benefits (see Imhof, Wong, Bosshard, 2002; the International 
                                                      
3 The World Commission on Dams (WCD) was established by the World Bank and The World 
Conservation Union in May 1998 in response to the growing opposition to large dams. Its main task was 
to research the environmental, social and economic impacts of the development of large dams globally.  
Chinese investment and aid in Cambodia’s energy sector: impacts and policy implications
13
 
water to be pumped for crops; foods and medicines can last longer because 
electricity makes refrigeration possible. Electricity also relieves women from 
the time-consuming and dangerous task of traveling long distances to gather 
wood for cooking and heating. Currently, 1.3 billion people globally still lack 
electricity (IEA, 2014). Not having access to electricity not only deprives 
people of such basic necessities as lighting and communication, but also 
hampers productivity and economic development. The WHO predicts that if 
half of the global households could have access to cleaner cooking sources, 
families would save US$ 34 billion per year, generating an economic return of 
US$ 105 billion per year over a ten-year period (WHO, 2006).   
Today over 80% of world energy is provided from thermal sources, i.e. coal, 
gas and oil (IEA, 2010) but there are growing global concerns regarding the 
lack of sustainability of these forms of energy. The significant environmental 
consequences of thermal energy sources have placed greater emphasis on 
sustainable energy policies that include the development of renewable energy 
supplies. Renewable energy technology exists in many forms, but among them, 
hydropower represents more than 92 percent of all renewable energy generated, 
and continues to stand as one of the most viable sources of new generation into 
the future (IEA, 2010). Over the past two decades, hydropower has been an 
important renewable energy source to response to the rapid increase in global 
energy demand. Hydropower generated 3,288 TWh of electricity, accounting 
for 17% of world electricity production, making it by far the most important 
renewable energy for global power generation (IEA, 2010). However, attitudes 
towards hydropower have changed as result of the changes in society’s values. 
At the present, the increased awareness in environmental and social issues has 
led to a growing debate on the benefits and consequences of hydropower. This 
study focuses on the link between hydropower and sustainable development. 
On the positive side, hydropower is claimed to make a significant contribution 
to sustainable development in many ways. Economically, hydropower produces 
reliable energy, with low operating costs, helps foster industrial development, 
generates revenues for the government through sale of electricity and, in 
essence, offers energy independence for many countries. Unlike the traditional 
energy sources which pollute the environment, hydropower provides clean and 
renewable energy, contributing to the reduction of air pollution and the fight 
against climate change. Hydropower may also provide many social benefits.  In 
addition to generating electricity, dams can be used to improve irrigation and 
 
build flood control systems. The construction of dams creates jobs for local 
people and may improve local infrastructure. Hydropower also enhances equity 
between present and future generations because it does not deplete natural 
resources, leaving them for the future generations (IHA, 2003).  
 
On the negative side, hydropower is blamed for causing negative environmental 
impacts and social disruption, including the loss of vital components of 
ecosystems, loss of livelihood for local communities, involuntary 
resettlement, and undermining indigenous and minority groups (McCully and 
Wong, 2004). According to the World Commission on Dams3, which 
reviewed 125 large dams in 56 countries, “dams have made a significant and 
considerable contribution to human development, … but in too many cases an 
unacceptable and often unnecessary price has been paid to secure those 
benefits, especially in social and environmental terms, by people displaced, by 
communities downstream, by taxpayers and by the natural environment” 
(WCD, 2000, p. 7). Furthermore, the Commission found that as many as 40-
80 million people have been forced from their homes and lands as result of 
large dams. Displaced people frequently face extreme economic hardship, 
community disintegration, and an increase in mental and physical health 
problems. Large dams also cause great environmental damage, including the 
extinction of many fish and other aquatic species, huge losses of forest, 
wetlands and farmland. The benefits of large dams have largely gone to the 
rich while the poor have borne the costs (WCD, 2000).  
 
To maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of dams, the World 
Commission on Dams and the International Hydropower Association (IHA) 
have published a set of guidelines to promote greater consideration of 
environmental, social and economic aspects in the sustainability assessment of 
new hydro projects and the management and operation of existing power 
schemes. Among other things, comprehensive stakeholder participation is the 
focus of recommendations. Both organizations place the importance on the 
need to engage all stakeholders, recognize entitlements and share benefits 
with directly affected people.  The goal is to minimize the risk and to ensure 
that all individuals and communities affected by these developments gain 
sustainable benefits (see Imhof, Wong, Bosshard, 2002; the International 
                                                      
3 The World Commission on Dams (WCD) was established by the World Bank and The World 
Conservation Union in May 1998 in response to the growing opposition to large dams. Its main task was 
to research the environmental, social and economic impacts of the development of large dams globally.  
Chinese investment and aid in Cambodia’s energy sector: impacts and policy implications
14
 
Hydropower Association, 2004). The section below discusses stakeholder 
involvement in hydropower project. 
 1.4.6. Stakeholder and hydropower project 
The concept of stakeholder participation originated in the business domain, but 
its use has gained popularity in many fields including law, public 
administration, health care and environmental policy (Freeman et al., 2010). 
Freeman (1984, p. 15) defines a stakeholder in the business context as “any 
group or individual who can affect, or is affected by, the achievement of a 
corporation’s purpose”. However, in the context of social policy, a stakeholder 
is referred to any entity with a declared or conceivable interest, or stake in a 
policy concern (World Bank, 2000). Stakeholders can be of any form, size and 
capacity. They can be individuals, organizations, or unorganized groups. 
Stakeholder engagement, thus, may be conceptualized as a consultation process 
that ensures that those people are aware of any changes that are to take place, 
and are able to adequately take part in the decision making process and the 
future direction of a project activity.  
 
Engaging stakeholders in a project provides a number of benefits. First, when 
people are involved with projects, policies or programs, they have a sense of 
ownership and they care about outcomes and work to ensure the benefits last 
(Richards et al., 2004). Secondly, transparent and inclusive engagement builds 
trust in relationships, minimizes conflict and resistance and promotes long term 
acceptance of change (Richards et al., 2004). Thirdly, effective dialogue in the 
initial phases of project development can identify potential conflicts, and enable 
the early resolution of contentious issues (Pomeroy 1995). 
Fourthly, participatory processes should lead to higher quality decisions, as they 
are based on more complete information, drawing from a diversity of 
perspectives (Beierle, 2002). Finally, stakeholder participation promotes equity 
and active citizenship by reducing the likelihood that those on the periphery of 
the decision-making context or society are marginalized (Martin and 
Sherington, 1997). 
 
Reed (2008) reviews the literature on stakeholder participation for 
environmental management and summarizes eight key features of best 
participation practice that have emerged from the literature. (1) Stakeholder 
participation needs to be underpinned by a philosophy that emphasizes 
empowerment, equity, trust and learning. (2) To reach high quality and 
 
durable decisions, stakeholder participation should be considered as early as 
possible, and throughout the process. (3) Relevant stakeholders need to be 
represented systematically. This can be done using stakeholder analysis to 
identify stakeholders, differentiate them and investigate their relationships. (4) 
Moreover, in order to design an appropriate process using relevant tools, clear 
objectives for the participatory process need to be agreed among stakeholders 
at the outset. (5) Methods should be selected and tailored to the decision-
making context, considering the objectives, type of participants and 
appropriate level of engagement. (6) Local and scientific knowledge should be 
integrated and (7) highly skilled facilitation is essential. (8) Finally, the long-
term success of participatory processes depends on institutionally embedding 
stakeholder participation. Thus, to overcome many of its limitations, 
stakeholder participation must be institutionalized, creating an organizational 
culture that can facilitate processes. 
 
In the context of hydropower, the WCD stresses that no dam should be built 
without the “free, prior and informed consent” of the affected people. The 
Commission offers four policy principles for gaining public acceptance. First, 
recognition of rights, and assessment of risks  are  the  basis  for  the  
identification  and  inclusion  of stakeholders in decision making. Second, 
information, legal and other support must be made available to all 
stakeholders, particularly indigenous and tribal peoples, women and other 
vulnerable groups, to enable their informed participation in decision-making 
processes. Third, demonstrable public acceptance of all key decisions must be 
sought through agreements negotiated in an open and transparent process, 
conducted in good faith and with the informed participation of all 
stakeholders. Finally, free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) should be 
obtained from indigenous and tribal peoples. The principle of FPIC holds that 
consent must be freely given, obtained prior to implementation of activities 
and be founded upon an understanding of the full range of issues implicated 
by the activity, or decision in question (WCD, 2000). 
 
Despite all these recommendations, hydropower development in practice often 
lacks comprehensive stakeholder participation. The community is a key 
stakeholder in hydropower projects, and is the one that is directly affected and 
thus the one who should be thoroughly consulted. However, experience shows 
that this is not the case. An estimated 40-80 million people worldwide have 
been displaced from their community because of dam construction (WCD, 
Chinese investment and aid in Cambodia’s energy sector: impacts and policy implications
15
 
Hydropower Association, 2004). The section below discusses stakeholder 
involvement in hydropower project. 
 1.4.6. Stakeholder and hydropower project 
The concept of stakeholder participation originated in the business domain, but 
its use has gained popularity in many fields including law, public 
administration, health care and environmental policy (Freeman et al., 2010). 
Freeman (1984, p. 15) defines a stakeholder in the business context as “any 
group or individual who can affect, or is affected by, the achievement of a 
corporation’s purpose”. However, in the context of social policy, a stakeholder 
is referred to any entity with a declared or conceivable interest, or stake in a 
policy concern (World Bank, 2000). Stakeholders can be of any form, size and 
capacity. They can be individuals, organizations, or unorganized groups. 
Stakeholder engagement, thus, may be conceptualized as a consultation process 
that ensures that those people are aware of any changes that are to take place, 
and are able to adequately take part in the decision making process and the 
future direction of a project activity.  
 
Engaging stakeholders in a project provides a number of benefits. First, when 
people are involved with projects, policies or programs, they have a sense of 
ownership and they care about outcomes and work to ensure the benefits last 
(Richards et al., 2004). Secondly, transparent and inclusive engagement builds 
trust in relationships, minimizes conflict and resistance and promotes long term 
acceptance of change (Richards et al., 2004). Thirdly, effective dialogue in the 
initial phases of project development can identify potential conflicts, and enable 
the early resolution of contentious issues (Pomeroy 1995). 
Fourthly, participatory processes should lead to higher quality decisions, as they 
are based on more complete information, drawing from a diversity of 
perspectives (Beierle, 2002). Finally, stakeholder participation promotes equity 
and active citizenship by reducing the likelihood that those on the periphery of 
the decision-making context or society are marginalized (Martin and 
Sherington, 1997). 
 
Reed (2008) reviews the literature on stakeholder participation for 
environmental management and summarizes eight key features of best 
participation practice that have emerged from the literature. (1) Stakeholder 
participation needs to be underpinned by a philosophy that emphasizes 
empowerment, equity, trust and learning. (2) To reach high quality and 
 
durable decisions, stakeholder participation should be considered as early as 
possible, and throughout the process. (3) Relevant stakeholders need to be 
represented systematically. This can be done using stakeholder analysis to 
identify stakeholders, differentiate them and investigate their relationships. (4) 
Moreover, in order to design an appropriate process using relevant tools, clear 
objectives for the participatory process need to be agreed among stakeholders 
at the outset. (5) Methods should be selected and tailored to the decision-
making context, considering the objectives, type of participants and 
appropriate level of engagement. (6) Local and scientific knowledge should be 
integrated and (7) highly skilled facilitation is essential. (8) Finally, the long-
term success of participatory processes depends on institutionally embedding 
stakeholder participation. Thus, to overcome many of its limitations, 
stakeholder participation must be institutionalized, creating an organizational 
culture that can facilitate processes. 
 
In the context of hydropower, the WCD stresses that no dam should be built 
without the “free, prior and informed consent” of the affected people. The 
Commission offers four policy principles for gaining public acceptance. First, 
recognition of rights, and assessment of risks  are  the  basis  for  the  
identification  and  inclusion  of stakeholders in decision making. Second, 
information, legal and other support must be made available to all 
stakeholders, particularly indigenous and tribal peoples, women and other 
vulnerable groups, to enable their informed participation in decision-making 
processes. Third, demonstrable public acceptance of all key decisions must be 
sought through agreements negotiated in an open and transparent process, 
conducted in good faith and with the informed participation of all 
stakeholders. Finally, free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) should be 
obtained from indigenous and tribal peoples. The principle of FPIC holds that 
consent must be freely given, obtained prior to implementation of activities 
and be founded upon an understanding of the full range of issues implicated 
by the activity, or decision in question (WCD, 2000). 
 
Despite all these recommendations, hydropower development in practice often 
lacks comprehensive stakeholder participation. The community is a key 
stakeholder in hydropower projects, and is the one that is directly affected and 
thus the one who should be thoroughly consulted. However, experience shows 
that this is not the case. An estimated 40-80 million people worldwide have 
been displaced from their community because of dam construction (WCD, 
Chinese investment and aid in Cambodia’s energy sector: impacts and policy implications
16
 
2000). Most often the displacement is involuntary and those displaced “face a 
broad range of impoverishment risks that include landlessness, joblessness, 
homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, increased morbidity, loss of 
common resources and community disarticulation that result in a loss in socio-
cultural resilience” (WCD, 2000, p. 10). It is thus critically important that the 
community have ownership of the process and decision making in the planning 
and development of hydropower. This study proposes a framework that 
combines stakeholder theory and sustainable hydropower principles to study the 
impact of Chinese investment in Cambodia’s hydropower sector on the 
livelihood of local community. 
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Economically speaking, hydropower has the potential to contribute positively to 
growth due to its vital role in the energy system. However, sustainable 
hydropower development means that the economic benefits must be shared 
among all the stakeholders, in particular, the affected communities. In this 
regard, local communities should be given support and opportunities to improve 
their livelihood (Klimpt et al., 2002). This may include providing access to the 
dam’s electricity at an affordable price, creating employment and other 
economic opportunities, building local people’s capacity through training and 
skill development, renovating or building local infrastructure such as schools, 
hospitals, roads, bridges, market places or tourist facilities. 
 
The construction and operation of hydropower dams may cause a range of 
environmental and health issues. For example, building a dam involves building 
a reservoir which requires inundating vast areas of land or forest that was once 
habitat for animals. A dam also acts as a barrier between the upstream and 
downstream movement of migratory river animals, disrupting the aquatic 
ecosystem. Dam reservoirs can also become breeding grounds for mosquitoes, 
snails and other disease vectors, causing public health issues. Water quality can 
also be negatively affected due to construction activities, and the decomposed 
vegetation in the reservoir (WCD, 2000). A hydropower project, without careful 
assessment and planning, can trigger a range of adverse social impacts. These 
include involuntary resettlement of the community members, the physical loss 
of homes and lands, the transition to alternative means of earning a livelihood, 
disruption of established community networks, and loss of local cultural 
identity and heritage and sometimes an intrusion into the indigenous and ethnic 
minority’s way of life (Klimpt, et al., 2002).  
 
1.5. Overall Research Design 
 
This study explores the rationale and impact of Chinese investment and aid on a 
local community using hydropower project as a case study. Since the study is 
more interested in the observed impact on people’s livelihood rather than 
economic numbers, a qualitative research methodology is used. Qualitative 
research shares the theoretical assumptions of the interpretative paradigm, 
which is based on the notion that social reality is created and sustained through 
the subjective experience of people involved in communication (Morgan and 
Smircich, 1980). In this method, researchers attempt to accurately describe, 
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Economically speaking, hydropower has the potential to contribute positively to 
growth due to its vital role in the energy system. However, sustainable 
hydropower development means that the economic benefits must be shared 
among all the stakeholders, in particular, the affected communities. In this 
regard, local communities should be given support and opportunities to improve 
their livelihood (Klimpt et al., 2002). This may include providing access to the 
dam’s electricity at an affordable price, creating employment and other 
economic opportunities, building local people’s capacity through training and 
skill development, renovating or building local infrastructure such as schools, 
hospitals, roads, bridges, market places or tourist facilities. 
 
The construction and operation of hydropower dams may cause a range of 
environmental and health issues. For example, building a dam involves building 
a reservoir which requires inundating vast areas of land or forest that was once 
habitat for animals. A dam also acts as a barrier between the upstream and 
downstream movement of migratory river animals, disrupting the aquatic 
ecosystem. Dam reservoirs can also become breeding grounds for mosquitoes, 
snails and other disease vectors, causing public health issues. Water quality can 
also be negatively affected due to construction activities, and the decomposed 
vegetation in the reservoir (WCD, 2000). A hydropower project, without careful 
assessment and planning, can trigger a range of adverse social impacts. These 
include involuntary resettlement of the community members, the physical loss 
of homes and lands, the transition to alternative means of earning a livelihood, 
disruption of established community networks, and loss of local cultural 
identity and heritage and sometimes an intrusion into the indigenous and ethnic 
minority’s way of life (Klimpt, et al., 2002).  
 
1.5. Overall Research Design 
 
This study explores the rationale and impact of Chinese investment and aid on a 
local community using hydropower project as a case study. Since the study is 
more interested in the observed impact on people’s livelihood rather than 
economic numbers, a qualitative research methodology is used. Qualitative 
research shares the theoretical assumptions of the interpretative paradigm, 
which is based on the notion that social reality is created and sustained through 
the subjective experience of people involved in communication (Morgan and 
Smircich, 1980). In this method, researchers attempt to accurately describe, 
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decode, and interpret the meanings of phenomena occurring in their social 
contexts (Fryer, 1991). Qualitative research is less likely to impose restrictive a 
priori classification on the collection of data. It is also less driven by very 
specific hypotheses and categorical frameworks, and more concerned with 
emergent themes and idiographic descriptions (Cassell & Symon, 1994). The 
strengths of qualitative research include: the ability to get a holistic view of the 
phenomena under investigation (Bogdan & Taylor, 1975; Patton, 1980) a more 
realistic feel of the world that cannot be experienced through numerical data 
and statistical analysis used in quantitative research, and the ability to interact 
with the research subjects in their own language and on their own terms (Kirk 
& Miller, 1986). 
 
The qualitative method applied in this project is the case study approach. Yin 
(1984, p. 23) defines case study research method as, “an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in 
which multiple sources of evidence are used.” Despite the criticism that case 
studies provide very little basis for scientific generalization since they use a 
small number of subjects, case studies allow for both quantitative and 
qualitative analyses of the data, thus enabling  the exploration and 
understanding of complex issues (Yin, 1984). A case study is appropriate for 
this research because it allows the researcher to go beyond the numbers, and 
help explain the complexity of the impact of the dam on the local community, 
which may not be captured through other research methods, such as survey or 
experimental research.  
 
Multilevel sampling methods (Teddlie & Fen, 2007) were used to select cases 
and sample. At the first level, sampling involves the selection of hydropower 
projects as the cases of the study. Seawright and Gerring (2008) offer seven 
strategies for case selection: typical, diverse, extreme, deviant, influential, most 
similar, and  most  different4. Given the context in Cambodia and objective of 
the research, this study employed a typical case selection technique, meaning 
choosing cases that are typical examples of some cross-case relationship. Tong 
and Hem (2010) identified eight Chinese-led hydropower projects in Cambodia 
                                                      
4 For details, see Seawright and Gerring. (2008). Case Selection Techniques in Case Study 
Research : A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options. Political Research Quarterly 2008 
61: 294 
 
which have been approved for construction (see table below). Out of these 
projects, the Kamchay  hydropower was selected as the case for this study 
because it was the only project at the advanced stage of construction at the time 
of the research. The rest of the projects were in either pre-feasibility or feasility 
study. 
 
Table 3: Chinese-led hydropower projects in Cambodia. Updated from Middleton 
(2008) 
 
No Project 
Name 
Install 
capacity 
(MW) 
Investor Expected 
year of 
commission 
Status 
1 Kamchay 193 Sinohydro 2012 Advanced stage 
of Construction 
2 Stung Atay 110 Yunnan Corporation 
for Int’l Techno-
Economic 
Cooperation (CYC) 
2012 Early stage of 
Construction 
3 Kirirom III 18 State-run China 
Electric  Power 
Technology Import 
and Export 
Corporation 
2011 Feasibility study 
4 Stung Tatay 80 China National Heavy 
Machinery 
Corporation 
unknown Feasibility study 
5 Lower Stung 
Russey 
Chrum 
235 CYC and Yunnan 
Southeast Asia 
Economy and 
Technology 
Investmen Industrial  
Co Ltd. 
2015 Feasibility study 
6 Stung Chay 
Areng 
260 China Southern 
Power Grid Co Ltd. 
2015  
7 Sambor 465 or 
3,300 
China Southern 
Power  Grid Co Ltd. 
2016 Feasibility study 
8 Sre Pok 3 300 Guangxi Guiguan 
Electric Power Co. 
Ltd 
unknown Feasibility study 
The second level of the sampling strategy involves the selection of smaller 
embedded units in the case (e.g the community members). Households were 
stratified into two categories: those who live on the project site and those who 
live off the site, while ensuring gender equality in the sample. Such 
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The second level of the sampling strategy involves the selection of smaller 
embedded units in the case (e.g the community members). Households were 
stratified into two categories: those who live on the project site and those who 
live off the site, while ensuring gender equality in the sample. Such 
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classification is useful for the comparison of perception towards and impact of 
Chinese investment across different variables. A total of 35 community 
members from both groups were purposefully selected for the interview. In 
additon, 20 key informants from non-governmental organizations and 
government officials from relevant institutions were also interviewed. (See 
Annex 1) 
1.5.1. Data Collection 
A number of qualitative methods were used to collect both secondary and 
primary data for this research. The following section describes each method in 
detail. 
 
Document Analysis 
Secondary data was collected through comprehensive desk research and content 
analysis of more than one hundred newspaper and magazine articles on China–
Cambodia relations, and an extensive review of the literature on China’s foreign 
policy, investment and aid motivation, government policy documents and 
reports, literature on sustainable energy, hydropower and community 
development. The documents were selected from multiple sources such as 
online journals, online newspapers, government institutions, research think-
tanks, and civil society organizations. After the collection, the materials were 
organized and categorized into different themes related to the topic of the 
research (See section 1.5.2 below for detail of data analysis) 
 
Fieldwork  
Fieldwork was carried out in the period from 20th to 22nd July 2011, from June 
15th to 17th and again from 22nd -24th June 2013 in three villages affected by 
the dam construction (Snam Prampir, Moet Peam and O’Touch village). In the 
three visits the researcher met with and interviewed community members 
including local NGO representatives, village chiefs, head of community 
representatives, and the affected families. The researcher also visited the dam 
site, took observation notes about  water quality, the forest, and the 
community’s life. In the observation technique, the researchers paid several 
visits to the actual project site to observe what was really happening. A digital 
camera was used to record and take photos during the visits.  
 
 
In-depth interview: 
Interviews were the primary data collection method because they yield rich, in-
depth qualitative data (O’Leary, 2010). In addition, interviews allow interaction 
between the interviewer and the interviewee and tend to have a higher response 
rate than self-administered or mail questionnaire, which respondents can easily 
ignore. Interviews can also increase internal validity because they allow 
interviewers to ask for explanations of vague answers, or to provide 
clarification when respondents find the questions unclear. Also, given the low 
literacy rate in the Cambodia community, interviews ensure that even those 
who cannot read and write will also be included in the sample, thus avoid bias 
in sampling.  
 
The interview was done in a semi-structured and informal way. Researchers 
asked questions based on a standardized interview schedule, but asked 
respondents for clarification, explanation or examples. With the consent of the 
participants, the interview was recorded but interviewers also took notes during 
the interview. To ensure validity, the questions were designed to be concise, 
using simple language whereas leading questions, double-barrelled questions 
and awkward or embarrassing questions are avoided (See Annex 2 for the 
interview question). Questions were asked in such a way that they were 
coherent and linked well together to help respondents in their recall of the 
event.  The questioniaree was trialled  before the actual data collection to assess 
the adequacy of the instrument.  
 
In total, the study inteviewed 55 people representing different stakeholders such 
as government representatives at the national level and local level, non-
governmental organizations, development partners, academics, researchers, 
independent analysits, represetatives from Chinese companies, and local 
community members (See Annex 1). Five undergraduate research students from 
Royal University of Phnom Penh were recruited as research assistants to help 
collect the data. The assistants were then trained by the researcher to familiarize 
themselves with the research, and to gain practical skills in conducting an 
interview effectively.  
 
Focus group discussion 
Two focus group discussions were organized among the community members 
at two different locations. The first focus group discussion took place in Snam 
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interview question). Questions were asked in such a way that they were 
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as government representatives at the national level and local level, non-
governmental organizations, development partners, academics, researchers, 
independent analysits, represetatives from Chinese companies, and local 
community members (See Annex 1). Five undergraduate research students from 
Royal University of Phnom Penh were recruited as research assistants to help 
collect the data. The assistants were then trained by the researcher to familiarize 
themselves with the research, and to gain practical skills in conducting an 
interview effectively.  
 
Focus group discussion 
Two focus group discussions were organized among the community members 
at two different locations. The first focus group discussion took place in Snam 
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Prampi village involving six people (four females), one village head and five 
villagers. The second group discussion was conducted with seven more people 
(5 females), including one deputy village head and six villagers at O Touch 
village. The main objective of both focus group discussions was to find out the 
impact that the dam had on their everyday life. Each of the discussions took 
place at the village head’s house. Effort was made to ensure that the discussion 
happened in a natural setting and that the villagers felt at ease. The research 
team was asked to dress in casual outfits to blend in with the villagers. Key 
questions were asked in Khmer using simple language. The facilitator asked the 
questions based on the questionnaire, but probed for more detail when 
necessary. A minute taker was assigned to take notes during the discussion. 
Each discussion lasted for about an hour. 
 
1.5.2. Data analysis  
 
The data collected from the main sources described above was analyzed using 
the framework  commonly used for applied policy research (Ritchei and 
Spencer, 1994). The analysis consists of the following six stages and is dealt 
with in a linear fashion.  
 
a) Transcription: in this initial stage, the recorded data and handwritten 
field notes from the interview and observation were transcribed into the 
computer. The transcription work was done by a team hired for this 
purpose, and the finished product was reviewed by the data collectors to 
ensure its accuracy. 
b) Familiarization: at this stage, researcher immersed himself into the data 
by listening to the tape, reading the transcript and studying the 
observational notes to gain an overview of the detail, depth and diversity 
of the materials gathered and to make notes of key ideas and recurrent 
themes. 
c) Identificaton of the thematic framework: after the important materials 
have been reviewed, the researcher returned to the research notes and 
attempted to set up a thematic framework (key issues, concepts and 
themes) within which the materials could be sifted and sorted. This is 
the initial coding framework which was developed both from a priori 
issues and from emerging issues from the familiarization stage. For 
instance, respondents’attitude towards Chinese’s investment is 
 
categorized as positive, indifferent or negative, while the investment 
impacts are labelled as economic impacts, social impacts and 
environmental impacts. 
d) Indexing: this stage involves reading, annotating the collected materials 
according to the thematic framework developed in the previous stage. 
Numerical systems or textual codes are noted in the margin of each 
transcript to create indexing references.  
e) Charting: at this stage, the specific pieces of data that were indexed in 
the previous stage are arranged in charts of the themes. This means that 
the data is lifted from its original textual context, and placed in charts 
that consist of the headings and subheadings that were drawn during the 
thematic framework, or from a priori research inquiries. Charting allows 
easy reading and comparison across the whole dataset.  
f) Mapping and interpretation: the final stage involves a systematic 
process of searching for patterns, associations, concepts and explanation 
in the data. The outcome of the analysis is expressed in narrative text 
with examples, quotes, and a visual display. 
 
1.5.3. Ethical consideration  
 
Every effort was made to conform to the standard ethical research norms. 
During the entire research process, the researcher adhered to the principles of 
honesty, and integrity. Research participants were informed about the 
background and objectives of the research and their voluntary agreement to take 
part in the research were sought. Participants were also told they had the right to 
quit the involvement at any time. The questionnaire was drafted to ensure that it 
did not contain any degrading, discriminating or any other unacceptable 
language that could be offensive to any members of the sample group. 
Confidentiality of the research participants and their responses was respected. 
Thus all personal names cited in this dissertation are pseudonyms. When 
necessary, names of interviewees were changed into pseudonyms to protect 
their privacy. Permission to tape or video record was always requested 
beforehand. The community representatives, and other key informants were 
invited to join a number of workshops where the researcher presented the 
research findings for validation. All data was stored safely and securely. Soft 
copies of the data were kept in encrypted data files; hard copies of data 
(questionnaire, interview script, observations note were kept in locked filing 
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cabinets.  Our research participants were informed that they were entitled to ask 
for a copy of their data if they wanted.  
 
1.6. Summary of the Research Findings 
This dissertation is based on four separate but interrelated articles which have 
been published or are currently under review with an academic journal. This 
section provides the summaries of the four articles. The articles flow from the 
broad discussion on China-Cambodia relation (country level) to examining the 
role that China’s play in Cambodia’s energy sector (sector level) to even more a 
specific case study on the impact of China-funded hydropower dam (case-
level). 
The first article (Chapter 2), using expert interviews, media analysis and an 
extensive literature review, studies the extent and implication of China-
Cambodia relations. The paper concludes that China is re-emerging as a 
prominent foreign player in Cambodia. Because Cambodia’s geographical, 
natural, and cultural landscapes are conducive to China’s rise in the region, the 
latter country has utilized its soft power to increase its involvement in the 
former country. China’s influence now runs deep in Cambodian society. 
Politically, Cambodia is one of China’s oldest and closest allies. Economically, 
China is Cambodia’s top foreign investor, a major donor, and an increasingly 
important trading partner. Culturally, Chinese values are deeply embedded in 
the Cambodians’ way of life. It is of great importance that the two countries 
work together to ensure that their relationship results in a win-win scenario. 
Among other things, serious efforts must be made to improve the management 
of investment and aid. This will entail placing great emphasis on improving 
transparency and information disclosure, promoting a participatory and 
inclusive development approach by involving relevant stakeholders, minimizing 
any potential negative impact on the environment, and making sure that the 
benefits are shared among all parties involved, particularly the local 
community.  
The second article (chapter 3) examines Cambodia’s energy challenges and 
critically analyzes China’s controversial role in the energy sector using a 
sustainable development framework. Combining site visits, in-depth interviews 
and comprehensive desk research, this paper found that China’s multimillion-
dollar investment is transforming the country’s energy sector, helping to reduce 
 
reliance on foreign energy, increased electrification rates, and potentially reduce 
energy costs. However, the article argues that while China plays a crucial role 
in moving Cambodia out of its chronic energy crisis, Chinese companies pose 
serious threats to social and environmental sustainability. China has the 
potential to be a catalyst for sustainable energy development in Cambodia if it, 
together with the local government, puts more effort into embracing the 
international best practices and significantly improve the transparency of their 
investment projects. To ensure that energy projects provide benefits, local 
governments must enhance their regulatory role by putting in place clear 
investment regulations, especially on environmentally sensitive investment 
projects and compliance should be strictly monitored. The article suggests that 
China’s money can also be channeled to support energy efficiency initiatives 
and fund less controversial renewable energy projects such as solar power, 
micro hydropower, biofuel and biogas. These off-grid energy projects will not 
only contribute to sustainable energy development of Cambodia but also 
significantly improve the livelihood of the poor rural population. 
 
The third article studies the China-funded Kamchay hydropower project in 
Cambodia and examines its impact on the local community two years after its 
operation started. While the mainstream studies tend to look at the general 
impacts of the dam, this paper contributes to the existing literature by placing 
its emphasis on the local community, who is a key stakeholder directly affected 
by the project, but one who is often neglected. The paper suggests that the 
Kamchay project promised economic benefits mainly in the form of affordable 
electricity; however, inadequate planning and stakeholder consultation have 
caused the project to fail short of international standards. While the economic 
gains from the dam have not yet materialized, local communities have seen 
their income reduced and their livelihood disrupted. It is clear that if 
hydropower is to contribute to solving Cambodia’s energy crisis in a sustainable 
way, a comprehensive and inclusive mechanism of good hydropower 
development must be developed and rigorously implemented. China, in this 
regard, should play a vital role in enhancing and enforcing its environmental 
and social safeguards if it wants to establish a long-term presence in Cambodia 
and contribute to its poverty reduction and sustainable development. 
 
The last paper puts China-Cambodia relations in the global context and analyses 
if its so-called “resource diplomacy”, also applies in Cambodia. The paper 
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concludes that China’s growing outward investment, no-strings-attached 
economic assistance, and political support to resource-rich developing nations 
are elements of its diplomacy to secure important resources to sustain its 
expanding economy.  While the mainstream literature tends to prove the 
resource-oriented nature of such diplomacy, this paper argues there are 
exceptions to this common belief. Using Cambodia as a case study, this paper 
critically analyzes the motivation of China’s resource diplomacy from an 
institutional perspective and finds that China charms Cambodia not for short 
term economic benefits, but rather for long term strategic and political gains. 
China is indifferent to Cambodia’s limited resources, but finds Cambodia’s 
strategic geographical location vital to increase its influence in the region. 
Specifically, China needs Cambodia on its side in dealing with South China Sea 
dispute, in securing a safe transport routes for its oil supply from the Middle 
East and Africa, and in its effort to control the region’s waterway through its 
dam construction on the Mekong.  
1.7. Research Outputs 
The outputs of this research were presented in four papers published in 
international peer-reviewed journals, local and international media and were 
presented in a number of national and international conferences as listed below. 
 
Publication in international peer-reviewed journals 
 
 Title Journal name  Status 
Paper 1 Cambodia–China Relations: 
A Positive-Sum Game? 
Journal of Current 
Southeast Asian 
Affairs 
Published in 
2012, 
31(2):57-85 
Paper 2 China’s roles in Cambodia’s 
energy sector: catalyst or 
antagonist for development? 
Southeast Asia 
Research 
Published in 
2015, 
23(3):405-422 
Paper 3 Hydropower and local 
community: A case study of 
Kamchay Dam, a China-
funded hydropower project in 
Cambodia 
Community 
Development 
Under Review 
Paper 4 China’s Resource Diplomacy China Information: Under Review 
 
in Cambodia and Beyond: On 
Soft Power and Strongmen5 
A Journal on 
Contemporary 
China Studies 
Publication in national and international media 
Name of article Publisher Published date 
Cambodia’s Energy Security Is at Risk The Cambodia Daily 7 November 2012 
Chinese investment and aid in 
Cambodia a controversial affair East Asia Forum 
16 July 2013 
 
Hydropower: Not Inherently Evil The Khmer Times 29 May 2014 
Sustainable Energy for Cambodia The Khmer Times  12 June 2014 
 
Presentations in national and international conferences and workshops 
Title of the presentation Name of the conference/workshop 
Chinese investment in hydropower and 
the sustainable development of local 
communities in Cambodia  
2nd Fresh Perspectives Conference ‘New 
Encounters’, VU University Amsterdam, 
The Netherlands (15–16 September 2010)  
China's resource diplomacy in 
Cambodia 
 
Workshop on “Competing Hegemonies - 
Foreign-dominated processes of 
modernization and political change in 
post-conflict Cambodia"  (07 October, 
2014) 
“Toward Cambodia’s energy security: 
the role of China’s investment and aid. 
The Future of CLMV: Drivers and 
Challenges of Water, Energy and Food 
Security organized by Cambodian 
Institute for Cooperation and Peace on 
April 3-4, 2014 in Phnom Penh 
The Dragon's power: China's influence, 
dominance and controversy in 
Cambodia" 
The 8th International Convention of Asia 
Scholars, Macau (24-27 June 2013) 
                                                      
5 This paper was co-authored with Prof. Dr. Heidi Dahles 
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Cambodia's energy challenges: is 
hydropower the solution" 
Regional Public Forum on The Mekong 
and The 3s Hydropower Dams, Phnom 
Penh, Cambodia (3-4 JUNE 2013) 
In pursuit of a sustainable solution to 
Cambodia’s energy’s shortage: the 
potentials of renewables" 
National Conference on Climate Change, 
Agriculture, and Energy, Phnom Penh, 
Cambodia (1-2 Dec 2011) 
Mekong at the crossroad: energy 
security or food security?"   
The 2nd Mekong Round Table 
Discussion, Phnom Penh (18 Oct 2011) 
 
 
1.8. Setting within the Cambodian Research Programme 
This PhD research project is part of a large Cambodia Research Programme, 
“Competing Hegemonies: Foreign-Dominated Processes of Development in 
Post-Conflict Cambodia”, a collaborative project between Dutch and 
Cambodian academic institutions, and funded by the Netherlands Organisations 
for Scientific Research (NWO). Other research projects include topics dealing 
with state-society relations, NGO’s source of funding, the impact of Korean 
investments, Sino- Khmer entrepreneurship, and diaspora institutional 
entrepreneurship. One of the main objectives of the programme is to “analyse 
the diverging ways in which the main stakeholders in Cambodian development 
(government, civil society, foreign investors, and the Cambodian diaspora and 
business community) position themselves vis-à-vis one another and the 
development models that emerge in their wake” (Cambodia Research 
Programme, 2010). My project contributes to the programme by analysing the 
role that China plays in Cambodia’s development. The project raises the issue 
to what extent China dominates the processes of development in Cambodia or, 
instead, lead the country towards an independent route to development, away 
from the stipulations of the Washington consensus. 
 
1.9. Organization of the Dissertation 
The dissertation consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 introduced the overall 
research objectives, questions, framework, and methodology approach and 
research findings. Chapter (2), entitled “Cambodia-China relations: A positive-
 
sum game?” discusses the overall relationship between the two nations and 
serves as the background of the PhD research project. The paper was published 
in the Journal of Current Southeast Asia Affairs in 2012. Chapter 3 on “China’s 
roles in Cambodia’s energy sector: catalyst or antagonist for development?”, 
analyzes China’s controversial role in the energy sector using a sustainable 
development framework. The paper was accepted by Southeast Asia Research 
Journal and is scheduled for publication in September 2015. Chapter 4 on 
“Hydropower and local community: A case study of Kamchay Dam, a China-
funded hydropower project in Cambodia and Chapter 5 on “China’s Resource 
Diplomacy in Cambodia and Beyond: On Soft Power and Strongmen” are 
currently under review by the Community Development Journal and China 
Information respectively. The last chapter, chapter 6 concludes the dissertation 
by discussing the most significant findings, drawing conclusions and 
implications. The appendices consist of the research instruments and documents 
(interview schedule, list of key informants and photos from the fieldwork).  
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CHAPTER 2: 
Cambodia–China Relations: A Positive-Sum Game?6 
 
 
Abstract: China has re-emerged to become a dominant foreign player in 
Cambodia. Politically, Cambodia is one of China’s oldest and closest allies. 
Economically, China is Cambodia’s top foreign investor, a major donor, and an 
increasingly important trading partner. Culturally, Chinese values are deeply 
embedded in many aspects of Cambodian society. However, China’s 
dominance is surrounded by renewed controversy. While the government 
warmly welcomes China’s aid, saying that it comes with no strings attached, 
many experts are concerned that China is providing aid for more nefarious 
reasons. Critics also accuse Chinese investment and aid of having exacerbated 
corruption, weakened governance, and harmed human rights, and of ruining 
Cambodia’s natural resources and environment. With such controversies, it is 
relevant and significant to assess the roles that China plays in Cambodia’s 
socio-economic development. Using expert interviews, media analysis and an 
extensive literature review, this paper contributes to the existing discussion on 
China–Cambodia relations by closely examining the controversies of China’s 
investment and aid, critically analysing China’s interests in Cambodia, and 
asking if the relationship between the two nations is a positive-sum game.  
 
Keywords: China, Cambodia, ODA, FDI, economic development, controversy 
 
 
 2.1. Introduction 
 
China’s global rise needs no introduction, but the country’s increased influence 
in Cambodia, one of the world’s poorest countries, provokes some heated 
discussion. Although the presence of China in Cambodia is nothing new, the 
extent of its current involvement in Cambodia’s politics and economic 
development is staggering. In fact, Cambodia is one of China’s oldest and 
                                                      
6 This chapter was published as a journal article in the Current Southeast Asian Affairs in 
September 2012. The paper can be downloaded free of charge from  http://journals.sub.uni-
hamburg.de/giga/jsaa/article/view/545  
 
closest allies. Sino-Cambodian cultural and commercial relations can be traced 
back to eight centuries ago when a Chinese diplomat paid a visit to Angkor City 
in 1296 (Zhou, 2007). During this thousand-year-old friendship, China’s 
foreign policy toward Cambodia changed from time to time. During the 1960s 
China lent its patronage to ex-King Sihanouk, then from 1975 to 1979 China 
financially and politically backed the Khmer Rouge regime led by Pol Pot, who 
was responsible for the killing of 1.7 million people during his rule. China 
continued to supply the Khmer Rouge with weaponry along the Thai–
Cambodian border between 1979 and 1990, even after the regime fell.  
 
After the first general election in 1993, Cambodia formed a coalition 
government comprising the FUNCINPEC party led by King Sihanouk’s son 
Prince Norodom Ranariddh, and the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), led by 
Hun Sen, a former prime minister in the Vietnamese-installed People’s 
Republic of Kampuchea during the 1980s. Prior to 1996, China provided 
patronage to Prince Norodom Ranariddh but later withdrew its support because 
of the prince’s closer relationship with Taiwan. In 1997, Hun Sen ousted Prince 
Ranariddh in a violent coup. Despite the international condemnation, China 
recognized the result of the coup and provided Hun Sen with huge financial aid. 
Since then, a series of reciprocal high-level visits between the countries have 
helped to strengthen the bilateral relationship. 
 
Presently, the bond between Cambodia and China is closer and stronger than 
ever. China is Cambodia’s top foreign investor, a major donor and an 
increasingly important trading partner. With 247,197 Chinese tourists visiting 
Cambodia in 2011, China is also the country’s third-biggest tourism market, 
after Vietnam and South Korea (Ministry of Tourism quoted in TTR Weekly 
2012). According to the Chinese Association in Cambodia, there are about 
500,000 Chinese and Chinese-Cambodians living in Cambodia, where they are 
one of the largest and most visible ethnic minorities (Radio Free Asia, 2012a). 
Chinese-Cambodians play a prominent role in the Cambodian business sector as 
well as within Cambodia’s political scene. Mandarin Chinese is the second 
most popular language in Cambodia after English. There are approximately 56 
schools offering Chinese language classes to some 30,000 students nationwide 
(Xinhuanet, 2011b).  
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Cambodia–China Relations: A Positive-Sum Game?6 
 
 
Abstract: China has re-emerged to become a dominant foreign player in 
Cambodia. Politically, Cambodia is one of China’s oldest and closest allies. 
Economically, China is Cambodia’s top foreign investor, a major donor, and an 
increasingly important trading partner. Culturally, Chinese values are deeply 
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6 This chapter was published as a journal article in the Current Southeast Asian Affairs in 
September 2012. The paper can be downloaded free of charge from  http://journals.sub.uni-
hamburg.de/giga/jsaa/article/view/545  
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China is undisputedly playing an important political, economic and cultural role 
in Cambodian society. However, China’s dominance is surrounded by renewed 
controversies. While the Cambodian government warmly welcomes China’s 
aid, saying that it comes with no strings attached, experts warn that China 
provides aid for reasons other than to be a helpful neighbour. Given China’s 
dominance and the controversies its involvement has evoked in Cambodia, 
some key questions are being asked. How is China impacting on the socio-
economic development of Cambodia? Will the Cambodia–China relationship 
result in a positive-sum game? What roles will China play in Cambodia in the 
future? This paper aims to shed some light on these questions. 
 
The discussion in this paper is based on 15 in-depth interviews, a 
comprehensive content analysis of more than one hundred newspaper and 
magazine articles on China–Cambodia relations, and an extensive review of the 
literature on China’s foreign policy, investment and aid motivation, and 
economic condition. The interviews were conducted with experts from relevant 
government institutions as well as local and international organizations and thus 
represent the perspectives of different stakeholders. Unfortunately, the author’s 
repeated requests for an interview with the Chinese embassy were rejected, so 
Chinese media was analysed instead in order to indirectly represent China’s 
views. The interviews were conducted in the Cambodian language and were 
transcribed by the author himself. Data from multiple sources have been 
triangulated to enhance the reliability of the material. 
 
2.2. The Extent of China’s Involvement 
In recent years, China has emerged as a major foreign player in Cambodia. 
Prime Minister Hun Sen once said Cambodia’s strong economic growth in past 
years owes a great deal to China’s investment and steady technical and financial 
assistance (China Daily, 2012a). This section illustrates the role of China as a 
top foreign investor, an important trading partner and a major economic and 
military donor in Cambodia and discusses the distinctive characteristics and 
controversies of such investment and assistance. 
 
2.2.1. China: A Prominent Foreign Investor 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows are seen as one of the main drivers of 
economic development and liberalization in Cambodia. After the restoration of 
peace and stability in 1993, Cambodia started to receive inflows of FDI and has 
 
since been a popular destination for foreign investors from China, South Korea, 
the United States, Malaysia and Thailand due mainly to its unexplored natural 
resources, low labour costs and attractive investment incentives. The investment 
projects approved rose steadily, with an annual average of 640 million USD 
from 1994 to 2005, and 5.3 billion USD from 2006 to 2010 (CDC, 2012). 
According to the Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC, the highest 
decision-making level of the government for private and public sector 
investment), by September 2011 China’s accumulative FDI had reached 8.8 
billion USD, making it the largest investor in the kingdom,7 followed by 
South Korea (4 billion USD), Malaysia (2.6 billion USD), the United Kingdom 
(2.3 billion USD) and the United States of America (1.2 billion USD) (CDC, 
2012).  
 
Table 1: Top Investors in Cambodia (Jan 1994–Sep 2011, in million USD ) 
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (1–9) 1994–2011.9 
Total Rank 
China 717 180 4,371 893 694 1,147 8,866 1 
South 
Korea 
1,010 148 1,238 120 1,026 134 4.027 2 
Malaysia 28 241 3 7 167 231 2,609 3 
UK 4 26 6 6 11 2,222 2,378 4 
US 62 3 672 2 36 144 1,285 5 
Taiwan 48 40 22 27 92 69 827 6 
Vietnam 56 139 21 210 115 246 812 7 
Thailand 100 108 74 178 2 0 746 8 
Singapore 12 2 52 273 37 0 636 9 
Russia 278 0 103 235 0 0 618 10 
Total 4,440 2,656 10,889 5,859 2,691 5,674 39,886 - 
Source: Cambodia Investment Guide, Council for Development of Cambodia 2012. 
                                                      
7 There are reasons to believe that Chinese investment in Cambodia might have been 
misreported. Comparing the investment figures from different sources, the author finds a huge 
discrepancy. He nevertheless acknowledges that China is one of Cambodia’s major foreign 
investors. 
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Traditionally China invested heavily in small-scale manufacturing, and the 
garment sector, but has now become a leading investor in natural resources and 
the energy sector. It also invests in large-scale infrastructure, agriculture, 
tourism, telecommunications and construction. An estimated 23 Chinese firms 
are exploring mineral resources, five are constructing five hydropower dams, 
and hundreds more are investing in the garment industry (People’s Daily 
Online, 2011b).  
 
Figure 1: China’s Fixed Asset Approvals in Selected Sectors 1998–2008 (% of total 
FDI fixed asset approvals in each sector)
 
 
Source: Ouch, Saing and Phann 2011. 
2.2.2. China: An Important Trading Partner 
Since the ASEAN–China Free Trade Agreement8 was put into force in January 
2010, China has become the biggest trading partner and the number-one export 
destination for ASEAN countries. China’s trade with ASEAN jumped seven-
fold between 2000 and 2010, to 232 billion USD (ASEAN, 2012). The growth 
of trade between China and Cambodia is the highest vis-à-vis the bilateral trade 
between China and any other ASEAN country. Driven by imports of garment 
raw materials, machinery, motorcycles, cars, foodstuffs, electronics, furniture, 
                                                      
8 The ASEAN–China Free Trade Area is the largest free trade area in the world in terms of population and 
third-largest in terms of nominal GDP (behind the European Union and the North American Free Trade 
Area). Under the FTA accord, the average tariff on goods from ASEAN countries to China is reduced to 
0.1 per cent from 9.8 per cent. 
 
medicines and cosmetics, Cambodia–China trade tripled to 2.5 billion USD in 
2011 from 791 million USD in 2009 (ASEAN-China Centre 2012). However, 
Cambodia’s exports (mainly agricultural products, rubber, fishery, timber and 
textile) to China remain minimal, standing at 184 million USD by the end of 
2011 (ASEAN-China Centre, 2012). Thailand and the United States continue to 
be Cambodia’s top trading partners, but China is predicted to surpass both 
countries in the next decade. China and Cambodia have already pledged to 
double the trade amount to 5 billion USD by 2017 (People’s Daily Online, 
2012). 
 
 
Table 2: Cambodia’s Top Import and Export Partners 2007–2010 (in million USD) 
Export Partners 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total  
2007–2010 
1. United States 2363.1 1970.9 1552.8 2183.6 8070.4 
2. Hong Kong, China 17.1 839.9 1646.3 20.4 2523.6 
3. Canada 189.2 292.0 195.8 346.6 1023.6 
4. Germany 298.3 138.1 108.8 294.6 839.8 
5. United Kingdom 211.7 155.7 179.7 315.0 862.2 
6. Singapore 76.7 113.3 482.3 143.3 815.6 
7. Vietnam 186.8 169.3 115.5 118.7 590.4 
Import Partners  
1. Thailand 1491.1 696.9 464.8 2574.4 5227.2 
2. China 969.4 934.9 881.3 1482.0 4267.6 
3. Singapore 482.2 303.8 209.0 2436.1 3431.0 
4. Hong Kong, China 673.3 589.6 484.2 645.4 2392.5 
5. Vietnam 1145.2 471.0 493.5 507.2 2616.9 
6. South Korea 309.6 229.4 209.1 214.9 962.9 
7. Indonesia 134.0 96.2 145.5 239.5 615.3 
Source: Author’s calculation based on ADB key indicator 2011. 
2.2.3. China: An Emerging Bilateral Donor 
China has also been a major source of foreign assistance to Cambodia. In 1999 
China gave Cambodia 218.3 million USD (200 million USD in interest-free 
loans and 18.3 million USD in foreign assistance guarantees), one of the largest 
aid packages that it had ever given to any country at the time (Long, 2009). 
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China has also been a major source of foreign assistance to Cambodia. In 1999 
China gave Cambodia 218.3 million USD (200 million USD in interest-free 
loans and 18.3 million USD in foreign assistance guarantees), one of the largest 
aid packages that it had ever given to any country at the time (Long, 2009). 
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China became Cambodia’s biggest donor in 2009, pledging 257 million USD, 
compared to 214 million USD from the EU, and 113 million USD from Japan 
(Palit and Palit, 2011). Most recently, Cambodia received three aid packages 
from China in just three months. These include 70 million USD in aid pledged 
when President Hu Jintao visited Cambodia in April 2012 (Yahoo News 
Singapore, 2012), a 20 million USD military aid deal signed in May (VOA 
News, 2012) and a 430 million USD loan signed in June of the same year (The 
Phnom Penh Post, 2012c). China’s accumulative official development 
assistance (ODA) from 1992 to 2011 reached 0.86 billion USD, accounting for 
7.1 per cent of total ODA, making it the second-largest bilateral donor, behind 
only Japan (CDC, 2011).9 
 
 
Table 3: Disbursement to Cambodia in millions USD (selected years and countries) 
Country/ 
Organization 
1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 
(est.) 
1992–2011 
Amount % of 
total 
World Bank 29.6 32.69 37.83 56.91 95.97 795.07 6.6 
ADB 37.86 51.13 89.39 76.285 149.72 1,209.15 10 
EC 28.88 27.94 23.65 34.19 55.78 687.37 5.7 
Japan 112.40 106.02 111.66 146.02 120.63 2,081.28 17.2 
China 3.12 2.61 46.63 138.15 210.73 863.70 7.1 
US 45.14 17.60 43.25 60.36 57.20 779.84 6.4 
France 62.23 27.80 24.44 23.20 19.96 554.68 4.6 
Germany 13.89 12.22 27.29 35.30 44.40 360.07 3 
Total 513 456 609 1,074 1,235 12,131 100 
Source: Author’s own compilation from Cambodian Development Effectiveness Report 2007 and 2011. 
 
ODA from China also has a number of distinct characteristics. Globally, 
Chinese financial assistance falls into three categories: grants, interest-free 
loans and concessional loans. As for Cambodia, the majority of China’s ODA 
comes in the form of concessional loans, mostly earmarked for infrastructure 
                                                      
9 Caution should be used when interpreting the amount of China’s aid to Cambodia from the 
media because statistics regarding Chinese aid are frequently misquoted. For example, Voice of 
America wrote that “by mid-2006 China provided at least 2 billion USD in grant aid and loans” 
(VOA News 2010), but the number far exceeds even the total 0.86 billion USD of accumulative 
ODA from 1992 to 2011 recorded in the CDC’s report.  
 
projects (24 out of 34 Chinese-funded projects listed in the CDC database are 
concessional loans). It is not known for sure how much Cambodia owes China. 
There are contrasting estimates on Cambodia’s debt to China, ranging from 2 
billion to 6 billion USD (The Phnom Penh Post, 2012a). Access to information 
concerning Cambodia’s debt to China was restricted, even to members of 
parliament, according to Yim Sovann, a spokesperson for the opposition party 
(The Phnom Penh Post, 2012a). However, the International Monetary Fund and 
World Bank joint report suggests that China holds the largest bilateral loans to 
Cambodia, at 66 per cent of the total debt at the end of 2010 (The Phnom Penh 
Post, 2012a). Also, in comparison to other donors, China offers the least 
favourable loan conditions. Most Chinese loans have higher interest rates and 
shorter amortization and grace periods (Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Terms of Loans from China Compared to from Other Donors (for most 
projects) 
Country Interest rate Repayment period Grace period 
China 2–3%  15–20 years 5–7 years 
ADB 1.2% 30 years 8 years 
World Bank 1.2% 40 years 10 years 
Japan 0.01% 40 years 10 years 
Source: Author’s compilation from interview with officials at the respective institution. China’s 
figures were quoted from China’s Foreign Aid Policy Paper 2011. 
  
Another distinctive feature of China’s ODA that has been widely discussed is 
the so-called “no strings attached” policy. Unlike the traditional donors whose 
assistance always comes with strict reform requirements, China’s ODA is 
believed to come with no conditions and is warmly welcomed by the 
Cambodian government. Cambodia’s prime minister has repeatedly praised 
China in public, saying that “China has a way of doing things. They talk less 
but do more. Before anyone knows it there we get bridges, roads, etc. They are 
all without conditions” (Prime Minister Cabinet Office, 2009). The same 
sentiment is felt at all levels of the government. A senior officer at the 
Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board of the Council for the 
Development of Cambodia said the following in an interview with the author: 
“In terms of ownership, China respects the receiving countries in terms of 
how the money should be used. China listens to the receiving countries’ 
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figures were quoted from China’s Foreign Aid Policy Paper 2011. 
  
Another distinctive feature of China’s ODA that has been widely discussed is 
the so-called “no strings attached” policy. Unlike the traditional donors whose 
assistance always comes with strict reform requirements, China’s ODA is 
believed to come with no conditions and is warmly welcomed by the 
Cambodian government. Cambodia’s prime minister has repeatedly praised 
China in public, saying that “China has a way of doing things. They talk less 
but do more. Before anyone knows it there we get bridges, roads, etc. They are 
all without conditions” (Prime Minister Cabinet Office, 2009). The same 
sentiment is felt at all levels of the government. A senior officer at the 
Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board of the Council for the 
Development of Cambodia said the following in an interview with the author: 
“In terms of ownership, China respects the receiving countries in terms of 
how the money should be used. China listens to the receiving countries’ 
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needs and lets them use the money without any conditions. Another thing, 
China never regards itself as the donor. China gives aid to Cambodia as 
a friend and on a solidarity basis.” (A senior officer at the CDC, 
interview with the author on 9 February 2012) 
 
While each side claims that China’s financial assistance packages are simply 
the actions of a benevolent, friendly neighbour, analysts and observers believe 
China has a hidden agenda. Experts have no doubt that China’s aid does come 
with strings attached but they are just different strings. For traditional donors, 
good governance, democracy and human rights are very important, so their aid 
usually comes with conditions which require the receiving countries to reform 
in these areas. China, on the other hand, is not interested in those things and 
claims that it does not want to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, 
so its aid comes with no reform pressure in those areas; instead, the conditions 
usually surface in the form of political and investment favours. Dr. Heng 
Narith, director of a local research think tank, told the author during an 
interview that China’s aid has won the hearts and minds of the politicians more 
than it has the hearts and minds of the citizens.  
 
“There is no aid without any strings attached. But how they put the 
strings on the politician is different from putting the strings on civilians. 
The West thinks about the general public because of their mindset of 
democracy and they believe that public opinion can shape a political 
system. This is the Western value so that’s why they care about the 
general public. For China, they don’t care about the general public. 
They care who makes the decisions and that is the politicians.” (Dr. 
Heng Narith, director of a local research think tank) 
 
China’s aid is also infamously known for its lack of transparency. It is not 
known exactly how the money is utilized, and information regarding the 
projects is not publicly disclosed. Researchers on this topic, even of Chinese 
nationality, are usually not welcomed. As stated above, my requests for 
interviews with the Chinese embassy were rejected, and my interview requests 
at the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Cambodia were likewise denied. It 
should also be noted that China is still an observer in the annual consultative 
group meeting of all donors in Cambodia. Questions are being asked as to why 
China does not want to be a member. “We don’t have a clear record of Chinese 
 
aid. When we ask the CDC, they tell us [one thing] but when we ask the 
Chinese embassy, they tell us [another thing],” says a former senior economist 
at the UNDP Cambodia office in an interview with the author. Also, Chinese 
ODA is unpredictable and unsystematic. Unlike ODA from the World Bank and 
Japan, China and Cambodia have not yet established a clear mechanism for aid 
management. In most cases, China’s assistance is unplanned and often provided 
based on the Cambodian government’s request. 
 
“Japanese aid is predictable because we have a clear process of what to 
do from the beginning until we get the response from Japan […]. Also, 
Japan usually follows up for the entire project cycle. We need a lot of 
time to discuss, but when [it comes] to implementation it’s very 
systematic.” (A senior program officer at JICA, interview with the 
author on 20 January 2012) 
“The World Bank is very strict with regard to the use of the Bank’s 
money. After the agreement has been signed, and after the procurement 
is complete and [the] consulting firm has been selected, the money is 
transferred directly to that firm. The government doesn’t normally get 
the money. We also hire international procurement agents to manage 
the procurement activities. The implementing firm also needs to write 
reports for the World Bank at different stages of the project. So it’s very 
transparent.” (A senior economist at the World Bank, interview with the 
author on 12 January 2012) 
 
The lack of transparency of Chinese aid is nothing out of the ordinary in 
Cambodia. China’s ODA to other countries also meets similar criticism; as 
Lancaster (2007) puts it, “China appears to administer foreign aid in an ad hoc 
fashion, without a centralized system, foreign aid agency and mission, or 
regularized funding schedule.” In April 2011, China published its first foreign 
aid document (also known as the White Paper) as an initiative to improve 
transparency. However, the document is far from being comprehensive. 
Important statistics such as the amount of annual aid flow to each country are 
not available. Several observations can help explain the lack of information 
disclosure regarding China’s aid. First, being a developing country that still 
receives financial assistance itself, China does not want to be recognized as the 
major ODA provider as it would be difficult to justify to the Chinese people 
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why it is providing aid to other countries while a large proportion of the 
Chinese population is still poor. Second, not revealing too much information 
can also help avoid questions from receiving countries. For instance, questions 
may be asked about why one country gets more aid than another. Third, China’s 
aid spreads across continents and given its large territory, it is a real statistical 
challenge to keep records of the money provided by all the different provinces 
and ministries across different portfolios. 
 
 
2.2.4. China: The Biggest Source of Military Aid 
In addition to the close economic relationship, Chinese–Cambodian military 
cooperation has also increased considerably since the late 1990s. China has 
provided military assistance to Cambodia in various forms. For example, in 
December 1999 China donated construction materials worth 1.5 million USD, 
including new barracks, ten jeeps, ten ambulances, and parachutes for the 
Cambodian armed forces (Marks, 2000). Between September and October 
2006, China pledged assistance for Cambodian army human resource training 
and the repair of military equipment, and gave Cambodia six patrol boats to 
help combat drug and human trafficking (IntellAsia 2005). More recently, 
during talks between Cambodian Premier Hun Sen, and Chinese President Hu 
Jintao alongside the opening of the World Expo in Shanghai in April 2010, 
China announced a new aid package comprising 257 new military cars, 50,000 
uniforms, and 100 million CNY (15 million USD) (Radio Free Asia, 2010). In 
May 2012, Cambodia and China signed a military cooperation pact in which 
China agreed to provide 120 million CNY (20 million USD) to Cambodia to 
build military hospitals and military training schools for the Royal Cambodian 
Armed Forces and promised to continue training Cambodian military personnel 
in China (Radio Free Asia, 2012c). According to a senior official at the 
Ministry of Defense who asked not to be named, China is the biggest source of 
military aid to Cambodia, contributing more than 5 million USD a year and 
sponsoring an average of 40 Cambodian soldiers every year to study military 
strategy in China (Newsmekong, 2005). 
 
In sum, Cambodia is currently one of China’s closest allies in Southeast Asia. 
The relationship between the two nations has reached a new peak with closer 
ties in almost all areas of cooperation. Chinese Ambassador to Cambodia Pan 
Guangxue once said, “China and Cambodia will always be good neighbours, 
 
close friends, trusted partners and dear brothers” (The Phnom Penh Post, 2011). 
The dominant influence of China in Cambodia has sparked heated discussions 
on China’s interests in this tiny country. The next section elaborates on China’s 
underlying interests globally, and then proposes some hypotheses on its motives 
in Cambodia. 
 
2.3. China’s Interests in Cambodia 
 
The rise of China has become a topic of keen debate in recent years. Its 
impressive economic growth, colossal foreign reserve, rising investment and aid 
to other countries have amazed the world, worried the West, and spurred 
discussion on the motivation for its increased presence throughout the region. In 
terms of investment, China has become the sixth-largest investor in the world, 
investing 68.81 billion USD in 178 countries across the globe (UNCTAD, 
2011). With regard to official development assistance, China is the most 
prominent emerging donor, having given a total of 40 billion USD by the end of 
2009 to 161 countries and 30 international and regional organizations (People’s 
Republic of China, 2011).  
 
Attempts to pinpoint the real motives behind China’s rising investment and aid 
have proven challenging due to the scale and diversity of its investment and 
assistance. A survey of more than one thousand Chinese firms finds that the top 
five drivers of China’s overseas investment are 1) following a “Go Global” 
policy, 2) seeking new markets, 3) pursuing advanced technology, 4) reducing 
production costs and 5) benefitting from the preferential policy of the host 
country (Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada 2009). Empirical evidence, 
however, is far less conclusive. Buckley et al. (2007) find that Chinese firms 
tend to invest in countries with poor governance and high political risk, but 
Cheung and Qian (2008) argue that the quality of institutions is not the main 
factor, and suggests that Chinese FDI is attracted by a potential host country’s 
natural resources. Cheng and Ma (2008) rule out both factors as the explanatory 
variables. Some scholars argue that China’s investment motivation cannot be 
explained by mainstream theories because of its unique characteristics. The 
majority of China’s outward investment is undertaken by state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), so their activities have to be in line with government 
policies, meaning their investment goal may be defined by political 
motivations, rather than driven by profit maximization. With regard to aid, the 
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Chinese government claims that its foreign aid is used to help recipient 
countries strengthen their self-development capacity, improve the livelihoods of 
their people, and promote economic growth and social progress (People’s 
Republic of China 2011). However, scholars believe that China provides aid for 
reasons beyond those listed in the paper. According to analysts, China’s ODA 
aims to secure natural resources, establish strategic diplomacy, and spread 
Chinese values (see Lengauer, 2011; Lum et al., 2011; Weston, Campbell and 
Koleski, 2011).  
 
Probing into China’s domestic situation and examining the sector in which 
Chinese investment is concentrated, and the countries to which it provides aid 
paints a good picture of the real motives of Chinese government. With an 
average annual growth rate of 10 per cent over the last three decades, China is 
one of the world’s fastest-growing economies. China has overtaken Germany as 
the world’s number-one exporting country and Japan as the world’s second-
largest economy. To sustain its economic growth, which is necessary for this 
large authoritarian state China needs energy. China surpassed the US to become 
the world’s largest energy consumer in 2010 and will likely remain in this 
position for the next 25 years (IEA, 2011) With rising energy demand and few 
natural resources back home, China needs to do whatever it takes to secure 
energy from abroad. Thus, it is not surprising that China invested 102.2 billion 
USD from 2006 to 2010 in the energy and power sector in the Middle East, 
Central Asia, Africa and Latin America. This investment amount is the largest 
sum relative to all other sectors (Scissors, 2011). 
 
Currently, China depends on foreign imports for over 50 per cent of the oil it 
consumes (Zhang 2011). Thus, China has, to a great extent, tried to build good 
relationships with leaders in many countries around the globe through various 
means; such as public diplomacy, large-scale investments, and no-strings-
attached aid and debt cancellation to secure access to natural resources. For 
example, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao made an extensive tour of Africa and 
offered 3 billion USD worth of credits to Angola, China’s major oil supplier, to 
secure future reliable supplies (Asia Times, 2006). To diversify their oil imports 
(which mostly comes from the Middle East), Beijing has also spent billions of 
dollars securing drilling rights in Nigeria, Sudan, Democratic Republic of 
Congo and Ethiopia (Asia Times, 2006). Second, in addition to energy security, 
food security may present a potential problem for China in the future. China has 
 
a fifth of the world’s population, but only 8 per cent of the world’s arable land; 
this makes feeding its people a challenge. Although China can achieve self-
sufficiency at the present thanks to its large agricultural outputs, with dwindling 
agriculture land due to urbanization, industrialization,10 and a rising 
population,11 China will become more dependent on imports to meet local 
demand. To illustrate, after having been a net food exporter for the previous two 
decades, in 2007 China became a net importer of food for the first time (see 
Figure 2). In 2010, Chinese import of grain reached a record high 60 million 
tons, of which 54.8 million tons is comprised of soybeans (60 per cent of the 
world’s total) (People’s Daily Online, 2011a). In this regard, it is reasonable to 
believe that China is also looking for external food sources. Africa is one of the 
most promising regions for China’s agriculture outsourcing thanks to its 
abundant agricultural land. Chinese agricultural investment in Africa is 
currently concentrated in Sudan, Tanzania and Ethiopia, although there are also 
Chinese firms investing in joint ventures in the fish industry in Mozambique, 
Namibia and Gabon (Naidu and Mbazima, 2008). 
 
Figure 2: Food Trade (in billion USD), 1992–2010 
 
 
 
Source: Huang (2011), Centre for Chinese Agricultural Policy. 
                                                      
10 According to Mr. Chen Xiwen, the top agriculture advisor to Premier Wen Jiabao, China’s 
farmland has shrunk by 8.33 million hectares in the past 12 years due to the construction of 
apartments and factories, desertification, and deforestation (The Sydney Morning Herald 2012). 
11 Under the medium fertility scenario, China would reach a maximum population of 1.443 
billion in 2030 (10 per cent annual increase for the next 25 years) followed by a long-term 
population decline (Wei and Liu 2009). 
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Third, China is evidently seeking to expand its export market. Serving as the 
factory of the world, China’s export plays a crucial role in its economy, 
averaging 47.8 billion USD annually (1990–2012) and accounting for almost 40 
per cent of its GDP (Trading Economic, 2012). In May 2012, China’s exports 
of office machines and data-processing equipment, telecommunications 
equipment, electrical machinery, and apparel and clothing were worth 181 
billion USD (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2012). Currently, China 
exports mainly to the European Union, the United States, Hong Kong, ASEAN, 
Japan, South Korea, India, Russia and Taiwan, but in order to sustain its 
economic growth China is also on a quest for new export markets for its 
products. Given its combined population of 1 billion people and its rapid 
economic growth, Africa is a promising market for China to tap into. Africa 
accounted for 3.8 per cent of China’s exports in 2011, an increase from 2 per 
cent in 2002 (Times Live, 2012). Latin America, Southeast Asia and Australia 
are also emerging export destinations for China. 
Figure 3: Imports and Exports (2006–2011) 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China 2012. 
 
 
Fourth, China is using the charm offensive to attract more supporters and allies. 
Having a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, a nuclear-
armed military, a continental-sized territory, massive foreign reserves, and 
being the major manufacturing hub of the world, many think China will become 
 
the next global superpower. In fact, some scholars predict that China will 
overtake the US to be the world’s foremost military superpower within 20 
years, and will become the world’s largest economy by 2021 (CNN, 2011). 
Although some would contest the timeframe of the prediction, the consensus is 
that China will get there sooner or later. To ensure that the transformation to 
superpower is peaceful, China needs a lot of international support. Therefore, 
there is little doubt that one of China’s motives for its increased presence 
abroad is to make more friends and gather support for its imminent rise. China 
has been using its consultative, non-interference and no-strings-attached 
policies to develop political and economic ties with many countries, including 
those viewed as rogue states by the United States.  
 
Finally, China has used cultural tools within its public diplomacy to win more 
friends and expand its influence. For example, China has created various 
scholarship programmes to attract foreign scholars and students to study, 
research and work in China. Serious effort has also been made to promote the 
learning and teaching of the Chinese language (Mandarin) worldwide. One 
example of such an effort is the establishment of the famous Confucius 
Institutes around the world; these institutes offer Chinese-language training and 
promote Chinese culture through various activities; involving music, cooking, 
and lectures on Chinese history and society. As of 2011, there were 320 
Confucius Institutes in 96 countries with over 230,000 registered students 
globally, and China plans to increase the number of such institutes to one 
thousand by 2020 (Siow and Wey, 2011). Hu You Qing, deputy to the National 
People’s Congress once said, “Promoting the use of the Chinese language will 
contribute to spreading Chinese culture and increasing China’s global influence. 
It can help build up our national strength, and should be taken as a way to 
develop our country’s soft power” (Kurlantzick, 2007). It is apparent the 
Chinese government has successfully established a range of institutions and a 
solid infrastructure to promote Chinese culture around the world. 
 
To sum up, it is true that the increase in China’s presence abroad is due partly to 
the, “Go Global” policy, but China’s agenda is more than increasing 
investment, pursuing product diversification, improving the level and quality of 
the projects, expanding financial channels, and promoting brand recognition of 
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on at least four main motives: to secure natural resources, particularly oil and 
food; to expand its export market to sustain growth; to spread its cultural 
values; and to strengthen friendship and cooperation with world leaders using 
public diplomacy to gather support for its transition to a superpower. What 
about China’s dominance in Cambodia? What does Cambodia have to offer to 
China? In the subsequent paragraphs, I propose four hypotheses.  
Table 5: China’s Interest in Cambodia 
Interest Priority 
Economic Secure natural resources Medium 
Expand export market Low 
Political Enhance regional security High 
Seek support for “One China” policy High 
Strategic Seek support at global arena Medium 
Balance the US influence High 
Ideological Spread Chinese culture High 
Source: Author’s own analysis. 
 
Politically, Cambodia is China’s ally. Cambodia – in particular, Prime Minister 
Hun Sen – has become one of ASEAN’s strictest adherents of the “One China” 
policy and a vocal supporter of China’s 2005 anti-secession law12 that Hun Sen 
describes as “highly necessary to the cause of China’s national reunification” 
(People’s Daily Online, 2005). Also, China can always count on Cambodia’s 
full cooperation in dealing with its political resistance. For instance, in 
December 2009, upon Beijing’s request, Cambodia decided to deport 20 ethnic 
Uyghur13 asylum-seekers to China despite an outcry from the international 
community (BBC, 2009). In April 2012, President Hu Jintao promised millions 
of dollars of aid and loans during his visit to Cambodia right before the ASEAN 
summit during when Cambodia was the chair. In return, he requested the South 
China Sea dispute not be discussed during the meeting. Experts believe that 
                                                      
12 Ratified on 14 March 2005, the law formalizes the long-standing policy of the People’s 
Republic of China to use “non-peaceful means” against the “Taiwan independence movement” 
in the event of a declaration of Taiwan independence. 
13 Uyghurs are members of a Turkic-speaking ethnic minority living mostly in western China. 
The 20 Uyghurs were seeking refuge in Cambodia after fleeing persecution in a crackdown that 
followed riots in which the Chinese government reported that at least 197 people were killed. 
 
Cambodia’s ASEAN membership is important for China to engage Cambodia 
to shape regional actors to serve the interests of China.  
 
Economically, China has also benefitted from Cambodia. In return for its 
assistance, Cambodia’s government has welcomed and facilitated Chinese 
investment. Chinese FDI fixed asset approval rose sharply from just 105 million 
USD in 1998 to a staggering 4.375 billion USD in 2008 (CDC, 2010). Using 
Cambodia’s “Most Favoured Nation”, “Generalized System of Preferences” and 
“Anything But Arms” status, Chinese garment factories were able to bypass 
quotas and tariffs imposed by the US and the EU, and export their products to 
the world market.  
 
Relatively speaking, Cambodia has fewer natural resources than Africa or 
Central Asia, but this tiny country possesses an estimated 400 million barrels of 
crude oil and three trillion cubic feet of gas (EIC 2008). Cambodia also offers 
mineral resources, which is one of the few remaining underexplored 
(greenfields) areas in the world, and plenty of agricultural land. Investing in 
these sectors allows China to secure stable access to vital resources for its 
domestic growth. In fact, Chinese companies have already been granted land 
concessions and licenses to invest in mining, hydropower and the agro-industry 
in Cambodia. According to a report by Cambodian Centre for Human Rights 
(CCHR), 50 per cent of the land concessions granted since 1994 (4.6 million 
hectares) are in the hands of 107 Chinese firms (The Phnom Penh Post, 2012b). 
An estimated 23 Chinese firms are exploring mineral resources (People’s Daily 
Online 2011b), five are constructing five hydropower dams (People’s Daily 
Online, 2011b), and 66 are investing in agro-business industry (Hicks et al., 
2009). It is not known for sure how many Chinese firms are investing in 
Cambodia’s oil, but in 2007 the China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC) reportedly won the right to drill in Cambodia’s offshore Block F, 
covering 7026.7 square kilometres (Xinhuanet, 2011c).  
 
China also sees Cambodia as a farming field. As mentioned above, China is 
seeking external food sources to ensure its food security. With its favourable 
climate and because less than 30 per cent of its total potential arable land is 
currently cultivated (Yu and Xinshen, 2011), Cambodia is promising for 
China’s agricultural outsourcing. Thus, it is not surprising that China is the 
second-largest investor in agriculture with a share of fixed assets of 17.6 per 
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cent from 2000 to 2010 (CDC, 2010). There are already some visible signs of 
China’s interest in Cambodia’s agricultural products. For instance, in August 
2011, the China National Food Industry Group signed an agreement with the 
Cambodian agricultural firm Ly Ye Rubber Company to import one million 
tons of cassava. In the same month, the Guangzhou branch of the China Grain 
Reserves Corporation (Sinograin) also agreed to buy up to 200,000 tons of 
milled rice per year from Cambodia (Xinhuanet, 2011a). Investments in these 
sectors allow China to secure important natural resources to feed its population 
back home. 
 
Strategically, Cambodia occupies a unique geographical location vital for China 
to strengthen its own security in Southeast Asia. China’s increasing exports and 
insatiable demand for energy have driven it to pursue its “string of pearls” 
strategy, a strategic move which involves establishing a series of nodes (pearls) 
of military and economic power throughout a region, often through gaining 
increased access to airfields and ports. Situated in the centre of mainland 
Southeast Asia, the Cambodian port of Sihanouk Province is a precious “pearl” 
among China’s “string of pearls” (see Figure 4). It should be noted that China 
has already funded the renovation of the docking facilities at Ream, and the port 
of Sihanouk Province. Access to these ports provides an excellent base for 
projecting maritime power into the Gulf of Thailand and the Straits of Malacca. 
Thus, Cambodia is strategically important for China to exert greater influence 
in Southeast Asia and to counterbalance the power of the US.  
 
Figure 4: China’s “String of Pearls” Map 
 
Source: Map modified by the author; original map produced by Edgar Fabiano 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Collardeperlaschino.png 
 
Culturally, China has also been trying to spread Chinese values in Cambodia. 
By the end of 1960, Chinese had become the largest minority group in 
Cambodia, the population of Chinese and Chinese-Cambodians numbering 
approximately 425,000 at that time (Swann, 2009). Although this number 
dropped during the subsequent war and during the killing under the genocidal 
Pol Pot regime, ethnic Chinese have re-emerged as one of the prominent groups 
in Cambodia, and play an important role in the business sector. There are now 
about 500,000 Chinese and Chinese-Cambodians in the country, according to 
the Chinese Association in Cambodia (Radio Free Asia, 2012a)  
 
The cultural influence from China has not been paid enough attention, but it is 
prominent and can be witnessed in many aspects of Cambodian society, 
including but not limited to, language and education, food and eating, media 
and entertainment, and festivals. For example, the Chinese New Year is one of 
the biggest celebrations in Cambodia, with up to 80 per cent of Cambodian 
people celebrating it every year (Xinhuanet, 2012). Although Chinese New 
Year is not officially recognized as a public holiday, a number of schools, 
markets, businesses and government ministries are closed during this event. 
Chinese food has become a common dish in most Cambodians’ homes. It is 
estimated that there are at least one hundred Chinese restaurants in the capital 
Phnom Penh alone. Mandarin is the second most-popular language in Cambodia 
after English. There are approximately 56 schools offering Chinese-language 
classes to some 30,000 students nationwide (Xinhuanet, 2011b). To further 
promote the Chinese language, China built a Confucius Institute in Phnom Penh 
to offer Chinese-language programmes to Cambodian learners, and training 
programmes for Chinese-language teachers (Xinhuanet 2010).  
 
“The popularization of the Chinese language in Cambodia far exceeds 
that in any other Southeast Asian country. This feather in the cap of 
Cambodia’s Chinese has made an enormous contribution to both 
glorifying Chinese culture and developing the friendship between 
Cambodia and China.”
 
(Yan Tingai, a former Chinese Ambassador to Cambodia [Marks 2000]) 
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2.4. Discussion 
 
Clearly, China is re-emerging as a prominent foreign player in Cambodia. 
Because Cambodia’s geographical, natural, and cultural landscapes are 
important for China’s rise in the region, the country has utilized its soft power 
(diplomatic, economic and cultural) to increase its involvement in Cambodia. 
China’s influence now runs deep in Cambodian society. Politically, Cambodia 
is one of China’s oldest and closest allies. Economically, China is Cambodia’s 
top foreign investor, a major donor, and an increasingly important trading 
partner. Culturally, Chinese values are deeply embedded in Cambodians’ way 
of life. 
 
So given the scale of China’s dominance in Cambodia, it has become relevant 
and important to assess the roles that China plays in Cambodia’s socio-
economic development. As far as China is concerned, there are two opposing 
points of view. One group believes that Chinese investment contributes to 
Cambodia’s economic development and poverty reduction. For instance, 
investment in the garment industry has boosted exports and generated local 
employment (Ouch, Saing and Phann, 2011), and investment in hydropower can 
potentially provide electricity to some, if not all, of the 78 per cent of the 
population who currently do not have access to reliable electricity (UNDP, 
2010). These investments may not empower all Cambodians equally at once, 
but will contribute to everybody’s well-being through the trickle-down effect in 
the long run. The government is also expected to benefit financially through 
taxes and royalties from Chinese investment in mining, oil and gas. Chinese aid 
for building roads, bridges and highways are also expected to improve 
Cambodia’s physical infrastructure, contributing indirectly to poverty reduction. 
However, another group argues that China’s unquestioning approach to how its 
aid and investment money is used has exacerbated corruption, deteriorated 
governance and human rights, and ruined Cambodia’s natural resources and 
environment. For example, Chinese investment has been repeatedly criticized 
for its lack of transparency, its human rights abuses, and the environmental 
deterioration it has wrought. Human rights activists have often implicated 
Chinese garment factories in the abuse of workers’ rights. Issues such as 
involuntary unpaid overtime work, unauthorized deductions from pay and only 
rare allowances for sick leave are commonly reported (Radio Free Asia, 2012b). 
 
Chinese investment in massive agricultural and forestry exploitation projects 
has also sparked controversies. For example, the 200,000-hectare concession 
granted to Pheapimex, partnering with China’s Wuzhishan, has displaced 
indigenous minority people who rely on the forests for their traditional 
livelihood (Global Witness, 2009). Chinese hydropower investment projects 
have also negatively affected the environment, destroying the protected areas, 
forest biodiversity and wildlife habitats (Middleton, 2008). Critics also argue 
that the lack of transparency and accountability in the management of Chinese 
aid will aggravate the existing widespread corruption and poor governance.14 
As Michael Sullivan puts it, “Chinese investment and aid, backed by China’s 
regional foreign policy goals, may create new rent-seeking opportunities for 
powerful political and economic networks within the Cambodian state, at the 
expense of the government’s reform agenda” (Sullivan, 2009, p.2). 
The Cambodian government has warmly welcomed China’s involvement. 
Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Sok An told Chinese Ambassador H.E. 
Madam Zhang Jinfeng in Cambodia “the more investments and tourists from 
China, the greater contributions will be for Cambodian economic growth” 
(People’s Daily Online, 2010). On another occasion, Cambodia’s Public Works 
and Transport Minister Tram Iv Tek stated the following at the signing 
ceremony of the infrastructure development Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU): “So far, China has built three bridges and 1,500-km-of roads for 
Cambodia, worth nearly 1 billion US dollars. The Cambodian people and 
government will not forget China’s help” (Xinhua, 2010). Premier Hun Sen 
called China “Cambodia’s most trusted friend”. He openly appreciated Chinese 
aid, saying that it comes with no strings attached, unlike aid from the US and 
the West, which often comes with stringent structural adjustment and reform 
requirements. 
China’s “unconditional” aid and inflow of large-scale investment are in some 
ways weaning Cambodia off its dependence on the West, but experts warn that 
too much reliance on any single country is unhealthy for Cambodia. “China will 
play an even more important role but we still need traditional donors,” said Han 
Phal, a president of a Phnom Penh-based research institution, in an interview 
with the author. There are concerns about the loss of independence and 
                                                      
14 Cambodia ranks 164 out of 182 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 
2011. 
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14 Cambodia ranks 164 out of 182 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 
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autonomy in decision-making if Cambodia’s government is to rely solely on 
China. Past experiences have already shown how China could influence 
Cambodia’s actions and decisions, especially with regard to diplomatic and 
political matters. In fact, most recently, Cambodia has been harshly criticized 
for its unjust chairmanship of the ASEAN meeting in July 2012 with regard to 
the South China Sea dispute. Meeting delegates described Cambodia as “the 
worst chair” and said China had effectively bought Cambodia’s loyalty 
(Reuters, 2012). Cambodia might also risk losing face and trust within 
international community, and its role in the ASEAN community might be 
marginalized if it continues to give China special treatment. 
“This time around, Cambodia, as the ASEAN chair, has taken an 
uncompromising stand on the issue of the South China Sea. Instead of 
trying to find common ground among all concerned parties, as the 
ASEAN chair has done in the past, the chair decided to put its national 
interest ahead of the grouping’s solidarity. In the long run, it will 
backfire on Cambodia and ASEAN as a whole” (The Nation 2012). 
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long-term net payoff has yet to materialize. Also, the lack of empirical evidence 
coupled with the poor information disclosure present a huge challenge to any 
attempt to assess the net impact of Chinese investment and aid.  
 
Although the net effect of China on Cambodia is yet to be determined, there is 
one issue that most experts would agree on, and that is the fact that China will 
continue to play a vital role in Cambodia in the near future, and that China’s 
dominance will persist. Cambodia is an essential partner for China in the 
regional context, and Southeast Asia is arguably one of the most important 
regions for China. With the combined population of 591 million people and a 
 
combined nominal GDP of 1.4 trillion USD (ASEAN, 2011), ASEAN is 
significant for the growth of the Chinese economy. In fact, ASEAN is the 
fourth-largest trading partner for China, after the EU, the US and Hong Kong 
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ASEAN population is Chinese, this region’s values are also culturally the 
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exercise its maritime power and balance the influence of the US. In this 
regional context, Cambodia is one of China’s few friends. While Vietnam, 
Singapore, and the Philippines have a closer relationship with the US, China’s 
closest allies are Myanmar and Cambodia. China needs the two countries’ 
support in the wake of disputes (for example, the South China Sea dispute) and 
in order to maintain regional security in general. 
 
“China and Cambodia will always be good neighbours, close friends, 
trusted partners and dear brothers […]. I’m [of the] firm belief that 
with the care and support from the leaders of both countries and the 
joint endeavours of the two peoples, the traditional friendship between 
China and Cambodia will be passed on from generation to generation, 
and the bilateral ties will [lead to] an even [more] promising future 
(Pan Guangxue, Chinese ambassador to Cambodia; quoted in the 
Phnom Penh Post 2011). 
 
Cambodia, on the other hand, also needs China’s investment and aid for its 
economic growth. With Cambodia’s government revenue currently at only 15.4 
per cent of GDP (Um, 2012), it will continue to depend on foreign aid for many 
years to come (presently almost half of its national budget comes from aid). 
And given the government’s preference for Chinese “no-strings-attached” aid 
over that from the traditional donors, China will remain a major player and 
Cambodia–China relations will become even closer. There are already signs of 
closer ties between the two nations. In February 2012, for example, both 
countries agreed to advance the comprehensive relations of strategic 
cooperation and partnership in trade, agriculture, infrastructure, communication, 
security and law enforcement. Just four months later, Cambodian and Chinese 
firms signed ten MoUs on business cooperation in the fields of agriculture, 
mineral resources, food, garments, and electronic products. Through these 
MoUs, Cambodian companies expect to export 60,000 tons of rubber latex, 
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500,000 tons of rice, 1 million tons of cassava, and 3,500 tons of black pepper 
to China to supply Chinese firms (China Daily, 2012b). 
 
In short, Cambodia depends on China economically, while China needs 
Cambodia politically and strategically. Both nations will continue to be good 
friends, at least until there is new leadership in either country. However, it is of 
great importance that the two countries work together to ensure that their 
relationship result in a win-win scenario. Among other things, serious effort 
must be made to improve the management of investment and aid. Considerable 
literature shows that aid, if not well managed and if given in the wrong context, 
will do more harm than good. Aid delivered over long periods to nations with 
weak institutions has the potential to undermine good governance and to reduce 
local ownership, accountability and democratic decision-making, and it does 
very little to promote economic growth (Graham and O’Hanlon, 1997; Easterly, 
2003; Tangri and Mwenda, 2006). To ensure that Cambodian–Chinese 
cooperation will ultimately turn out to be a positive-sum game requires good 
leadership and accountable governments with a long-term vision of achieving 
sustainable development. This will entail placing great emphasis on improving 
transparency and information disclosure, promoting participatory and an 
inclusive development approach by involving relevant stakeholders, minimizing 
any potential negative impact on the environment, and making sure that the 
benefits are shared among all the people involved, particularly local 
communities. 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: 
China’s roles in Cambodia’s energy sector: catalyst or 
antagonist for development?15 
 
Abstract  
 
China is the largest foreign investor in Cambodia’s energy sector. Its 
multimillion-dollar investment is transforming the country’s energy sector, 
helping to reduce reliance on foreign energy, increase the rate of electrification, 
and potentially reduce the cost of energy. However, China-funded energy 
projects, particularly hydropower dams, have met with widespread suspicion 
and harsh criticism for failing to meet international standards, and for imposing 
social and environmental damage. Combining site visits, in-depth interviews 
and comprehensive desk research, this paper examines Cambodia’s energy 
challenges, and critically analyzes China’s controversial roles in the energy 
sector using a sustainable development framework. The paper provides 
significant insights into the link between energy and sustainable development, 
and contributes to the formation of sustainable energy policy for Cambodia.  
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3.1. Introduction  
 
China is arguably the most important foreign player in Cambodia nowadays. 
The relationship between the two countries dated back to the 12th century. 
Presently, the bond between Cambodia and China is closer and stronger than 
ever. China is Cambodia’s second largest bilateral donor, providing US$ 0.86 
billion accounting for 7.1 per cent of total official development assistance from 
1992-2011.16 China has also become an increasingly important trading partner. 
The growth of trade between China and Cambodia is the highest among the 
bilateral trade between China and other ASEAN countries. Driven by the 
import of raw material for the garment sector, machinery, motorcycles, cars, 
                                                      
15 This paper was published by South East Asia Research, Volume 23, Number 3, September 
2015, pp 405-422(18) 
16 Council for the Development of Cambodia (2011), pp 14-15, see figure 4. 
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foodstuff, electronics, furniture, medicines and cosmetics, Cambodia-China 
trade tripled to US$ 2.9 billion in 2011 from US$ 791 million in 2009.17  
 
China is also Cambodia’s largest foreign investor, with cumulative investment 
reaching US$ 9.17 billion by December 2012.18 China’s investment was 
traditionally dominant in small scale manufacturing and the garment sector, but 
recently China has become a leading investor in natural resources and the 
energy sector with project approval in petroleum, energy and mining accounting 
for 99.8 per cent, 91.7 per cent and 83.5 per cent of total sector approval 
respectively.19 The surge in Chinese investment in this sector is due to the 
strong diplomatic and economic ties between the two nations, and the result of 
the Cambodian government’s effort to address its energy challenges. Apart 
from Myanmar, Cambodia has the lowest electrification rate in the region with 
only 24 per cent of its entire population having access to reliable electricity.20 
Currently, it has to import 42 per cent of its electricity from neighboring 
countries to meet its local demand.21  Also, since 93 per cent of the power 
locally produced depends on imported diesel fuel, and the electricity tariff in 
Cambodia is one of the highest in the world.22 Such high costs of energy 
impose a heavy financial burden on the majority of low-income households, 
deprive the poor rural population of access to electricity and drives potential 
investors away. Cambodia’s woefully inadequate supply of power presents one 
of the main structural problems affecting the country’s competitiveness. 
 
Cambodia’s desire for energy is obvious, but how to increase it remains 
controversial. The government has turned to China for loans and encouraged 
Chinese firms to invest in energy projects, especially hydropower. China has 
been the main engine for Cambodia's energy development, investing billions of 
dollars in power generation and distribution projects. China is currently the 
dominant player in the hydropower sector, financing and building most of the 
hydroelectric dams across the Kingdom. The government is grateful for China’s 
contribution to the energy sector, saying that it is helping Cambodia to achieve 
energy independence. However, to civil society, the role of China is mysterious 
                                                      
17 Global Times (2013) 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ouch Chandarany , Saing Chanhang and Phann Dalis (2011), p. 35. 
20 International Energy Agency (2011), p 167 
21 Ministry of Industry Mines and Energy (2011) 
22 World Bank (2006), p 4. 
 
at least, and potentially detrimental at worst. Activists and environmentalists 
have criticized China-funded hydropower projects for failing to adopt 
international standards, for causing environmental damage and hurting the 
livelihood of local communities. Experts also warn that the construction of 
dams in some places such as Koh Kong and Kratie province will greatly affect 
the fish populations in Cambodia’s rivers, and threaten the few remaining 
habitats of endangered species, like the freshwater Irrawaddy dolphin and the 
Siamese crocodile.23 Hydropower projects built by Chinese firms have also 
been criticized for the absence of meaningful public consultation, and an overall 
lack of transparency in the decision-making process.24 
 
Energy is undeniably a requisite for Cambodia’s economic growth. 
Nevertheless, it should be stressed that economic gains from energy 
development projects should not occur at the cost of the society. The principles 
of sustainable development clearly suggest that any development must avoid 
permanent losses of vital societal components for the future generation, and 
inequitable distribution of costs and benefits among the population. Motivated 
by these principles, this paper aims to contribute to the discussion of 
Cambodia’s sustainable energy development by examining its energy 
challenges and critically analyzing the role of China, asking if China’s 
investment in Cambodia’s energy sector is the solution, or part of the problem. 
The paper provides significant insights into the energy debate and aims to 
contribute to the development of sustainable energy policy for Cambodia. 
 
This paper is based on data triangulation combining systematic observations 
conducted during site visits, in-depth interviews and comprehensive desk 
research which includes government reports, local and international newspaper 
and magazine articles and literature on sustainable energy. During the course of 
research (June-August 2011), the author visited the China-funded Kamchay 
dam in Kampot province in Cambodia and interviewed local NGOs and 
villagers. In-depth interviews were also conducted with the experts from 
relevant government institutions, local and international organizations to 
capture different stakeholder perspectives. Each interview lasted about an hour, 
and was recorded with permission from the interviewees. The interviews were 
conducted in Khmer, then transcribed, translated and analyzed by the author. 
                                                      
23 http://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/sambor-dam 
24 Carl Middleton (2008), pp. 12-20 
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The paper is structured into four parts. In the first part, the author 
conceptualizes the link between energy and sustainable development and 
provides a framework for analysis. The second part of the paper gives an 
overview of the Cambodia’s energy sector and elaborates on China’s 
involvement in the sector. The third part analyzes China’s roles based on the 
proposed framework. The last part looks at the future of the energy sector, and 
how China can help to make it more sustainable. 
 
3.2. Conceptual framework: The link between energy and sustainable 
development 
 
The WCED (1987) report recognizes energy as a human basic need that must be 
fulfilled to achieve sustainable development. The importance of energy has 
been re-emphasized with the establishment of the UN’s initiative “Sustainable 
Energy For All” which aims to achieve three interlinked objectives by 2030: 
providing universal access to modern energy services; doubling the global rate 
of improvement in energy efficiency; and doubling the share of renewable 
energy in the global energy mix.25 SE4ALL recognizes that sustainable 
development is not possible without sustainable energy and policies to meet 
energy demand affect sustainable development effort in various ways. The 
following sections discuss the links between energy, and the three pillars of 
sustainable development.  
Figure 1: Energy and Sustainable Development Link 
                                                      
25 United Nations, Sustainable Energy for All, 
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3.2.1.Energy and economic growth  
The relationship between energy and economic development has been widely 
discussed in the literature; however, most of the previous scholarly work 
focuses on how economic growth affects energy use, rather than vice versa.26 
Much of the recent theoretical and empirical evidence indicates that energy use 
and output play a key role in enabling growth.27 “Integral to the process of 
production is a combination of capital, labor, and energy.” 
 
Energy alone is clearly not sufficient for creating the conditions for economic 
growth, but it is certainly necessary. The International Energy Agency studied 
the factors contributing to the rapid growth of several countries during 1980-
2001 and found that energy contributes significantly to economic growth in all 
of the sample countries, and was the leading driver of growth in Brazil, Turkey 
and Korea. They also find that the lack of investment in public utilities, 
inefficient management, under-pricing and unattractive climate for private 
investment cause energy shortages and hinder economic growth and 
development in many developing countries.28  
 
Figure 2: Contribution of energy to GDP growth in selected countries 1980-2001 
 
 
 
                                                      
26 Michael Toman and Barbora Jemelkova (2003), pp. 93-112. 
27 See David I. Stern (2000),  pp. 267–283; Lee, C. and C. Chang (2008), pp. 50–65.; B.S Warr 
and R.U Ayres (2010), pp. 1688- 1693. 
28 International Energy Agency (2004), pp. 332-333 
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3.2.2.Energy and the environment  
The production and consumption of energy place a wide range of pressure on 
the environment. The use of fossil fuel which accounts for 81 per cent of global 
primary energy consumption creates various environmental harms.29 The 
burning of oil, for example, produces large amount of CO2 which causes global 
warming. During oil production, harmful gasses and waste materials are 
produced, causing groundwater and air pollution. Incidents such as oil spills 
during the transportation of oil, pose the threat of additional damage to the   
environment. Similarly, coal mining creates toxic wastes, poisons water and 
pollutes the air. . Coal and coal waste products release toxic chemicals which 
kill approximately one million people annually across the world.30 To reduce 
the environmental impact of the traditional energy source, there is a concerted 
effort to promote the use of renewable energy (wind, water, the sun, biomass 
and geothermal energy) and enhance energy efficiency. The UN’s Sustainable 
Energy for All’s initiative has already laid out plans to double the use of 
renewable energy, and double the global rate of energy efficiency by 2030.31 
Increasing the share of energy from renewable sources not only reduces 
greenhouse gas emissions, but also fosters economic growth and improves 
energy security of developing countries. Similarly, investing in energy 
efficiency increases global resource productivity, supports economic growth, 
and reduces costs for all citizens. 
 
3.2.3. Energy and social development  
Energy services contribute to social development by improving education, 
public health and enabling basic human needs to be met. Access to electricity 
allows children to study after dark and increases household’s overall 
productivity. Agricultural yields can be improved because electricity allows 
water to be pumped for crops; foods and medicines can last longer because 
electricity makes refrigeration possible. Electricity also relieves women from 
the time-consuming and dangerous traveling long distances to gather wood for 
cooking and heating. Currently, 1.3 billion people globally still lack electricity. 
Not having access to electricity not only deprives people of such basic 
necessities as lighting and communication, but also hampers productivity and 
                                                      
29 International Energy Agency (2011), p 1 
30 World Health Organization (2006), p. 13 
31 United Nations, Sustainable Energy for All, website 
http://www.sustainableenergyforall.org/objectives  
 
economic development. The WHO predicts that if half of the global households 
could have access to cleaner cooking sources, families would save US$ 34 
billion per year, generating an economic return of US$ 105 billion per year over 
a ten-year period.32  
 
A shortage of electricity, high costs of supplying rural households, the lack of 
appropriate investment incentives, and weak implementing capacity are the 
common barriers to closing the energy access gap. While efforts to find 
additional energy sources have the potential to improve access, energy 
generation projects, if not well managed, can cause harm to the environment 
and the society. For example, many large-scale mining and hydropower projects 
have been criticized for their detrimental impacts on society including 
involuntary relocation of villagers, and interruption to their way of life and 
livelihood.  
 
To sum up, energy and sustainable development are intricately linked. 
Sustainable development cannot be achieved without energy, and energy 
policies can directly affect effort to achieve sustainable development. Energy 
has become such a significant development ingredient that The United Nations 
General Assembly declared in 2012 the International Year of Sustainable 
Energy for All. The Assembly recognizes that “…access to modern affordable 
energy services in developing countries is essential for the achievement of the 
internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium 
Development Goals, and sustainable development, which would help to reduce 
poverty and to improve the conditions and standard of living for the majority of 
the world’s population”.33 In the Cambodian context, energy is clearly one of 
the biggest development challenges. The country’s serious shortage of energy is 
affecting its competitiveness and growth. To deal with this problem, the 
Cambodian government has turned to China for loans and encouraged Chinese 
firms to invest in energy-related projects. China has been the main engine for 
Cambodia's energy development, and its roles are affecting the country’s 
development in many ways. The following section gives an overview of the 
Cambodia’s energy sector and elaborates on China’s involvement in this area. 
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33 United Nations (2011), p. 2 
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3.3. Cambodia’s energy institutional arrangement and policy 
 
After the prolonged civil wars of the 1970s which destroyed energy 
infrastructure, Cambodia, with the support of the international community, 
started to rehabilitate its energy sector in the early 1990s. In 1992 an energy 
sector master plan was completed with the assistance from the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA). In 1994 the energy development 
policy was formulated (1) to provide an adequate supply of energy throughout 
Cambodia at reasonable and affordable price, (2) to ensure a reliable, secure 
electricity supply at prices which facilitate investment in Cambodia and 
development of the national economy, (3) to encourage exploration and 
environmentally and socially acceptable development of energy resources 
needed for supply to all sectors of the Cambodian economy and (4) to 
encourage efficient use of energy and to minimize detrimental environmental 
effects resulting from energy supply and use.34  
 
In 1996, the Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy was established as the 
main government body responsible for setting and administrating the policies, 
strategies and planning in the energy sector. Five years later the electricity law 
was passed. The law, the country’s first major energy policy, was developed to 
(1) ensure the protection of the rights of the consumers to receive the reliable 
and adequate supply of electric power services at reasonable cost, (2) promote 
private ownership of the facilities for providing electric power services, (3) 
establish competition wherever feasible in the sector and (4) create favorable 
conditions for the investment in and the commercial operation of the electric 
power industry. Under this law, the Electricity Authority of Cambodia (EAC) 
was created as an independent regulatory authority of Cambodia’s power sector. 
EAC’s responsibilities include: tariff setting, solving disputes between 
producers/suppliers and consumers, setting up uniform accounting standards, 
enforcing regulations, and review of planning and financing performance. 
 
Even after decades of rehabilitation, Cambodia’s energy sector remains 
underdeveloped. Currently, traditional biomass (mainly wood) accounts for 73 
                                                      
34 World Bank (2006), p 13 
 
per cent of primary energy demand, followed by oil at 26 per cent.35 
Hydropower, despite its huge potential, has so far made a very small 
contribution, while coal and gas have not yet featured in the energy mix. 
Cambodia, which has one of the lowest GDP per capita figures in the world, 
also has one of the lowest energy uses per capita in ASEAN. On average, one 
person in Cambodia uses only 370 kgoe (kilograms of oil equivalent) of energy, 
compared to 423 kgoe in the Philippines, 744 kgoe in Vietnam and 1,503 kgoe 
in Thailand.36 In 2009 Cambodia had the electricity consumption per capita of 
130 kwh, a little more than Myanmar, but much less than neighboring countries 
(Table 1). 
Table 1: Energy Statistics in ASEAN 
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Brunei 17,225 0.4 18,939 7,971 99.7 8,661.8 
Cambodia 589 14.3 3,667 370 24.0* 130.8 
Indonesia 1206 242.3 351,841 850 64.5 590.2 
Lao PDR 591 6.2 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Malaysia 5,364 28.8 89,693 2,390 99.4 3,613.5 
Myanmar n.a 48.3 22,357 316 13.0 103.7 
Philippines 1,410 94.8 23,474 423 89.7 593.5 
Singapore 33,529 5.1 28 3,704 100 7,948.9 
Thailand 2,698 69.5 61,705 1,503 99.3 2,044.8 
Vietnam 757 87.8 76,642 744 97.6 917.6 
Source: Author’s compilation from World Bank Database and World Energy Outlook report 
2011.  
*According the latest presentation document of an official at MIME, Cambodia’s electrification 
has increased to 35% in 2011. See Victor Jona (2012). 
 
The power sector in Cambodia is highly fragmented. Since there is no 
integrated national transmission system, electricity is produced and distributed 
                                                      
35 Business Monitor International (2011) 
36 World Development Indicator, website 
http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=12&id=4&CNO=2  
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by 24 isolated power systems in various provincial cities. The largest system in 
Phnom Penh is run by Electricité du Cambodge (EdC), a wholly state-owned 
limited liability company formed in 1958 to generate, transmit and distribute 
electric power throughout Cambodia. However, due to its limited capacity, EdC 
currently produces electricity for only 376,000 customers in 18 cities and 
provincial towns, while the remaining areas are served by 249 licensed Rural 
Electricity Enterprise (REEs), which are small locally-owned businesses 
operating small diesel-powered mini-grids (1-10 MV) or battery charging 
services that sell power to local households and businesses. 37 It should be noted 
about half of these REEs operate only 4-12 hours a day and usually charge 
higher prices than the EdC.38 
 
Table 2: Cambodia’s energy issues 
Indicator Issues 
Access Only 24 percent of its entire population has access to 
electricity 
Dependency Cambodia has to import 42 percent of electricity from  
neighboring countries to meet its local demand 
Reliability Frequent energy supply disruptions and/or peak time 
electricity supply shortages 
Affordability Cambodia’s electricity is among the most expensive in 
the world 
Human resource Low technical and institutional capacity 
Financial 
resource 
Lack of funding (US$ 1 billion is needed till 2020) 
 
Arguably, one of the major problems in the power sector is the lack of access. 
Over 11.3 million people (mostly in rural areas) are still not connected to the 
grid. Cambodia’s electricity level stands in stark contrast to those of its 
neighbors: 64.5 per cent in Indonesia, 90 per cent in the Philippines, 98 per cent 
in Vietnam and 99 per cent in Thailand.39 Expanding access has been relatively 
slower than the neighboring countries. For example, in 1995 Laos and 
Cambodia had a similar level electrification, 15 per cent, but fifteen years later, 
                                                      
37 Electricité du Cambodge (2010), p. 5 
38 World Bank (2011), p. 105 
39 International Energy Agency (2011), p 134 
 
Cambodia is far behind Laos whose access to electricity had more than 
quadrupled to 69 per cent in 2010.40 There are two major reasons for such low 
electricity access in Cambodia. First, electricity grids cover very limited areas 
(mostly in the biggest cities) and are not connected to each other so 
communities in the remote locations cannot be served. Secondly, the high cost 
of electricity prevents the rural population from getting connected, even if they 
have access to the grid. According to the World Bank, Cambodia’s electricity is 
among the most expensive in the world. In the cities, the prices range from 
US$0.165 to US$0.205 per kilowatt-hour (kwh) and in rural areas the cost can 
be as high as US$1.25 per kwh (Table 3).41 Heavy reliance on imported fossil 
fuel for electricity generation and the lack of integrated high voltage 
transmission systems are the main culprits for the costly price of electricity.  
 
Table 3: Average electricity tariff of EDC calculated for three locations 
(Phnom Penh, Kandal province and Kompong Spue provincial town) 
 
Type of customer Explanation Tariff 
(US 
cent) 
Average 
tariff 
(US cent) 
Residential Monthly consumption below 50 kwh 15 16.5 
Monthly consumption above 50 kwh 18
Commercial and 
Industrial 
Small 19.99 19.32 
Medium 19.19
Big 18.79
Institutional Embassy, NGOs and foreign 
residents and institution 
20.5 20.5 
Source: Author’s calculation from EAC report 2011. Calculation is based on exchange rate of 
US$1= Riel 4000 
 
Another key issue in the power sector is the persistent shortage of supply. 
Growing at an average rate of 19 per cent per year, electricity demand in 
Cambodia reached 409 megawatts in 2010, while the electricity supply stood at 
485 megawatts in the same year.42 Of this supply output, only about 50 per cent 
is produced domestically, while the remaining of the electricity is imported 
                                                      
40 World Bank (2012), p viii 
41 http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/2011/02/25/cambodia-villagers-enjoy-cheaper-reliable-
electricity  
42  Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy (2011b) 
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from Vietnam, Thailand and Laos (Table 4). Currently, the electricity supply 
barely meets the local demand, but in dry season when more energy is needed 
for cooling, intermittent blackouts are common due to a lack of power. The lack 
of reliable power increases the operating cost of doing business, and affects the 
productivity of people.43 With the demand expected to increase fivefold by 
2020, Cambodia is under intense pressure to boost its power supply to meet the 
soaring demand. 
 
Table 4: Energy Import 2010 
 
Country Amount (in million kWh) Average cost per kWh 
Thailand 385 10 US cent 
Vietnam 1,155 6.9 US cent 
Laos 5.7 7.02 US cent 
Total 1,546  
Source: Author’s calculation from EAC report 2011. 
 
Realizing that costly electricity bills and the inadequate supply of power could 
hinder economic growth and deter investors, the government has made an 
ambitious plan to significantly increase Cambodia’s power output and to supply 
70 per cent of the population with reliable electricity by 2030. To achieve this 
goal, a number of strategies have been put into place. First, the government has 
prioritized 17 power generation projects in different phases to be completed by 
2020. This includes the construction of eight hydropower dams and a number of 
coal power plants with an installed capacity of 4,023 megawatts and 1,300 
megawatts respectively. Secondly, according to the national power grid 
development plan, sixteen power grid projects, with the total length of 2100 
kms, are also to be constructed by 2027 to help increase electricity access to the 
rural villages.44 In addition, rural electrification programs focusing on solar 
energy have also been implemented to bring electricity to remote places outside 
the grid system.  
 
Some improvements have been made in the power sector in recent years, 
particularly in the expansion of the electricity generation and supply system. As 
                                                      
43 The Phnom Penh Post (2012c),  
44 Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy, supra note 38 
 
of July 2012, one hydropower project (the Kamchay dam) was completed and 
four more are under construction (table 5). Several transmission lines and 
substations are also being built.45 Also, as part of the Rural Electrification Fund 
projects, a total of 12,000 Solar Home Systems have been installed in seven 
provinces.46 Despite the progress, Cambodia’s energy sector remains in a 
critical situation and is facing significant financial, technical and institutional 
challenges.  
 
One of key barriers to the improvement of the sector is the lack of adequate 
financial resources. The World Bank estimates that Cambodia will need to 
invest a total of US$1.4 billion from 2011-2020 and an additional US$2.3 
billion from 2021-2030 to achieve universal electricity access.47 Given the 
government’s poor budget performance, such funding will have to come from 
donors and private investors. 
 
“The main challenge is the lack of funding support from international 
NGOs and development partners to develop the energy sector, 
particularly the rural electrification program. According to our 
estimate, we need about one billion US dollar to achieve the two goals: 
(1) By 2020, all villages will have access to electricity and (2) by 2030, 
at least 70 per cent of all household is connected to the quality grid. So 
we need financial support from various donors or loan from local banks 
to develop in this sector,”48  
 
Another major challenge is the lack of technical and institutional capacity to 
implement the plan. The management systems of the two governing bodies of 
the energy sector (MIME and EAC) are weak; their staff lack technical 
expertise and research is poor or absent. These present major barriers for 
effective policy formulation and implementation. 
 
“We lack experience and expertise and this is the our challenge for the 
future. The energy sector will grow in the future and we don’t know how 
                                                      
45 Author’s interview with the director of planning department of MIME on 03 February 2012 
46 Author’s Interview with the executive director of the Rural Electricity Fund on 15 February 
2012 
47 World Bank (2011), p. 105 
48 Author’s interview with the director of planning department of MIME on 03 February 2012 
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Realizing that costly electricity bills and the inadequate supply of power could 
hinder economic growth and deter investors, the government has made an 
ambitious plan to significantly increase Cambodia’s power output and to supply 
70 per cent of the population with reliable electricity by 2030. To achieve this 
goal, a number of strategies have been put into place. First, the government has 
prioritized 17 power generation projects in different phases to be completed by 
2020. This includes the construction of eight hydropower dams and a number of 
coal power plants with an installed capacity of 4,023 megawatts and 1,300 
megawatts respectively. Secondly, according to the national power grid 
development plan, sixteen power grid projects, with the total length of 2100 
kms, are also to be constructed by 2027 to help increase electricity access to the 
rural villages.44 In addition, rural electrification programs focusing on solar 
energy have also been implemented to bring electricity to remote places outside 
the grid system.  
 
Some improvements have been made in the power sector in recent years, 
particularly in the expansion of the electricity generation and supply system. As 
                                                      
43 The Phnom Penh Post (2012c),  
44 Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy, supra note 38 
 
of July 2012, one hydropower project (the Kamchay dam) was completed and 
four more are under construction (table 5). Several transmission lines and 
substations are also being built.45 Also, as part of the Rural Electrification Fund 
projects, a total of 12,000 Solar Home Systems have been installed in seven 
provinces.46 Despite the progress, Cambodia’s energy sector remains in a 
critical situation and is facing significant financial, technical and institutional 
challenges.  
 
One of key barriers to the improvement of the sector is the lack of adequate 
financial resources. The World Bank estimates that Cambodia will need to 
invest a total of US$1.4 billion from 2011-2020 and an additional US$2.3 
billion from 2021-2030 to achieve universal electricity access.47 Given the 
government’s poor budget performance, such funding will have to come from 
donors and private investors. 
 
“The main challenge is the lack of funding support from international 
NGOs and development partners to develop the energy sector, 
particularly the rural electrification program. According to our 
estimate, we need about one billion US dollar to achieve the two goals: 
(1) By 2020, all villages will have access to electricity and (2) by 2030, 
at least 70 per cent of all household is connected to the quality grid. So 
we need financial support from various donors or loan from local banks 
to develop in this sector,”48  
 
Another major challenge is the lack of technical and institutional capacity to 
implement the plan. The management systems of the two governing bodies of 
the energy sector (MIME and EAC) are weak; their staff lack technical 
expertise and research is poor or absent. These present major barriers for 
effective policy formulation and implementation. 
 
“We lack experience and expertise and this is the our challenge for the 
future. The energy sector will grow in the future and we don’t know how 
                                                      
45 Author’s interview with the director of planning department of MIME on 03 February 2012 
46 Author’s Interview with the executive director of the Rural Electricity Fund on 15 February 
2012 
47 World Bank (2011), p. 105 
48 Author’s interview with the director of planning department of MIME on 03 February 2012 
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to manage it effectively. So we’ll have to learn from international 
experience.”49
 
Most of the power producers, suppliers and distributors are also in poor 
technical and financial condition. For example, almost all of the Rural 
Electricity Enterprises are run as a family business without proper 
documentation or financial statement. Many even operate without an official 
license from the government. The lack of official documents and financial 
statements has prevented them from getting loans from the banks to upgrade 
their businesses. They also lack skill in the operation, maintenance and 
management; trainings are rare since some of them simply inherit the business 
from their elders, while some learn from their counterparts in the 
neighborhood.50 Even the largest state-owned power facility, Electricité du 
Cambodge, is faced with such institutional challenges as its Deputy Director of 
Corporate and Planning division told the author during an interview on 29 
February 2012 “Human resource is a problem for many institutions and the EdC 
is no exception. But we’ve made some progress. We have staff trained locally 
and some are going abroad to study.” 
 
International donors have played a vital role in the development of the energy 
sector in Cambodia. The World Bank, for example, has contributed at least 
US$98.5 million in loans and grants to improve the sector.51 The Asian 
Development Bank has also provided technical assistance, loans and grants for 
the construction of various transmission lines and substations.52 China, 
Germany, Australia and South Korea are the key donors in Cambodia’s energy 
sector.53 Most notably, of all the donors, China is arguably the biggest player in 
the sector, having financed billions of dollars in energy-related projects. 
Chinese firms, financed by China’s banks and supported by the Chinese 
government, have invested heavily in hydropower, coal power plants and power 
distribution systems.  
 
                                                      
49 Author’s interview with the deputy director of the corporate and planning division, Electricity 
of Cambodia (EdC) on February 29, 2012. 
50 Author’s Interview with the executive director of the Rural Electricity Fund on 15 February 
2012 
51  http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/cambodia/projects/all  
52 http://cdc.khmer.biz/  
53 Ibid. 
 
3.4. China’s involvement in Cambodia’s energy sector 
  
China is one of the most prominent foreign players in Cambodia. A century-old 
relationship between China and Cambodia allows the two nations to establish 
close diplomatic, political and economic ties. Presently, China is Cambodia’s 
top foreign investor and a major source of foreign assistance. China’s 
accumulative official development assistance (ODA) from 1992- 2011 reached 
US$ 0.86 billion accounting for 7.1 per cent of total ODA, making it the second 
largest bilateral donor, behind Japan.54 
 
According to Council for Development of Cambodia, the highest decision-
making level of the government for private and public sector investment, by 
September 2011 China’s accumulative investment reached US$8.8 billion, 
making it the largest investor in the kingdom, followed by South Korea (US$ 4 
billion), Malaysia (US$ 2.6 billion), the United Kingdom (US$ 2.3 billion) and 
the United States of America (US$1.2 billion).55 China has now become a 
leading investor in natural resources and the energy sector. In fact, 92% of total 
energy investment approved from 1998-2008 came from China.56 Noticeably, 
five hydroelectric dams with a total capacity of 915 megawatts were financed 
by Chinese investors with the total investments of US$ 1.8 billion.57 These 
include the recently completed 193- megawatt Kamchay dam in Kampot 
province, the 18 megawatt Kirirom III dam, the 246 megawatt Stung Tatay dam 
and the 338 megawatt Russei Chrum Krom dam in Koh Kong Provice, and the 
120 megawatt Stung Atay dam in Pursat province. Five additional projects 
financed by Chinese firms, are also currently being studied (Table 5). 
 
Table 5: Hydropower Plants funded by China 
No Project Capacity 
(MW) 
Cost 
(million 
USD) 
Expected 
Year of 
Operation
Status 
1 Kamchay  193 280 2011 Completed 
2 Kirirom III  18 47 2012 Under construction 
3 Stung Atay  120 450 2013 Under construction 
                                                      
54 Council for the Development of Cambodia (2011), p 14 
55 Ibid. p 3 
56 Ibid. p 4 
57 Ibid. p 4 
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56 Ibid. p 4 
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4 Stung Tatay  246 540 2014 Under construction 
5 Lower Stung 
Russey 
Chhrum  
338 495 2013 Under construction 
6 Stung Chhay 
Areng  
108 - 2017 MoU 
7 Lower Sesan 
II 
400 781 2017 MoU 
8 Lower Sre 
Pok III  
416 - 2018 MoU 
9 Lower Sre 
Pok IV 
48 - 2018 MoU 
10 Sambor  2,600 4,947 2019 MoU 
Source: Author’s compilation from MIME report and various media reports. Note: MoU means 
a memorandum of understanding has been signed but construction has not started. 
 
Apart from hydropower, China is also investing in coal power plant, which 
according to the national power sector plan, will play a secondary role in the 
energy mix after hydropower. Currently, three coal power plants are being 
constructed, two of which are reported to be financed by Chinese firms. The 
first plant is being built in Stoeng Hav Industrial Zone in Sihanouk province by 
a joint venture between a local firm and an undisclosed Chinese company. The 
plant, which costs US$362 million to build, has the capacity of 270 megawatts 
and is expected to be operational in 2014.58 Another unnamed Chinese firm has 
also been reported to invest US$370 million in a 300-megawatt coal power 
plant in Kampot province.59 Once completed in 2015, the plant will provide 
electricity for the Kampot Special Economic Zone, the nearby Prey Nob oil-
refinery and rice mills in Preah Sihanouk province. 
 
                                                      
58 The Phnom Penh Post (2010) 
59 The Phnom Penh Post (2012b) 
 
Table 6: Plan of coal power plant construction in Cambodia 
No Province Capacity 
(MW) 
Cost 
(million 
USD) 
Investor Expected 
Year of 
Operation 
Status 
1 Sihanouk 100 200 Cambodia 
International 
Development 
Group Co Ltd 
Leader 
Universal 
Holding and 
built by 
Huadian 
Engineering 
Company 
2013 Being 
constructed 
2 Stoeng 
Hav 
Industrial 
Zone, 
Sihanouk 
Province 
270 362 Cambodia 
International 
Development 
Group Co Ltd 
and an 
Unnamed 
Chinese firm 
2014 Construction 
began in 
November 
2012  
3 Kampot 300 370 Undisclosed 
Chinese firm 
2015 Being 
constructed 
4 Oddar 
Meanchey 
200 n.a Hang Seng 
company 
2015 EIA 
approved 
5 Koh Kong 1,800 3,000 Cambodia's 
K.K. Power 
firm and 
Thailand's 
Ratchaburi 
Electricity 
Generating 
Holding Plc 
(50% each) 
n.a Feasibility 
study is 
being 
conducted  
Source: Author’s compilation from various media reports.  
 
In addition to investment in electricity generation projects, China has assisted in 
the building of the power distribution system. For example in 2009, China 
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In addition to investment in electricity generation projects, China has assisted in 
the building of the power distribution system. For example in 2009, China 
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provided an US$80 million soft loan to the EdC to build the Phnom Penh Loop 
Line Transmission System which brings electricity from all over Cambodia.60 
Recently, China also offered a US$53 million of concessional loan to Cambodia 
for the construction of a 22 kilovolt electricity transmission line that will run 
through four provinces: Kampong Cham, Prey Veng, Kampong Speu, and 
Preah Sihanouk. Built by China National Heavy Machinery Corporation, the 
project is to be completed in 2014 and is expected to benefit four million people 
who currently lack access to electricity.61  
China is indeed a key driver for Cambodia's energy development, and is 
investing huge amount of capital compared with other countries. China’s 
contribution to the energy sector is significant and is warmly welcomed by the 
government. “China is the largest country that helps develop energy sector in 
Cambodia. [….] On behalf of the Government of Cambodia and myself, I'd like 
to profoundly thank China for its aid on the right target and right time to 
develop Cambodia's energy sector," said Suy Sem, Cambodia's Minister of 
Industry, Mines and Energy.62  
 
While the government is grateful for China’s assistance, critics suggest that 
China’s generous donation comes with strings attached: business favors and 
political influence. Cambodia has been very supportive of Chinese investment. 
According to a report by Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR), 
Chinese companies hold the largest share of the land concessions granted since 
1994 (50 per cent of 4.6 million hectares).63 On the political front, Cambodia 
has been accused of being under the influence of China. Incidents such as the 
deportation of ethnic Uyghur asylum seeking in 2009,64 and the preferential 
treatment given to China during the ASEAN meeting in 201265 suggest that 
China can always count on Cambodia for political favors. The special 
relationship between Cambodia-China has raised the suspicion that Cambodia 
might not have applied strict regulations and standards on Chinese investment 
projects.  
 
                                                      
60 The Phnom Penh Post (2009) 
61 Xinhuanet (2012) 
62 Ibid. 
63 The Phnom Penh Post (2012a) 
64 BBC (2009) 
65 Reuters (2012) 
 
Such suspicion arises from the fact that Chinese investment in the energy 
sector, especially in hydropower projects, has been notoriously known for a 
lack of transparency. Many China-funded dams remain a mystery until the 
construction starts. Little information is disclosed to the public, while 
meaningful consultation with affected stakeholders is either absent or 
superficially conducted. To illustrate, a baseline study conducted by NGO 
Forum on the construction of the Lower Sesan 2 dam by a Chinese firm which 
environmentalists believe would affect 100, 000 people suggested that there 
was no consultation with the public. None of the nine communities affected by 
the dam have been given enough information on its impact.66 In Cambodia, 
damming is a sensitive issue and is not publicly discussed. Requests for 
meetings and interviews with the Chinese Embassy and Chinese firms from 
NGO stuff and researchers including the author usually go unanswered. Until 
China improves its investment transparency and information disclosure, the 
accusation of establishing irresponsible projects and the suspicion that 
something wrong is happening will persist. 
 
3.5. Discussion  
 
There is no doubt that Cambodia’s energy security is at risk. Insufficient 
domestic energy production and poor physical infrastructure cause accessibility, 
dependency, reliability and affordability issues. Persistent power shortages 
cause frequent energy supplies disruptions across the country and forces 
Cambodia to largely rely on foreign countries for the import of fuel and 
electricity. As a result, Cambodia’s power is among the most expensive in the 
world, while its rate of electrification is one of the lowest. With billions of 
dollars invested in energy projects, China is playing a vital role in Cambodia’s 
energy sector. Since energy is intricately linked with sustainable development, 
it is important to analyze how China’s involvement in Cambodia’s energy 
sector affects the country’s sustainable development.  
 
Obviously, energy is a primary concern for Cambodia. With the demand 
predicted to increase fivefold in the near future, the government has put forward 
an ambitious plan to boost domestic energy production, mainly through the 
construction of hydropower dams and coal power plants, and promises to bring 
                                                      
66 The Phnom Penh Post (2013) 
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electricity to 70 per cent of its population by 2030. Given the limited financial 
and institutional capacity of the government, the roles of bilateral, multilateral 
donors and the private sector are crucial in helping Cambodia to achieve this 
goal. China, in this regard, is seen to be the most prominent stakeholder in 
terms of their contribution to Cambodia’s energy sector. When Cambodia 
needed money China spent billions of dollars in the form of investments, loans 
and grants to help improve domestic power generation, distribution and 
capacity building in the energy sector. In this way, China is seen to be 
transforming Cambodia’s energy sector by helping to reduce reliance on foreign 
energy, increase the rate of electrification, and potentially bring down the cost 
of energy. 
 
China-funded energy projects help boost domestic electricity generation and 
contribute to improving access to electricity for rural people. This in turn 
translates into an economic gain for the community and households. With 
access to electricity, children can study at night; women can save time from 
going into the wood to collect firewood for cooking thus improving the 
productivity of their income generating activities. Communal health may also 
improve as health facilities can care for patients at night and medicines can be 
properly refrigerated.  
 
Advantageous as it may seem, China’s roles need to be analyzed from a broader 
sustainability framework. As discussed in the previous section, energy is 
delicately linked to sustainable development. Energy is a multi-dimensional 
issue; hence, policies to achieve sustainable energy must reflect and address 
local context in such as a way that they do not create problems in other areas. 
Sustainable energy for Cambodia should mean more than having energy 
independence. It must satisfy the energy needs of current and future generations 
in a sustainable way which does not seriously harm the environment, nor 
negatively affect the livelihood of the local people.  
 
China-financed energy projects may be economically beneficial, and might 
have the potential to solve Cambodia’s chronic power deficit, but critics have 
expressed their concerns on the social and environmental consequences of such 
projects. Chinese investment in hydropower dams, in particular, has been met 
with widespread criticism from local and international environmental activists. 
For example, the Kamchay hydropower project, which was built by China’s 
 
largest hydropower company, Sinohydro Corporation, has flooded 2,000 
hectares of forested land in Bakor national, home to a number of endangered 
species and an important resource to local communities. The construction of the 
dam had started long before the approval of the environmental impact 
assessment (IEA). Even now, the project EIA is still not made available to the 
public. In the case of Stung Atay dam in Koh Kong province, it is estimated that 
around 5,000 hectares of protected forest in the Phnom Samkok Wildlife 
Sanctuary and the Cardamom Mountains would be flooded. According to an 
official of an international organization working closely with this case, the local 
forest was cleared, destroying the food source of the local community. 
Although the villagers were promised compensation, until now nothing has 
materialized. The affected families neither know when they will be 
compensated, nor what kind of the compensation they will get.67 Stung Tatay, 
another dam in the same province which is being built by a Chinese firm, also 
poses a major risk to more than 2,000 hectares of evergreen forest and animal 
habitat. The conservation groups warn that the project could devastate one of 
Cambodia’s richest ecological sites for little gain.68 Most notably, the proposed 
Sambo Dam in Kratie province, if built, would jeopardize fisheries, threaten the 
habitat of the critically endangered Irrawaddy dolphins and affect around 
20,000 people who would be evicted from their homes and land.69  
 
“It’s a great loss because we do not have many places in the country 
like that left. So many forests have been destroyed. This area has the 
rare animals, the endangered species, the mountain crocodile – so many 
rare animals I have never seen before,” says opposition Sam Rainsy 
Party MP Son Chhay after visiting the site for Stung Chhay Areng dam 
in Koh Kong province70
 
From the social perspective, China-funded dam projects have also affected 
people’s livelihood. For example, the Lower Sesan 2 dam in Stung Treng, 
which is being built by Cambodia’s Royal Group, in partnership with Chinese 
company Hydrolancang International Energy, will displace some 5,000 families 
and adversely affect the livelihoods of 100,000 more, who depend on the 
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capacity building in the energy sector. In this way, China is seen to be 
transforming Cambodia’s energy sector by helping to reduce reliance on foreign 
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largest hydropower company, Sinohydro Corporation, has flooded 2,000 
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around 5,000 hectares of protected forest in the Phnom Samkok Wildlife 
Sanctuary and the Cardamom Mountains would be flooded. According to an 
official of an international organization working closely with this case, the local 
forest was cleared, destroying the food source of the local community. 
Although the villagers were promised compensation, until now nothing has 
materialized. The affected families neither know when they will be 
compensated, nor what kind of the compensation they will get.67 Stung Tatay, 
another dam in the same province which is being built by a Chinese firm, also 
poses a major risk to more than 2,000 hectares of evergreen forest and animal 
habitat. The conservation groups warn that the project could devastate one of 
Cambodia’s richest ecological sites for little gain.68 Most notably, the proposed 
Sambo Dam in Kratie province, if built, would jeopardize fisheries, threaten the 
habitat of the critically endangered Irrawaddy dolphins and affect around 
20,000 people who would be evicted from their homes and land.69  
 
“It’s a great loss because we do not have many places in the country 
like that left. So many forests have been destroyed. This area has the 
rare animals, the endangered species, the mountain crocodile – so many 
rare animals I have never seen before,” says opposition Sam Rainsy 
Party MP Son Chhay after visiting the site for Stung Chhay Areng dam 
in Koh Kong province70
 
From the social perspective, China-funded dam projects have also affected 
people’s livelihood. For example, the Lower Sesan 2 dam in Stung Treng, 
which is being built by Cambodia’s Royal Group, in partnership with Chinese 
company Hydrolancang International Energy, will displace some 5,000 families 
and adversely affect the livelihoods of 100,000 more, who depend on the 
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region’s fisheries. According to a local NGO who study the impact of the dam, 
there was no consultation from the government. The people affected by the dam 
were given little, if any, official information about the dam. The Kamchay dam 
on Bokor mountain was also reported to have affected the livelihood the local 
people who depend on collecting and selling non-timber forest products (such 
as bamboo, medicinal plants, edible fruit) from the forests.71 The author’s 
interviews with villagers reveal that after construction commenced, bamboo 
collectors suffered a drastic loss of income because access to the forests has 
been restricted. 
 
“At the beginning they didn’t allow us to go into the forest. After we 
protested, we were allowed access but we had to register our name 
before you went in. Now we can go in freely but we have to travel long 
distance, go higher up the mountain to cut the bamboo since the 
bamboo near to the mountain hill had been cleared for dam 
construction. Before we could make five to seven baskets a day but now 
we can only make two to four,” Ms Chea Chheang, a villager in O’toch 
village, Kampot.72
 
While the economic benefits of China’s energy project are yet to be seen, the 
social and environmental consequences are evident. It may not be fair to 
generalize on the negative effect of Chinese energy projects but recurring 
issues; such as the lack of transparency and accountability, public consultation, 
and access to justice for those who are affected have been observed in many 
Chinese-led dam projects. As long as China-Cambodia relations remain 
unchanged, China will continue to play a vital role in the development of the 
energy sector. There are already signs of more Chinese investment in this 
sector. For example, a Beijing-based Junlun International Holding, which 
specializes in coal-fired power plants, oil and gas extraction was reportedly 
planning to invest US$ 500 million within six years in Cambodia's energy 
sector.73 It is, therefore, important the Chinese government, companies and 
other stakeholders work together to maximize the benefits, and minimize the 
impact of future energy projects. 
 
                                                      
71 Carl Middleton (2008) p 56 
72 Interview with the author on 20 July 2011 
73 DAP News (2012) 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
 
With rising demand, energy will surely continue to be Cambodia’s key 
development agenda for years to come. Various policies and plans have been 
developed and put into place to expand generation capacity, increase energy 
access, and improve energy efficiency. However, the lack of institutional 
capacity, human and financial resources remains the main challenges. With 
billions of dollars invested in energy projects, China is playing a vital role in 
helping Cambodia to achieve energy independence and this paper does not 
dispute this claim. However, the author argues that while China plays a crucial 
role in moving Cambodia out of its chronic energy crisis, Chinese companies 
pose serious threats to social and environmental sustainability.  
 
Chinese companies have the potential to be a catalyst for sustainable energy 
development in Cambodia if they, together with the local government, put more 
effort to embrace international best practices and significantly improve the 
transparency of their investment projects. To ensure that energy projects will 
benefit rather than harm communities, local governments must enhance their 
regulatory role by putting in place clear investment regulations, especially on 
environmentally sensitive investment projects and compliance should be strictly 
monitored. A comprehensive feasibility study should be conducted before the 
implementation of energy projects to thoroughly assess their costs and benefits. 
Stakeholders, in particular the local communities, should be consulted and 
empowered to express their ideas and concerns, and assured that their well-
being will be taken to consideration in the decision making process. Moreover, 
Chinese’s money can also be channeled to support energy efficiency initiatives 
and fund less controversial renewable energy projects such as solar power, 
micro hydropower, biofuel and biogas. These off-grid energy projects will not 
only contribute to sustainable energy development, but also significantly 
improve the livelihood of the poor rural population. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
Hydropower and local community: A case study of Kamchay 
Dam, a China-funded hydropower project in Cambodia74 
 
Abstract:
 
To solve its chronic power shortage, the government of Cambodia has 
placed the development of hydropower as one of the national 
priorities.  With a total of US$ 1.8 billion in investment, China is the 
most prominent player in hydropower development in Cambodia. The 
increase of hydropower projects and China’s involvement has sparked 
national controversy. There are contentious debates on such projects 
despite their potential economic benefits because of the concerns over 
their social and environmental consequences. Combining site visits 
and field interviews, this paper studies China-funded Kamchay 
hydropower project in Cambodia, and examines its impact on the 
local community two years after its began operating. While the 
mainstream studies tend to look at the general impacts of dam, this 
paper contributes to the existing literature by placing its emphasis on 
the local community who were a key stakeholder directly affected by 
the project and the one who is often neglected. This section of the 
paper makes a distinctive contribution to the ongoing debate on the 
effects of large-scale natural resource investments on sustainable 
development in Cambodia. 
 
Keywords: Cambodia, China, community, hydropower, livelihood 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Energy is one of the key development challenges in Cambodia. Currently, only 
about 35% of the population has access to reliable electricity (MIME, 2012). 
The price of electricity is one of the highest in the world (World Bank, 2006) 
because 92% of electricity produced is generated from imported diesel (EAC, 
2011). With the electricity demand is expected to increase fivefold by 2020 
                                                      
74 This chapter is currently under review by Community Development Journal.  
(World Bank, 2006), hydropower has been identified as the most effective 
solution to the nation’s energy shortage. A National Sector Review of 
Hydropower prepared by Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy (MIME) in 
2003 has identified 14 priority projects, of which 8 projects have been approved 
for construction and feasibility study. China has been the largest player in the 
development of dams in Cambodia. So far China has invested in at least eight 
dams: three have been constructed; three more dams are being built, and at least 
two more are currently being studied.  
 
There is a contentious debate about the rise of China’s involvement in 
Cambodia’s hydropower development. The government justifies Chinese 
investment in this sector with the economic benefits it will bring. For example, 
the dams could provide relatively cheap electricity, accelerate further 
investment create jobs, and prevent floods. Opponents, on the other hand, have 
voiced concerns over the social and environmental consequences of the 
investment. For instance, a US-based NGO International Rivers and NGO 
Forum have warned that poorly conceived hydropower development could 
irreparably damage Cambodia’s natural resources and environment (Middleton, 
2008). 
 
The principles of sustainable development clearly indicate that economic 
benefits from hydropower should not take place at the expense of society. 
Development must avoid permanent losses of vital societal components for 
future generations, and inequitable distribution of costs and benefits among the 
population. Given the global debate and national controversy on China’s 
involvement in dam building and motivated by sustainable hydropower 
principles, this study seeks to find out the potential gains and costs of 
hydropower in Cambodia, paying particularly attention to the impact on the 
local community.  Using Kamchay dam as a case study, this paper adopts an 
integrated framework to critically analyze how a hydropower project financed 
and developed by China affects sustainable community development. This 
paper is divided into four sections. The first section gives an overview of 
Cambodia’s hydropower sector and China’s involvement, while the second 
section elaborates on the framework for analysis. The third part of the paper 
analyzes the impact of Kamchay dam on local community after operating for 
two years, and the last part concludes and proposes policy recommendation. 
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4.2. Hydropower development in Cambodia 
Thanks to its geographical location, Cambodia has access to rich waterways and 
has the second highest hydropower generating capacity in the Lower Mekong 
Basin, with a theoretical potential amounting to 10,000 megawatt (MV). 
However, until recently Cambodia’s hydropower potential has remained largely 
untapped. To date, only four hydropower projects have been constructed, all of 
which contribute less than 3% to the current energy mix (MIME, 2012). 
 
In recent years, hydropower has become one of the development priorities. 
Cambodia is facing serious power shortage. Only about 25% of total household 
in the rural areas has access to electricity. Although almost every house is 
connected to the grid in the main cities, intermittent power outrage is frequent 
due to an insufficient supply of electricity. The country depends on the import 
of almost half of its electricity from neighboring countries to meet its local 
demand. Cambodia’s inability to supply power regularly is one of the main 
problems affecting the country’s competitiveness.  
 
Recognizing the importance of energy for national development, the 
government has put forward an ambitious plan to boost domestic energy 
production and promised to bring electricity to 70% of the total population by 
2030. According to the power development plan (2008-2020), Cambodia 
intends to develop more domestic hydropower which will contribute more than 
50% to the total power supply by 2020. So far, four projects are operational, 
and seven more are either being studied or constructed. 
 
China is the most prominent player in hydropower development in Cambodia. 
Accounting to the Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC), China’s 
investment in hydropower has reached US$ 1.8 billion. The government has 
hailed the Chinese investors for their strong commitment to invest in 
Cambodia’s energy sector, which according to the prime minster, has 
contributed to Cambodia’s economy and society.  
 
“The investment has come from good relations and 
cooperation between Cambodia and China. On behalf of 
Cambodian government, I’d like to thank Chinese government 
for encouraging Chinese investors to Cambodia. The 
[hydropower] plants will not only reduce electricity shortages 
 
but also cut reliance on oil-fueled electricity,” says Hun Sen, 
Prime Minister of Cambodia. (Quoted on Xinhau News on 
February 23, 2013) 
 
China-financed hydropower projects may be economically beneficial and might 
have the potential to address Cambodia’s energy poverty, but critics have 
voiced their concern on the social and environmental consequences of such 
projects. For example, International Rivers claims that “Chinese companies …. 
are racing to exploit Cambodia’s hydropower resources whilst paying little 
regard to international best development practices.” (Middleton, 2008, p.5). Mu 
Sochua, an opposition lawmaker says “Chinese investments are helping to 
strengthen the climate of lawlessness and corruption. [….] These [hydropower] 
development projects violate human rights and are also raping our natural 
resources.” (Quoted on The Irrawaddy on March 29, 2013)  
 
Given the controversy of China’s involvement in the hydropower development, 
this paper aims to contribute to the ongoing debate on the pros and cons of 
hydropower projects in Cambodia by using one China-funded hydropower 
project as a case study. Kamchay hydropower dam in Kampot was chosen as 
the case study because it is the only large scale dam that is operational at the 
time of writing. Using an integrated sustainable hydropower framework, and by 
placing the local community as the focus of study, this paper examines the 
various impacts of the dam two years after its operation. Findings from this 
study provide concrete evidence contributing to the ongoing discussion on the 
effects of large-scale natural resource investments on sustainable development 
in Cambodia. 
 
4.3. Conceptual framework 
4.3.1. Hydropower and sustainable development 
 
The development of hydropower is not a new phenomenon. Over the past two 
decades, hydropower has been an important renewable energy source to 
respond to the rapid increase in global energy demand. In 2013 hydropower 
accounted for 16.5% of world electricity production, making it by far the most 
important renewable energy for electrical power production (REN21, 2013). 
However, attitudes globally towards hydropower have changed. . Thirty years 
ago, hydropower was generally considered to be a a sign of progress with little 
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thought given to any negative effects; today, an increased awareness of 
environmental and social issues has led to a growing debate on the benefits and 
consequences of hydropower. 
 
On the positive side, hydropower is claimed to make a significant contribution 
to sustainable development in many ways (Frey & Linke, 2002). Economically, 
hydropower produces reliable energy, helps foster industrial development, 
generates revenues for the government through sale of electricity and, in 
essence, offers energy independence for many countries. Unlike the traditional 
energy sources which pollute the environment, hydropower provides clean and 
renewable energy, contributing to the reduction of air pollution and the fight 
against climate change. The construction of dams may also provide a range of 
benefits.  In addition to generating electricity, the dam can be used to improve 
irrigation and flood control. The construction of dams creates jobs for the local 
population and may improve local infrastructure. Hydropower also enhances 
equity between present and future generations because it does not deplete 
natural resources, conserving them for future generations (IHA, 2003).  
 
On the negative side, hydropower is blamed for a range of environmental 
problems and social disruption, including the loss of vital components of 
ecosystems, loss of livelihood, involuntary resettlement, and undermining 
indigenous and minority groups (McCully & Wong, 2004). According to the 
World Commission on Dams75, which reviewed 125 large dams in 56 
countries, “dams have made a significant and considerable contribution to 
human development, … but in too many cases an unacceptable and often 
unnecessary price has been paid to secure those benefits, especially in social 
and environmental terms, by people displaced, by communities downstream, 
by taxpayers and by the natural environment (WCD 2000, p. 24).” 
Furthermore, the Commission found that as many as 40-80 million people 
worldwide have been forced from their homes and lands as result of large 
dams. Displaced people frequently face extreme economic hardship, 
community disintegration, and an increase in mental and physical health 
problems. Large dams also cause considerable environmental damage, 
                                                      
75 The World Commission on Dams (WCD) was established by the World Bank and The World 
Conservation Union in May 1998 in response to the growing opposition to large dams. Its main 
job is to research the environmental, social and economic impacts of the development of large 
dams globally.  
 
including the extinction of many fish and other aquatic species, huge losses of 
forest, wetlands and farmland. The benefits of large dams have largely gone to 
the rich while the poor have borne the costs (WCD, 2000).  
 
Recent empirical studies tend to support WCD’s findings. Most studies 
recognize the potential economic benefits of hydropower, but find detrimental 
effects on the social and environmental aspects of the communities. A study 
conducted by WWF, Oxfam and WaterAid on hydropower in Africa reveals 
that in general hydropower has the potential to contribute to reducing Africa’s 
energy poverty, but it also imposes losses on the ecosystem. Large hydropower 
plants such as Kariba and Cahora Bassa on the Zambezi River have brought 
electricity to urban and industrial areas, but have largely bypassed rural 
villagers. They also resulted in resettlement and loss of livelihoods for hundreds 
of thousands of people. In the case of the Zambezi River, the economic losses 
of reduced prawn fisheries, for example, have been estimated at US$10 to 20 
million per annum. In some cases, the devastating impacts have not been 
adequately addressed even decades later (Collier, 2006). 
 
Another study carried out by the International Rivers76 that includes eleven 
hydropower projects in Laos reaches similar findings. According to the report, 
tens of thousands of people are already experiencing negative impacts from 
hydro projects that are under construction, and hundreds of thousands of people 
stand to be affected by the proposed dams.  The hydro boom has resulted in 
losses in the fisheries sector, flooding and erosion, water quality problems and 
displacement of thousands of ethnic minorities (International Rivers, 2008). The 
study calls for slowing down the development of new dams, better assessment 
of other energy options, sharing of benefits with affected people, and improving 
environmental and social assessments. 
 
More recently, the Mekong River Commission conducted a comprehensive 
strategic environmental assessment of twelve hydropower projects in Lower 
Mekong Basin (LMB) countries which include Myanmar, Lao PDR, Thailand, 
Cambodia and Viet Nam. The study concluded that the 12 mainstream 
                                                      
76 Founded in 1985, International Rivers is a non-profit, non-governmental, environmental and 
human rights organization that works with a global network of policy and financial analysts, 
scientists, journalists, development specialists, local citizens and volunteers to address 
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75 The World Commission on Dams (WCD) was established by the World Bank and The World 
Conservation Union in May 1998 in response to the growing opposition to large dams. Its main 
job is to research the environmental, social and economic impacts of the development of large 
dams globally.  
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hydropower projects would bring significant additional power and investment 
benefits to the region, but they would also bring many serious risks and 
uncertainties, economic, social and environmental concerns to the Mekong 
countries and communities. The projects could contribute 8% of the 2025 
regional demand if all went ahead and would represent significant investments 
of some US$25 billion into the regional economy (MRC, 2010). However, the 
study cautioned that the projects would lead to permanent loss of aquatic and 
terrestrial biodiversity of global importance. Risks and losses incurred would 
degrade the livelihoods of the poorest communities, result in increasing food 
insecurity for millions of people and may lead to regional tension in the Lower 
Mekong Basin. 
 
4.3.2. Principles of sustainable hydropower 
To maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of dams, the World 
Commission on Dams suggests a framework for decision making based on 
recognizing the rights of, and assessing the risks to all stakeholders and offers 
seven strategic priorities which include (i) Gaining public acceptance (ii) 
Comprehensive options assessment (iii) Addressing existing dams (iv) 
Sustaining rivers and livelihoods (v) Recognizing entitlements and sharing 
benefits (vi) Ensuring compliance (vii) Sharing rivers for peace, development 
and security (WCD, 2000). The International Hydropower Association (IHA) 
also publishes a set of guidelines to promote greater consideration of 
environmental, social and economic aspects in the sustainability assessment of 
new hydro projects and the management and operation of existing power 
schemes. The guidelines stress that thorough environmental impact 
assessments (EAI) must be conducted to inform decision makers of the 
positive and negative effects of a project and associated mitigation measures. 
It is recommended that developers consult with local and national resource 
agencies at the earliest opportunity to assist in the determination of the 
environmental issues to be addressed, the studies required, and to clarify the 
timelines that apply. Also, to be sustainable, hydropower schemes need to 
recognize entitlements and shared benefits with the affected people.  The goal 
should be to ensure that all individuals and communities affected by 
developments gain sustainable benefits. (See the International Hydropower 
Association (2004) Sustainability guidelines for details.) 
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Despite the WCD’s suggestion that no dam should be built without 
“demonstrable consent from the community, the opposite is often the case in 
reality. An estimated 40-80 million people have been displaced from their 
community because of dam construction (WCD, 2000). Most often the 
displacement is involuntary and those displaced “face a broad range of 
impoverishment risks that include landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, 
marginalization, food insecurity, increased morbidity, loss of common 
resources and community dislocation that result in a loss in socio-cultural 
resilience (WCD, 2000). It is thus critically important that the community’s 
livelihood be taken into serious consideration in the planning and development 
of hydropower. This study proposes a framework to analyze the impacts of 
hydropower on the local community.  
 
Figure 1: Hydropower for sustainable community development: a proposed framework 
 
Source: Author’s own illustration 
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A hydropower scheme involves many stakeholders including the project 
developer, local and national government, civil society, the international 
community and the local community. Each stakeholder has a different role to 
play and they can affect the quality and outcome of the project. This proposed 
framework places the community at the center of the discussion and looks at 
three aspects of a hydropower project that affected the livelihood of a local 
community. 
 
Table 1: Stakeholder matrix in hydropower project development 
 
Stakeholder Role / Responsibility Interest Power 
National 
Government 
- Access and approve investment 
project 
- Develop policies and guideline to 
promote responsible investment 
- Ensure compliance 
- Share information with the public 
- Economic 
growth 
- Energy security 
High 
Local 
Government 
- Inform the community about the 
pros and cons of the project 
- Facilitate communication between 
the community and the project 
developer 
- Monitor the implementation of the 
project 
- Community 
Development 
- Satisfy their 
boss and keep 
their job 
Medium 
Project 
Developer 
- Conduct proper EIA before 
investing 
- Implement the project respecting 
local and international rules and 
regulations 
- Minimize the negative impact  
- Profit High 
Civil Society 
Organizations 
- Represent local community 
- Monitor the project development 
- Advocate for positive changes 
- Environment 
protection 
- Community 
protection 
 
Medium 
International 
Community 
- Share best practices 
- Put pressure on firm and local 
government to adopt international 
standards 
- Practice of 
international 
standard 
Medium 
Local 
Community 
- Directly affected by the project 
- Know the rights, laws, policy 
- Protect local culture, tradition and 
livelihood 
- Report any abuse of law and 
human rights 
- Improve 
livelihood 
 
Low 
 
Economic aspects 
With proper management, hydropower has the potential to contribute positively 
to economic development thanks to its vital role in the energy system. 
However, sustainable hydropower development means that the economic 
benefits must be equitably shared among all the stakeholders, in particular, the 
affected community. In this regards, local community should be given support 
and opportunities to improve their livelihood (Klimpt et al., 2002). This may 
include providing access to the dam’s electricity at an affordable price, creating 
employment and other economic opportunities, building local people’s capacity 
through training and skill development, renovating or building local 
infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, roads, bridges, market places or tourist 
facilities. 
 
Environmental aspects 
Hydropower has traditionally been considered environmentally friendly because 
it produced clean and renewable energy. However, the construction and 
operation of hydropower dams can cause a range of problems. These include 
the loss of biodiversity through habitat destruction, decline in fish stocks, 
reduce water quality, and health issues. First, building a dam involves building 
a reservoir which requires drowning vast areas of land or forest that was once a 
habitat for animals. A dam also acts as a barrier between the upstream and 
downstream movement of migratory river animals, disrupting the aquatic 
ecosystem.  Dam reservoirs can also become breeding grounds 
for mosquitoes, snails and other disease vectors, causing public health issues. 
Water quality can also be negatively affected due to the construction activities 
and the decomposed vegetation in the reservoir. Therefore, mitigation options 
should be put in place to minimize the risks and ensure the local community 
will not suffer from serious environmental impacts as a result of the dam 
(WCD, 2000). 
Socio-cultural aspects 
Without careful assessment and planning, a hydropower project can trigger 
serious social changes including, but not limited to involuntary resettlement of 
the community members, the physical loss of homes and lands, the transition to 
alternative means of earning a livelihood, disruption of established community 
networks, loss of local cultural identity and heritage, and be an intrusion into 
indigenous people and ethnic minority’s way of life. Therefore, whenever 
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relocation is unavoidable, a comprehensive resettlement program must be put in 
place. The program should be fair, adequate and ensure that the affected 
communities will not be worse off from the relocation. Families or individuals 
who are displaced by a project should adequately be compensated (Klimpt et 
al., 2002). Sufficient assistance should be provided to ensure that their 
livelihoods are improved. 
 
Employing this framework, the following section studies the first operational 
large-scale hydropower project in Cambodia and analyzes its impact on the 
local community and discusses the implication for other dam projects in the 
country. 
 
4.4. Case Study: the Kamchay dam 
4.4.1. Case methodology 
Yin (1984) defines case study research method as “an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in 
which multiple sources of evidence are used.” Despite the criticism that case 
studies provide very little basis for scientific generalization since they use a 
small number of subjects, case studies allow for both quantitative and 
qualitative analyses of the data, and thus enable the exploration and 
understanding of complex issues (Yin, 1984). The detailed qualitative accounts 
often produced in case studies allow the researcher to go beyond the numbers 
and help explain the complexities of real-life situation which may not be 
captured through other research methods, such as survey or experimental 
research. As a result, case studies have been widely used in education 
(Gulsecen & Kubat, 2006), sociology (Grassel & Schirmer, 2006), and in 
community-based research addressing community problems such as 
unemployment, poverty, drug addiction and juvenile delinquency (Johnson, 
2006). 
 
The case study used in this study is a descriptive case aiming to answer a 
central question “what impact does the Kamchay dam have on the local 
communities in Kampot province?” The Kamchay dam is selected as a case to 
be investigated because it is the only large-scale Chinese dam that has been 
operational for almost two years. The other projects are either currently being 
constructed or their viability assessed through feasibility studies. In addition to 
 
an extensive review of relevant documents, such as the dam’s initial EIA report, 
data was also collected through observation from the site visits and interview 
with stakeholders. Fieldwork was carried out in the period from 20th to 22nd July 
2011, from June 15th to 17th and again from 22nd -24th June 2013 in three 
villages affected by the dam construction (Snam Prampir, Moet Peam and 
O’Touch village). In the three visits the researcher met with and interviewed 35 
community members, including local NGO representatives, village chiefs, head 
of community representatives, and the affected families. The researcher also 
visited the dam site, took observation notes of the water quality, forest, and the 
community’s life. The observation notes and the interview transcript were then 
coded and analyzed qualitatively based on the proposed framework. 
4.4.2. Case background 
The Kamchay Dam project is located on the Kamchay River in Mak Prang 
commune in Teuk Chhou district, Kampot province, a southern costal province 
of Cambodia. The dam itself is built in the Bokor National Park, which was 
established as a protected area by Royal Decree in 1993. The Kamchay River 
originates in the central mountains of Bokor National Park, flowing southwards, 
crossing an agricultural plain to Kampot Town and continues into the Gulf of 
Thailand (Grimsditch, 2012). 
 
The Kamchay project was built and operated by Sinohydro Corporation, 
China’s largest hydropower company, at the cost of US$ 280 million which was 
financed by Exim Bank of China, one of three institutional banks in China 
chartered to implement the state policies to promote the export of Chinese 
products and service. The project was reported to be the single largest 
investment by a foreign company in Cambodia at that time (Foxnews, 2012). 
 
It should be noted that since 1950s the Kamchay dam was considered for 
development by a number of firms from Japan, Russia and Canada, but the 
project did not get through due to the environmental concerns and financial 
viability (Grimsditch, 2012). In 2006, the project was finally awarded to 
Sinohydro on 44-year Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) basis. The decision was 
made after the international bidding process which took place in 2004-2005. 
However, it is believed that the Cambodian and Chinese government pushed 
forward the Kamchay Dam’s development in closed-door negotiations. The 
dam received strong political support from both governments. Cambodia, for 
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instance, agreed to financially compensate Sinohydro if the projects ran into 
problems or under-performed (Grimsditch, 2012). 
 
According to the initial environment impact assessment, the Kamchay project 
consists of two dams: the 112-meter main dam and a small downstream re-
regulator dam, which together has a capacity of 194 MW. The construction of 
the dam started in September 2007 and took four years to complete. The smaller 
dam started producing electricity in late 2009, but the main dam was officially 
inaugurated in December 2011 by Cambodia's Prime Minister Hun Sen and 
Chinese Ambassador to Cambodia Pan Guangxue. During its operation, 
Sinohydro will sell the electricity to the state-owned power facility, Electricité 
du Cambodge (EDC) at the price of 7.91 U.S. cents per kilowatt-hour (Xinhua, 
2013). 
4.4.3. Case Findings 
Economic aspects 
The Kamchay dam promises to increase electricity production, create 
employment and provide water for irrigation. According to the ministry of 
industry, mines and energy, the dam is currently producing only half of its 
capacity due to the shortage of water (interview with the ministry’s 
representative on June 24, 2013). The electricity from the dam is supplied to 
Phnom Penh Kampot, Kep, Takeo and Sihanoukville though it is not known for 
sure what proportion of the electricity from the dam is allocated for local use. 
Thanks to the reduction in price of electricity, there is a reported increase in 
access to electricity in some areas. In Snam Prampir village, a large majority of 
the 629 families have access to some sort of electricity. “Almost everyone has 
electricity to use now because the price of the electricity has been reduced from 
1,120 riel (US$ 0.28) to 920 riel (US$ 0.23) per kilowatt hour. Even if they 
cannot afford it themselves, many families are now connected through their 
relatives or neighbors,” says a vice village chief in an interview with the author 
on June 16, 2013. O’touch village also saw the same reduction in price, but 
many villagers still cannot afford the connection fee which cost as much as 
US$100. “Most villagers have only one light connected from their neighbor. 
Even if the price is lower now, they cannot afford the connection fee so they 
just connect from their neighbor, and pay them a low fee,” says the community 
representative. There was no access to electricity in Moat Peam village until 
 
2009. Currently, only a small number of the 208 families have access to 
electricity through a private provider who charges them 2,000 riel (US$ 0.49) 
per kwh. “It [the electricity] is very unreliable. It’s on and off very often. 
Sometimes I can’t even use the light,” complained the village chief. They 
[Chinese company] promised to give us free electricity before building dam but 
we still don’t get it now,” he added.  
 
With regard to employment, it is not clear how many people were employed on 
the project although the initial EIA report suggests that the project would 
employ 1,500 workers during the construction stage. A Chinese representative 
from Sinohydro interviewed in July 2011 claimed that the project employed 
around 4,000 workers, 3,000 of whom are Cambodian. This number is much 
higher than some other estimates (Grimsditch, 2012). According to an interview 
with a Chinese construction site supervisor during the visit to dam in July 2011, 
there were about 100 Chinese workers and over 200 Khmer workers as the dam 
was almost complete. Many of the workers come from other provinces to work 
as drivers, mechanics and stone collectors. They work in two shifts (day shift 
and night shift), 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Chinese workers were paid up 
to US$ 20 per day while Cambodian worker received only US$ 4-5 per day 
depending on their qualifications.  
 
Some improvements have been made on local infrastructure as a result of the 
dam construction. A new 12-km road was built and a seven-meter-wide bridge 
was constructed. The road and the bridge have been very beneficial for the 
villagers in Andoung Chimoeun and Moet Peam, providing them easy access to 
market, schools and health clinic. “Before it was very difficult to travel out of 
the village as we had to take a boat. Now it’s much easier thanks to the road and 
bridge,” said the village chief. The road leading from Kampot to Teuk Chhou 
has also been partly renovated by Sinohydro and a new road was built from 
Teuk Chhou up to the dam site to ease the transportation of construction 
materials to the dam site. As far as the communities are aware of, there has been 
no construction of new schools, health clinics or other local infrastructure. It 
should be noted that the dam itself is important infrastructure which, according 
to villagers and local authority, has helped to prevent floods for the past few 
years. “Previously, we had flood every year which destroy villagers’ houses, 
crops and livestock. We haven’t had a flood for 2 years now. People are very 
happy,” says Moat Peam’s village chief. 
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The most significant and visible economic effect that the dam has on the local 
communities is the loss of their income. The three villages under study depend 
largely on the Kamchay mountain’s ecosystem as the main source of their 
income. In O’touch village, over 90% of all villagers earn income by collecting 
bamboo and other Non-Timber Food Products (NTFP) from the from the forest 
mountain (interview with the community representative on June 16, 2013). 
Bamboo, the single most important NTFP resource for villagers, is collected 
from the forest, weaved into baskets of various sizes and sold to the markets. 
Edible fruits, medicinal plants are also collected for household consumption. 
 
The construction of the dam severely reduced the villager’s access to these 
important resources. A huge area of productive forest was cleared for building 
dam reservoir. During the construction period, people were not allowed to go 
up the mountain as the entrance was heavily guarded by contracted military 
personnel. Villagers were later allowed after they organized a demonstration in 
front of the provincial government office. Nevertheless, much of the productive 
forest was lost and the difficulty of commuting poses new challenges. Before 
the dam construction, villagers used bicycles or motorbikes to go up the 
mountain and transport the bamboo back to their home, but now due to the road 
condition and dam reservoir, they have to pay 20,000 riel (US$ 5) to rent a 
truck to go up the mountain and an additional 5,000 riel (US$ 1.24) to rent a 
raft to cross the reservoir to the bamboo forest. “Before I went and returned 
home on the same day. But now I usually spend two nights on the mountain, I 
don’t go every day. I go there again only when I have sold all the bamboo. In 
the past, I could earn 50,000 or 60,000 Riel (US$ 12.5 or US$ 15) per journey, 
but now it’s about 20,000 riel (US$ 5) to 30, 000 riel (US$ 7.41) after the 
expense of the transportation fees and food,” said one bamboo collector in an 
interview on June 16, 2013. 
 
While only a few families in Snam Prampir village have their main occupation 
related to collection of NTFPs, a relatively large number of villagers work as 
vendors at Teuk Chhou resort which has also been negatively affected by the 
dam construction. Located at the edge of the national park a few kilometers 
downstream of the dam, Teuk Chhou resort offers a scenic landscape which has 
been popular with locals and foreign tourists for decades. Around 200 local 
people work at the resort selling food, drinks, fruits, snacks and cakes and 
renting out huts to the visitors (Middleton, 2008). According to the initial EIA, 
 
in 2006 the resort received 278,000 tourists and generated a revenue of US$2.8 
million. However, the number of tourists dropped significantly during the dam 
construction due to the reduction in both the amount and quality of the water in 
the river. It was reported that the income of the local workers at the resort was 
reduced by half due to the decline in the number of visitors (The Cambodia 
Daily 2010). 
 
The researcher visited the resort in June 2013 and observed that there were 
about 40 permanent food shops and around 30 smaller stalls for fruit sellers and 
around 20 mobile vendors. When asked if the dam construction has affected his 
business, one seller said “Before I could get net income between 20,000 riel 
(US$ 5) and 30,000 riel (US$ 7.41) but for the last 4 or 5 years, I always made a 
loss because of the decrease of number of tourists. During the construction, 
sometimes when tourists arrived, they saw only rocks but no water, so they 
went back. Also, before the water was very clean and clear but during the 
construction the water was smelly and has weird color because of the rotten 
trees and human waste. Now it’s ok.” “There are more tourists now but still 
fewer than the period before the dam, and they don’t stay as long as they did 
before,” says one shop owner in an interview on June 24, 2013. In 2007 
Sinohydro was quoted in local media for promising to develop Tek Chou to be 
“the most beautiful” tourism resort in the country, but so far both the local 
authority and the community have not heard any further plan of the initiative. 
 
Environmental aspects 
The Kamchay dam was built within Bokor National Park which was designated 
as a projected area by the 1993 Royal Decree. The park covers an area of 
140,000 hectares of tropical evergreen forest and is home to large animals such 
as elephants and tigers and a few other endangered species (Middleton, 2008). 
The project extends over an area of 2,291 hectares of which 2,015 hectares is 
flooded by the dam’s two reservoirs. From the government’s perspective, the 
loss of less than 2% of the forest is acceptable considering the benefits of the 
project. However, environmentalists argue that the loss is significant and will 
entail a notable loss of forest biodiversity and wildlife habitat (Middleton, 
2008) According to the initial EIA report, there are 37 mammal species, 68 bird 
species, 23 reptile species and 192 fish species living in the project area. The 
same report also stated that the project would affect 1962 hectares of evergreen 
forest and 416 hectares of mixed forest and bamboo. Sinohydro has agreed to 
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allocate US$17.5 million for environmental protection, of which $12 million 
was for use during the construction phase and the remaining $5.5 million for the 
40 year period of operation, including a plan to replant 2,000 hectares of trees 
in other areas. Such plan has not been implemented at the time of writing and 
information regarding how the money will be used has not been revealed to the 
public. 
 
The construction of the dam also affected the water quality of the Kamchay 
River, which is the main source of water supply for Kampot town. According to 
the local population, before the construction of the dam, the water in river has 
good quality and need minimal treatment before consumption, but during the 
construction the water was sharply reduced in both quantity and quality. 
“Before, the water was very clean. We have no problem using it for cooking 
and drinking but during the dam construction, I dared not use it because the 
water was yellowish and there were rubbish floating in the river. I think the 
rubbish came from the construction workers,” said one villager in an interview 
on June 24, 2013. It was reported that water quality has improved after the 
construction finished but the local are still concerned that the water may affect 
their health. However, interviews with the local authorities and villagers 
suggest that there has been no report of serious health issues or disease outbreak 
which caused by consuming the water. 
 
The Initial EIA recognizes that organic materials in the reservoir, if not properly 
removed, would affect the quality of water in the reservoir and downstream 
river. While it is hard to measure the change in water quality, observations at 
the reservoir showed the water was a yellow- brownish color; captured gasses 
from the bottom of the reservoir also frequently appeared on the surface. There 
were a number of logs floating in the reservoir. Apparently, trees and other 
vegetation were not properly cleared from the forest before flooding, and not 
enough effort was put into monitoring the water quality. The inadequate 
clearing and removal of organic materials from the dam reservoir led to some 
critics to question the ability of the dam to reduce greenhouse gases as rotten 
biomass produces large emissions of methane and other harmful gasses causing 
global warming. This situation challenges the green profile of the dam, and 
makes others doubtful whether the project deserves the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) credits that Sinohydro has applied for.  
 
 
Social-cultural aspects 
While the Kamchay project did not involve relocation of people, some 301 
hectares of agriculture land and fruit trees were lost to the construction of 
reservoir, road and transmission line (interview with NGO Forum on June 10, 
2013). It was estimated that Maot Peam and Snam Prampir villagers occupied a 
total of 110 ha of these agriculture lands. Under Cambodia’s 2001 Land Law, it 
is illegal to reside in projected areas thus, people affected by the project were 
not compensated for the loss of land but they were compensated for the loss of 
crops. The official compensation rate was not made available to the public, but 
according to the villagers and local officials, the company agreed to pay 
US$500 per large tree, US$200 per small tree and US$10 for seedlings. People 
were generally happy with the compensation (interview with villagers and local 
official on June 15-16, 2013). While the loss of fruit tree was fairly 
compensated, the loss of income from forest products and the loss of income 
from tourism are still missing.  The Initial EIA stated that US$ 1 million has 
been allocated to compensate for both losses, but so far it is not known how the 
money was spent. 
 
With regard to human right issues, there have been only a few complaints from 
villagers related to the dam construction. According to a local human rights 
NGO Licadho, in one case, around 70 families complained that company using 
dynamite at the quarry caused large rocks to fly around, damaging their lands, 
homes and crops. In another instance, 50 families in Tuek Chhou district 
protested because of the dust, noise and debris caused by the over-laden trucks 
from the quarry as they drove past their homes. All cases were peacefully 
resolved (interview with Licadho on July 20, 2011).  A human right activist 
working for ADHOC revealed that she was aware of a number of mistreatment 
of Cambodian workers. “The safety standard is also not good. I heard on the 
radio that a Khmer work was seriously injured from an accident at work;” she 
said in an interview on July 20, 2011). In an interview with the researcher, one 
Cambodia worker admitted that he did not like his boss and neither did most of 
Cambodian workers working on the project. “My [Chinese] boss has no 
understanding. He never acknowledged or appreciated my good work, but when 
I made just a small mistake, he blamed me. He once threatened to fire me when 
I came to work late twice,” he said. He works from 7:30 am to 5:30 pm, seven 
days a week and earns 1600 riels (0.4US$) per hour or approximately 130$-
140$ a month. He had no salary increase or bonus during his three year of work, 
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though he was paid double for working on Sunday. “I could not support my 
family with my salary. We could survive because my wife supplemented my 
income from her work as a tailor,” he said. 
 
The construction of the dam also raises gender issues, which were not taken 
into serious consideration in the initial EIA. Women who work as bamboo 
collectors and vendors at Tek Chou resort have seen their income reduced 
substantially. From various interviews with the community, it is apparent that 
before the dam, both men and women, including older people, could easily 
collect bamboo, but after the construction of the dam, it has become much more 
difficult and more dangerous for women, children and elderly people to go as 
they have to climb a steep cliff, cross the reservoir and stay longer in the forest. 
“Life is hard now. In the past, everyone could go to collect bamboo. We just 
used bicycle to go up the mountain and transport the bamboo back home on the 
same day. Now travelling has become more dangerous. Before there were a lot 
women going to cut the bamboos, but now there are very few,” said a 
community representative in O’touch village. As men have to stay in the forest 
for a few days to collect the bamboo, women are also faced with an increased 
burden as temporarily single caretakers of families and homes. Many women 
selling food and fruit at Tek Chou were also financially affected as the number 
of tourists declined during the construction of the dam. This put pressure on the 
whole family to find additional income for their children’s food and education. 
 
4.5. Discussion 
 
The Kamchay dam is the first large-scale hydropower project in Cambodia. 
Two years after its operation, its impact on the local community is visible. As 
a result of the dam, there was a reduction of price of the electricity, a creation 
of short-term employment opportunities, and some improvement of the local 
infrastructure. However, these limited benefits come at a greater cost to the 
environment and livelihood of the local communities. The dam destroyed 
productive forest, threatened animal species, lowered water quality and might 
contribute to climate change. After the construction of the dam, local villagers 
lost their main source of income, causing their living standard to become 
worse. Therefore, even though the price of the electricity has been reduced, 
access remains limited since the community cannot afford it. While there was 
 
no relocation of villagers, the compensation for the loss of income for the 
affected families was missing. 
 
While one can argue that there is no development project without 
consequences, the negative effects of the Kamchay dam can be minimized had 
the international practice of hydropower management been adopted. The fact 
that the dam was financed by a Chinese bank, and developed by a Chinese 
firm raises the concern that international standard of dam development might 
not have been implemented. China is the world largest dam builder and 
financer. As of August 2012, China has been involved in at least 308 dam 
projects in 70 different countries globally (International Rivers, 2012). 
However, according to International Rivers, an international environmental 
NGO that monitors dam construction around the world, few Chinese dam 
builders and financiers have adopted environmental policies in line with 
international standards. In fact, China has been involved in some of the most 
environmentally destructive dams such as Merowe Dam in Sudan, Gibe III in 
Ethiopia, and the Myitsone Dam in Burma. 
 
China-funded dams overseas have developed such a negative image because 
China does not have strict implementation guidelines of its policies to govern 
the dam projects abroad. Until recently, the Chinese government did not 
regulate investment activities beyond its borders. Thanks to the increase 
awareness of the environmental and social impacts of dams, a number of 
guidelines for Chinese overseas enterprises are beginning to emerge. 
Nevertheless, the implementation of those guidelines is still weak and many 
Chinese hydropower companies continue to pursue projects that have 
detrimental impacts on host countries. 
 
Another shortcoming of the Kamchay dam project is the absence of strong legal 
system and regulatory framework on the governance of hydropower projects. 
Cambodia does not yet have laws specifically for hydropower projects. Existing 
projects are governed by relevant laws and policies such as the land law, law on 
water resources and law on Environmental Protection and Natural Resource 
Management. According to the latter, an environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) shall be conducted on a hydropower project with more one megawatt in 
capacity and shall be reviewed by the Ministry of Environment before being 
submitted to the Royal Government for decision. However, it has been reported 
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before the dam, both men and women, including older people, could easily 
collect bamboo, but after the construction of the dam, it has become much more 
difficult and more dangerous for women, children and elderly people to go as 
they have to climb a steep cliff, cross the reservoir and stay longer in the forest. 
“Life is hard now. In the past, everyone could go to collect bamboo. We just 
used bicycle to go up the mountain and transport the bamboo back home on the 
same day. Now travelling has become more dangerous. Before there were a lot 
women going to cut the bamboos, but now there are very few,” said a 
community representative in O’touch village. As men have to stay in the forest 
for a few days to collect the bamboo, women are also faced with an increased 
burden as temporarily single caretakers of families and homes. Many women 
selling food and fruit at Tek Chou were also financially affected as the number 
of tourists declined during the construction of the dam. This put pressure on the 
whole family to find additional income for their children’s food and education. 
 
4.5. Discussion 
 
The Kamchay dam is the first large-scale hydropower project in Cambodia. 
Two years after its operation, its impact on the local community is visible. As 
a result of the dam, there was a reduction of price of the electricity, a creation 
of short-term employment opportunities, and some improvement of the local 
infrastructure. However, these limited benefits come at a greater cost to the 
environment and livelihood of the local communities. The dam destroyed 
productive forest, threatened animal species, lowered water quality and might 
contribute to climate change. After the construction of the dam, local villagers 
lost their main source of income, causing their living standard to become 
worse. Therefore, even though the price of the electricity has been reduced, 
access remains limited since the community cannot afford it. While there was 
 
no relocation of villagers, the compensation for the loss of income for the 
affected families was missing. 
 
While one can argue that there is no development project without 
consequences, the negative effects of the Kamchay dam can be minimized had 
the international practice of hydropower management been adopted. The fact 
that the dam was financed by a Chinese bank, and developed by a Chinese 
firm raises the concern that international standard of dam development might 
not have been implemented. China is the world largest dam builder and 
financer. As of August 2012, China has been involved in at least 308 dam 
projects in 70 different countries globally (International Rivers, 2012). 
However, according to International Rivers, an international environmental 
NGO that monitors dam construction around the world, few Chinese dam 
builders and financiers have adopted environmental policies in line with 
international standards. In fact, China has been involved in some of the most 
environmentally destructive dams such as Merowe Dam in Sudan, Gibe III in 
Ethiopia, and the Myitsone Dam in Burma. 
 
China-funded dams overseas have developed such a negative image because 
China does not have strict implementation guidelines of its policies to govern 
the dam projects abroad. Until recently, the Chinese government did not 
regulate investment activities beyond its borders. Thanks to the increase 
awareness of the environmental and social impacts of dams, a number of 
guidelines for Chinese overseas enterprises are beginning to emerge. 
Nevertheless, the implementation of those guidelines is still weak and many 
Chinese hydropower companies continue to pursue projects that have 
detrimental impacts on host countries. 
 
Another shortcoming of the Kamchay dam project is the absence of strong legal 
system and regulatory framework on the governance of hydropower projects. 
Cambodia does not yet have laws specifically for hydropower projects. Existing 
projects are governed by relevant laws and policies such as the land law, law on 
water resources and law on Environmental Protection and Natural Resource 
Management. According to the latter, an environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) shall be conducted on a hydropower project with more one megawatt in 
capacity and shall be reviewed by the Ministry of Environment before being 
submitted to the Royal Government for decision. However, it has been reported 
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that the EIA final report of the Kamchay dam was only approved several years 
after the construction had already started. Even at the time of writing, the report 
is still not accessible.  
 
Good hydropower project management also requires the local government to 
uphold transparency and accountability, and ensure the equitable sharing of 
benefits. Such principles of good governance are absent in the Kamchay case. 
First, the project generally lacked transparency and accountability. In addition 
to the fact that the agreement to offer the project to Sinohydro was reached 
behind close doors, the rest of process of project was also kept in secret. 
Information regarding the dam was not released to public. Although several 
meetings about the dam construction and the Initial EIA were held, the 
participation of civil society, particularly the affected communities was 
inadequate. Villagers interviewed in this study stated that they learned about the 
project only after the construction had commenced through words of mouth, 
and through their observation of the company’s large trucks transporting 
construction materials and equipment. The lack of proper public consultation 
left many villagers unaware of safety issue, and the benefits and consequences 
of the dam. Sinohydro has apparently tried to avoid nearly all involvement with 
communities in the area, claiming that they are just the developer, thus all 
questions and concerns should be directed to the Cambodian government.  
 
The Kamchay dam also raises issues of unfair development. This research 
found that the project’s benefits are not shared equally among all stakeholders. 
While the poor suffer the direct consequence of the dam, they are the one who 
received the least benefits. For instance, the dam has reduced access to the 
bamboo forest which the poor depend on for their livelihood, but they were not 
compensated for the loss. Instead, they had to incur additional transportation 
costs which were unnecessary had the dam not been built. On the contrary, the 
wealthy, who were not affected as much by the loss of bamboo, have actually 
earned additional income by providing transportation service to bamboo 
collectors.  
 
The findings of this paper supplement the existing literature on China-funded 
dams. As the first large-scale hydropower dam to be constructed in Cambodia, 
the Kamchay dam provides important lessons for future projects. The lack of 
adequate planning prior to the start of construction, including the lack of proper 
 
environmental impact assessment and mitigation strategies, weak regulatory 
framework, poor implementation of the existing laws, the absence of 
comprehensive public consultation and the lack of commitment of the project 
developer and financers, are the main shortcomings of the project. 
Strengthening the implementation of local legal and regulatory guidelines are 
necessary to ensure that the project meet international standards. The EIA must 
be carefully conducted before the approval of the project. All stakeholders, 
particularly the affected community, should be involved in all stages of the 
project cycle, from initial planning to final evaluation. Comprehensive 
mitigation measures must be put in place to minimize the negative impact of the 
project.  The entire development process should be transparent, accountable and 
fair. Dam developers and financiers must do their upmost to adopt international 
best practices of dam development and apply their safeguards to provide 
protection for both the affected people, and the environment.  
 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
Cambodia is facing a growing energy demand and hydropower development 
is clearly one of the main government’s agenda to develop its energy sector. 
The Kamchay dam is only of one of dozen projects currently being studied 
and constructed in Cambodia. Given the fact that the majority of these 
projects are financed and built by Chinese firms, the experience of Kamchay 
case offers valuable lessons for the management of the rest of the projects. 
This paper provides clear evidence on how a dam project may affect the 
community. The Kamchay project promised economic benefits, mainly in 
form of affordable electricity; however, inadequate planning and stakeholder 
consultation have caused the project to fail short of international standards. 
While the economic gains from the dam have not yet materialized, local 
communities have seen their income reduced and their livelihood disrupted. It 
is clear that if hydropower is to contribute to solving Cambodia’s energy crisis 
in a sustainable way, a comprehensive and inclusive mechanism of 
hydropower development must be developed and rigorously implemented. 
China, in this regard, will play a vital role in enhancing and enforcing its 
environmental and social safeguards if it wants to establish a long-term 
presence in Cambodia, and contribute to its poverty reduction and sustainable 
development. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
China’s Resource Diplomacy in Cambodia and Beyond: On Soft 
Power and Strongmen77 
Abstract: 
China’s growing resources demand to fuel its economic growth has pushed the 
country to utilize its resource diplomacy to pursue resources abroad. China has 
encouraged outward investment by its state-owned enterprises in resource rich 
countries around the world, provided them economic assistance and offered 
political and diplomatic support at national and international stage. While the 
mainstream literature tends to suggest that China has been using its resourced 
diplomacy around the world to obtain energy and other importance resources, 
this paper argues that in some cases China’s motives are more strategic than 
economic. Drawing on extensive literature review on China’s resource 
diplomacy in various countries around the world, this paper uses Cambodia as 
a case study and reveals that China pursues its geopolitical interests based on 
patronage arrangements and strongman linkages.
 
Keywords: Cambodia, China, neopatrimonialism, resource diplomacy, soft 
power  
 
 
5. 1. Introduction 
With an average annual GDP growth rate of 10 per cent in the last three 
decades, China is one of the world’s fastest growing economies (Haltmaier, 
2013).  China has overtaken Germany as the world’s number one exporting 
country, and Japan as the world’s second largest economy. While rapid 
economic growth is an engine of development, it also presents massive 
challenges for China to secure the resources necessary for sustaining its 
industrial progress. China is currently the top consumer of key resources, 
consuming about 30 per cent of global aluminium and copper, 40 per cent of 
iron ore and lead, more than 50 per cent of coal; and is the second largest 
consumer of oil after the USA (Edinger and Pistorius, 2011; Lai and Warner, 
2015a). It is estimated that China will run out of 25 kinds of domestic minerals 
                                                      
77 This paper is co-authored with Prof. Dr. Heidi Dahles and is currently under reviewed by the 
China Information Journal. 
 
by 2020 due to industrialisation, urbanisation and agriculture modernisation 
(People Daily, 2012). 
 
Faced with a growing and pressing need to acquire natural resources and raw 
materials, China has expanded overseas trade and investment to many resource-
rich countries around the world. China’s pursuit of natural resources is affecting 
the country’s grand strategy in various ways. It is believed that acquiring 
resources is the driving force behind Chinese foreign policy which has been 
dubbed as ‘resource diplomacy’ (Downs, 2004; Zweig and Jianhai, 2005; 
Daojiong, 2006). China is said to have used this resource diplomacy to secure 
access to vital energy resources by establishing close relationship with many 
resource-rich nations, paving the way for its State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to 
invest in the resource sector in many parts of the world including Africa, 
Middle East, Central Asia and Latin America (Lai, O’Hara and Wysoczanska, 
2015; Thomson and Boey, 2015). The expansion of China’s SOEs, often 
accompanied by ‘unconditional aid’, has sparked global debate on China’s 
objectives and the implications for the receiving countries.  
 
While current literature suggests that the primary motive behind China’s 
resource diplomacy is to obtain energy and other natural resources in an 
increasingly competitive global market (Lai and Warner, 2015b), this paper 
argues that, in some cases, China’s motivation is more of a long-term strategic 
nature than tailored to immediate access to resources. Reviewing literature on 
China’s ‘resource diplomacy’ in various countries around the world, this paper 
focuses on Cambodia as a case in point, and argues that China’s interest in 
Cambodia is not economically, but rather (geo-)politically motivated. In order 
to fully understand why China charms Cambodia, this paper argues that an 
institutional perspective is called for which includes the asymmetrical, but 
reciprocal relationships between the two countries and their political elites. By 
embedding the case of Cambodia in the wider historical and political context of 
the Chinese-Cambodian relationship, this paper provides a more sophisticated 
perspective on the concept of resource diplomacy in general, and China’s 
resource-diplomatic strategies in particular.   
 
This paper is based on a comprehensive review of academic literature from 
recognized online sources in order to ensure the reliability of the information. In 
addition, primary data was collected through seven semi-structured interviews 
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with stakeholders representing government, local and international NGOs, 
development partners, and the academic and research community. The selected 
interviewees have comprehensive knowledge on the subject and who have 
worked on the issues for many years. To protect their identity, all participants 
are referred to by pseudonyms (see annex 1). 
 
This paper is divided into five sections. The next section presents evidence of 
China’s quest for resources in resource-rich developing countries worldwide in 
order to identify gaps in the current body of knowledge on China’s alleged 
resource diplomacy. Subsequently, in section three, the concept of resource 
diplomacy is critically assessed and a framework is designed to contextualise 
this concept in an institutional perspective. China’s resource diplomacy is 
elaborated in an in-depth case study of Cambodia in section four and analysed, 
in section five, against the background of the asymmetrical, but reciprocal 
relationships between the two countries and their political elites. The final 
section critically reflects on China’s interest in Cambodia and questions the 
concept of resource diplomacy in this particular case.  
  
5. 2. China’s Global Quest for Resources  
As China’s economy continues to grow, the country’s demand for resources 
will rise far above its current level. According to the US Energy Information 
Administration, China surpassed the USA to be the world’s largest energy 
consumer in 2010, and will remain in this position for the next 25 years. To 
reflect the ever rising energy demand, China has altered its energy policy a 
number of times from predominantly focusing on “self-sufficiency” (1949-
1993) when energy security mainly depended on domestic production to 
embracing a “going global” policy (1993-2005), and its current “outward 
investment” policy (2006-present) which encourages international cooperation 
in the energy sector, and the diversification of energy investments (Jian, 2011, 
4; Lai and Warner, 2015). It is during the latest period that Chinese corporations 
are incentivized to invest abroad, especially in resource-rich countries and the 
pursuit of international foreign sources of energy has become one of China’s 
top priorities. Currently, securing sufficient resource supply is the main driving 
force of China’s foreign policy (Downs, 2004; Zweig and Jianhai, 2005; 
Daojiong, 2006). 
 
 
According to the Heritage Foundation, from 2005 to 2013 China invested US$ 
370 billion in energy sector in the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa and Latin 
America. This amount is the largest sum relative to all the other sectors. China’s 
three largest national oil companies (NOCs), China National Petroleum 
Corporation, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and China 
Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec Corp.) have been actively 
engaging in signing long term contracts and purchasing overseas assets in the 
energy and natural resource sector around the world (Tylor 2009, 34). The 
successful bid for an oilfield in Peru in 1993 by the China National Petroleum 
Corporation marked Chinese energy industry’s first entry into the international 
market (Cheng, 2008).  In 2009 Sinopec paid US$ 8.8 billion for the acquisition 
of Addax, making it by far the largest such deal by a Chinese NOC at that time 
(Jiang and Sinton, 2011). Since 2009, the NOCs have purchased assets in the 
Middle East, North America, Latin America, Africa, and Asia. In 2011 alone, 
the NOCs invested US$18 billion in overseas oil and gas assets, according to 
US Energy Information Administration. 
 
In the Middle East, which is China’s largest source of oil, Chinese investment 
has increased sharply from US$1 billion in 2005 to US$11 billion in 2009, 
predominantly in oil and gas (Chen, 2011). China has employed both economic 
and political tools to court the government of Middle Eastern countries to allow 
Chinese firms to invest in their oil industry. For example, in order to maintain 
its access to Iran’s oil supply, China has provided the country with diplomatic 
protection in the UN’s Security Council, and other venues when Iran’s nuclear 
issue is discussed. China is now Iran’s number one oil and gas importer. Asia 
Time reported that in 2004 China’s state-owned corporation, Zhuhai Zhenrong, 
had an agreement to import 110 million tons of liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
over 25 years in a deal worth US$20 billion, while Sinopec has agreed to a 25-
year deal worth US$100 billion for 250 million tons of LNG, as well as a 50 per 
cent stake in the massive Yadavaran oilfield from which China will get 150,000 
barrels per day for 25 years. Similarly, China’s support for the new Iraqi 
government was seen as a method to gain access to the bidding processes on its 
big oil and infrastructure projects. China pledged US$25 million, agreed to 
forgive a large part of its debt, and trained Iraqi diplomats at the China Foreign 
Affairs University (Zhu, 2010). In August 2008 China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) signed the first major oil deal with a foreign company 
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since the fall of Saddam. The US$3 billion oil contract will allow CNPC to 
develop an oil field in southern Iraq’s Wasit province for about 20 years. 
 
China has also used a similar approach in Africa, a continent with which has the 
world’s third largest oil reserves and abundant non-fuel minerals (Aldens and 
Alves, 2009). According to the State Council’s Information Office, Africa is the 
largest recipient of China’s total aid disbursement. In 2009 alone, almost half of 
Chinese aid went to Africa.78 During the China fifth Conference on the Forum 
on Africa-China Cooperation in July 2012, China pledged US$20 billion loan to 
this continent. In addition to offering a new loan package, China also cancelled 
312 debts of 35 African countries, totalling 18.96 billion Yuan (US$3 billion), 
according to the Chinese government’s official website. China’s generous 
economic assistance, together with its so called “no strings attached and non 
interference” policy have won the heart of many African leaders. For instance, 
after receiving China’s credit line of approximately US$4 billion to US$11 
billion, Angola, China’s largest source of crude oil, provided China with a large 
amount of equity oil contracts. Reuters reported that in 2005, CNPC acquired a 
50 per cent stake in offshore block 18, and in 2006 Sinopec acquired a 20 per 
cent stake in block 15, with an investment value of US$ 982 million, a 25.5 per 
cent stake in block 17, with an investment value of US$1.1 billion, and a 
concession for a 40 per cent stake in block 18, with a total investment value of 
US$1.1 billion. Beside economic tools, China has also used political power to 
secure investment deals in Africa’s energy sector. For example, in exchange for 
access to their equity oil, China has provided protection for Sudan’s human 
rights violations by threatening to veto any significant sanctions against the 
country. China is now Sudan’s largest investor with total stakes estimated at 
US$8 billion (Salameh, 2010).  
 
In addition to oil which accounts for 80 per cent of China’s import from Africa, 
other important raw materials include iron ore, manganese, timber, copper, 
chromium and cobalt mostly from Angola, South Africa, Sudan, and the 
Republic of the Congo. At present, Africa has become China's fourth largest 
overseas investment destination. According to the State Council’s Information 
Office, by the end of 2009 China's direct investment in Africa had reached 
US$9.33 billion, climbing from US$490 million in 2003. There are more than 
                                                      
78 The total amount of Chinese aid to Africa was not revealed, but some estimate that it was 
close to US$1 billion in 2009. 
 
2,000 Chinese companies engaging in economic and trade activities in 49 
African countries, although the majority of investment is concentrated in South 
Africa, Nigeria, Zambia, Sudan, Algeria and Egypt.  
 
In Central Asia, securing energy and natural resources is the bedrock of China's 
strategy. China is an important player in the region thanks to the huge 
investments and loans to develop the region’s strategic infrastructures 
(pipelines, hydropower plants, bridges, roads, airports). China offers the region 
generous funding, and discreet diplomatic support if Russia becomes too 
demanding. As of 26 October 2005, the BBC reported the purchase of a 
Kazakhstan’s oil company, Petro Kazakhstan, for US$ 4.2 billion by Chinese 
oil company CNPC. China, unlike the western powers, registers no objections 
to the Kazakh government’s human rights abuses. During President Xi’s visit in 
September 2013, a series of contracts worth about US$30 billion were signed, 
including deals in the oil and gas sector, according to an article published by the 
Economist on 14 September 2013. In Turkmenistan, the CNPC is the only 
foreign company that can boast of having an onshore contract to explore for 
energy.  In Kyrgyzstan, Chinese companies are developing infrastructure, 
including important road networks and power lines. In Tajikistan, in addition to 
building roads and hydropower plants, China is also a vital source of credit. 
 
Econometric analysis based on aggregate data generally supports the thesis that 
Chinese companies are seeking resources, among other things. Buckley et al. 
(2007) analyse 49 host countries data and find that Chinese outward investment 
is positively correlated to a country’s endowment of natural resources (using 
ore and metal exports as the proxy). Buckley et al. (2008) using a different 
proxy for natural resources endowment (crude oil, and natural liquid gas and 
petroleum product exports) reach the same conclusion. Also Cheung and Quian 
(2009) confirm this result, for both developed and developing countries. In a 
similar vein, Kolstad and Wiig (2009) investigate the interaction between the 
strength of institutions of host countries and natural resource endowment. Their 
findings reveal that host countries with weak institutions attract Chinese 
investment in natural resources. Conversely, the more natural resources a host 
country possesses, the more likely that Chinese FDI is attracted by weaker 
institutions.   
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In addition to its outward investment, China also offers economic assistance to 
resource-rich nations as part of its resource diplomacy (Alessi, 2012; Zweig and 
Jianhai, 2005; Downs and Evans, 2006). This includes the provision of aid to 
build roads, railways, ports, hospitals, schools and the provision of technical 
training. Based on the State Council’s statistic, China is one of the largest 
emerging donors, generously giving 256.29 billion Yuan (US$41 billion) to 161 
countries by the end of 2009. China’s development assistance, generally 
provided without conditions attached, though warmly welcomed by the 
government of the recipient countries, is often questioned on its motives. For 
example, Naím (2007) characterizes China aid as ‘rogue aid’, as it is not guided 
by need in the developing countries, but rather by China’s national interests to 
access to resources, boost international alliances, and advance its global 
influence.  
 
Another aspect of China’s resource diplomacy is the political backing from 
Beijing for oil producing countries in order to win’s energy contracts. China 
often uses its veto power at the UN as a tool to prevent any sanctions on Sudan, 
Zimbabwe, and other troubled countries in Africa. For instance, it intentionally 
did not want to be involved with international efforts to force Iran to abandon 
its nuclear bomb ambition; as a result, China’s SOE Sinopec and CNOOC were 
awarded with major energy deals. China was also granted a major natural gas 
exploration contract in Burma shortly after China’s decision to veto a UN 
Security Council resolution directed against the junta in January 2007 
(Lagerkvist, 2007).   
 
In summary, China’s resource diplomacy has three main components: (1) 
encouraging outward investment by its state-owned enterprises in resource rich 
countries, (2) providing economic assistance in terms if ‘unconditional’ aid to 
build hard infrastructure, and advance debt cancellation, and (3) offering 
political and diplomatic support to resource-rich nations on the international 
stage.   
 
5. 3. Resource Diplomacy: a conceptual exploration 
Resource diplomacy is defined in terms of any diplomatic activity designed to 
enhance a nation’s access to resources and its energy security (Zweig, 2007). 
According to Zweig (2007), resource diplomacy is characterized by three 
 
elements: 1) insuring a stable supply of energy and resources; (2) keeping 
resource supplies at acceptable prices; and (3) being able to transfer those 
resources to designated locations where they are processed or consumed. 
Resources, particularly energy resources, are vital for economic growth and 
social stability of all nations. Therefore it is not surprising to see that each 
country has its own strategies and policies to secure the earth’s dwindling 
resources. The concept of resource diplomacy encompasses all the resources 
that a country, needs and is less frequently used than the term ‘energy 
diplomacy’ and ‘oil diplomacy’, which are narrower terms used to refer to a 
country’s strategy to obtain foreign supply of energy and oil respectively. Oil 
diplomacy is closely intertwined with energy and resource diplomacy in that 
successful oil diplomacy implies the diversification of energy resources to 
minimize dependence on oil, and oil imports (Lai, 2007). 
 
The concept of diplomacy refers to conducting relationships without conflict 
and is a chief instrument in foreign policies. The goal of diplomacy is to further 
a state's interests as defined by its historical, geographical and economic 
conditions without using coercion or force, while maintaining good 
relationships with other nations. Methods of diplomacy include linkage politics, 
where diplomats engage in gaining additional leverage to advance a particular 
interest (Biba, 2012). Successful linkage attempts combine issues that are of 
divergent priorities to the states involved. Regular linkage politics, as Biba 
(2012) explains, “are more likely to work in situations where the relative 
significance of issues is such that the stronger party is more concerned with the 
additional issue, while the initial issue is more relevant for the weaker party.” 
For example, if a developing country requires political support for an 
infringement on a neighbouring country (their initial issue), its political leaders 
would not approach a powerful ally directly, but instead send their diplomats to 
discuss technical support for the exploitation of the country’s oil supplies (the 
additional issue). The ally, in need of energy resources, would agree to assist in 
exchange for a share of the oil and, in addition, would object to sanctions issued 
against the developing country by the international community.   
 
Conversely, if the stronger party seeks to leverage their own linkage 
possibilities, as Biba explains (ibid.), they put everything in place to press ahead 
with their initial interest, while avoiding to find themselves manoeuvred into a 
disadvantaged position over this initial issue, a so-called actor-reversed issue 
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linkage. Large power differentials are at the basis of this course of action where 
the stronger party pre-empts possible issues with weaker parties, and does not 
allow the issue to be formally or publicly raised. Returning to the earlier 
example, the powerful ally would publicly acknowledge the resource-rich 
country, pledge development aid, coupled with manifold investments, without 
establishing an immediate linkage to its own interest in accessing the recipient’s 
energy resources. This access would materialize as part of a bundle of strings 
developing between the two nations. Such diplomatic tactics have come to be 
described in terms of soft power, a concept developed to capture the ability to 
persuade and co-opt, rather than coerce (Nye, 1990). Also dubbed as ‘charm 
offensive’, this approach favours the establishment of political and cultural 
strings emphasizing mutual benefits, and influencing public opinion through 
social media and lobbying by powerful organisations. The nature of these 
strings reaches deep into the political economy of nations. While the literature 
on diplomacy fails to address the underlying dynamics, this article makes an 
attempt at embedding political-economic dimensions in the concept of resource 
diplomacy. 
 
In particular in the arena where resource diplomacy unfolds, wealthy industrial 
nations vie for access to reserves vital to the growth of their economies. These 
nations compete to secure reliable resource supplies at an acceptable price and 
safe ways of transporting these supplies to their designated destination (Zweig, 
2007). Diplomatic tactics are widely employed in order to succeed in these 
efforts. These tactics are embedded in historically and politically defined 
unequal power balances between nations. In particular, in rapidly industrializing 
nations and emerging economies, access to resources may be regulated through 
patronage relations. Many resource-rich developing countries are manipulated 
by a small powerful political clique who abuse the state, and plunder its 
resources to advance their own interests. Political cliques nurtured by and 
revolving around an autocratic ruler or strongman (Luiz, 2000) are based on 
patronage arrangements. Patronage is understood as an asymmetrical but 
reciprocal relationship between individuals or organisations. It works as 
follows: the powerful party (the patron) creates a debt of obligation on the part 
of a client that binds them to their patron and morally compels them to 
reciprocate by providing services, often in the form of an exchange of non-
comparable goods and favours critical to both parties (Boissevain, 1966). These 
 
dyadic reciprocal relationships between patron and client, are the building 
blocks of a patronage system (Boissevain, 1966).  
 
Neopatrimonial regimes such as hosted by many resource-rich states in Africa 
and beyond, such as Haiti and, until recently, Indonesia and the Philippines 
(Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994) and, currently, Cambodia (Hughes and Un, 
2012), operate on the basis of personal patronage. “The essence of 
neopatrimonialism is the award by public officials of personal favours, both 
within the state (...) and in society (...)” (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994, 
p.453). Rule is built on personal loyalty to a strongman who derives his power 
from a more or less monopolistic position in access to scarce resources (Scott, 
1972). Patronage arrangements are at odds with the development of formal 
authority structures such as bureaucracies, democracy and the rule of law 
(Scott, 1972). Patronage systems are both the outcome of a weak state ruled by 
strongmen, and an instrument for sustaining restraints on civil society 
(Boissevain, 1966). Once firmly established, a patronage system may provide 
templates for modelling social relations at all levels of society (Migdal, 1988). 
As Verver and Dahles (2015) argue, these templates then become institutions 
that regulate relationships and interactions within the system. Similarly, such 
templates extend beyond national borders and define relations between nations. 
What seems to be diplomatic tactics if taken at face value may be the 
expression of underlying patronage arrangements between two nations, as will 
be shown by the Cambodian case in the next section. 
  
5. 4. China’s resource diplomacy in Cambodia  
Last year marked the 55th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between China and Cambodia. The two countries forged diplomatic 
bonds in 1958 under the leadership of King Norodom Sihanouk and the Chinese 
Premier Zhou Enlai. Despite several changes in its foreign policy, China has 
remained Cambodia’s oldest and closest friend in the region. In recent years, 
the relationship between the two countries has become even closer due to the 
increased frequency of high level visits. Currently, China is Cambodia’s top 
foreign investor, a major donor, and an increasingly important trading partner 
(Pheakdey, 2012). This section analyses the China-Cambodia relations and 
raises the question whether China applies its resource diplomacy in Cambodia 
for the same purpose as it does in other countries. 
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With a cumulative investment totalling at US$9.6 billion from 1994 to 2013, 
China is the single largest foreign investor in Cambodia to date (Global Times, 
2014). Chinese firms have invested in a variety of sectors such as garment and 
manufacturing industries, banking and finance, agriculture, tourism, real estate, 
minerals, energy, transport and telecommunication. Close ties between the two 
governments have encouraged more and more Chinese to invest in Cambodia. 
During his visit to Cambodia in April 2011, Zhang Xiaoqiang, the Vice 
Minister of the National Development and Reform Commission, said that China 
had urged more firms to invest in Cambodia. In April 2013, Prime Minister 
Hun Sen upon his return from his official visit to Beijing, signed off on eight 
deals for further Chinese investment in Cambodia. The New York Times 
reported that in 2013, Cambodia received the largest-ever foreign investment in 
its history when the government, and two Chinese companies reached a deal to 
build a 400-kilometre rail line, a steel plant and a sea port at the combined cost 
of US$11.2 billion. The Cambodia government has always warmly welcomed 
Chinese investments stating that it has contributed positively to local economic 
growth and poverty reduction. 
 
“Chinese investments in Cambodia’s garment industry have boosted national 
exports and generated employment for thousands of local workers, most of 
whom are low-skill females from rural areas,” says Mr Han Phal, a local senior 
economist. China’s dominant investment in the energy sector is also helping to 
solve Cambodia’s chronic energy shortage. Its investment in hydropower, for 
instance, could provide relatively cheap electricity to 65% of the population 
who currently are not connected to the grid.  “Building dams can create jobs for 
the local community and prevent flooding. With dams producing sufficient 
electricity, villagers do not need to burn wood for cooking and heating, which 
reduces the need for firewood sources and contributes to the protection of 
forests,” says Mr Hou Chhut, a government representative. Civil society 
organizations, however, claim that many Chinese investments, especially in 
hydropower, lack transparency, fail to meet international standards and cause 
social and environmental harm. “Chinese investors do not care about the 
community or the environment. They do not conduct proper environmental 
impact assessment and they rarely communicate with the local community; as a 
result, many of their projects affect the livelihood of the people,” says Dr. Van 
Chanra, the director of a prominent local NGO. 
 
 
In addition to being the largest investor, China is also a generous donor to 
Cambodia. According to Cambodia's Finance Ministry, China is one of 
Cambodia’s largest donors, providing about US$2.7 billion in loans and grants 
since 1992. In 2013 alone, China gave Cambodia US$1.67 billion in financing 
to build its first oil refinery, which is expected to produce five million tons of 
refined oil products a year after its completion in 2018. In the same year, China 
also pledged another US$548 million in aid to Cambodia for infrastructure and 
irrigation systems. China is also a major source of military aid, generously 
providing military assistance to Cambodia in various forms since the 1990s. For 
example, in 1999 China donated new military equipment worth US$1.5 million 
for the Cambodian armed forces (Marks, 2000). Between 2005 and 2007, China 
donated nine patrol boats and five warships to Cambodia (Burgos and Ear, 
2010). According to the Phnom Penh Post, in 2012 China signed a military 
agreement with Cambodia and granted US$19 million in defence aid. And 
recently, China delivered 26 military trucks and 30,000 sets of military 
uniforms to Cambodia in order to help relieve the difficulties of the Cambodian 
army (China Daily, 2014). According to Ms Yan Nary, a political commentator, 
thanks to good political ties between both countries, Cambodia has been a 
beneficiary of China’s military aid. In 2014 China offered to send more than 
400 Cambodian officers to China for training to mark greater bilateral military 
cooperation between the two allies. 
 
Unlike development aid from the West which often comes with conditions 
attached, China offers aid without any reform requirements, and is pledged to 
states regardless of their human right record, political transparency and 
environmental status. While most Western aid comes in form of direct financial 
support, the majority of Chinese aid is in form of concessional loans and mainly 
concentrates on infrastructure projects, which are built by Chinese firms 
bringing labourers from China. China’s so called “no strings attached” donation 
are said to be weakening the role of the traditional donors such as the World 
Bank, IMF the US and the West (Woods, 2008). China’s easy money provides 
alternative sources of development assistance and allows states with weak 
institutions to turn down aid offers from the West, and avoid the requirement to 
improve their governance, stop corruption, uphold human right and protect the 
environment. In Cambodia, the government warmly welcomes Chinese money 
and often praises China for contributing to the country’s development. 
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However, analysts claim that the way in which China is giving and using its 
money is undermining the work of the civil society who has been trying to 
strengthen democracy, good governance, transparency and accountability. Dr. 
So Hoeun, a local governance specialist told the authors that Chinese aid to 
Cambodia was reducing the political leverage of traditional donors in many 
ways, and was making their effort to promote good governance harder. 
 
On the political front, while China has claimed that it upholds its foreign policy 
of non-interference and refrains from meddling with Cambodia’s politics, 
Beijing has often offered its support to Cambodia’s ruling government. For 
instance, after the contested election in July 2013, China was among the first 
foreign countries to accept the results which the opposition party rejected, 
alleging that the elections were manipulated. Sam Rainsy, the leader of the 
opposition party (Cambodia National Rescue Party), appealed to the 
international community not to recognize the results, but China assured 
Cambodia that it would stand by the result. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang 
Yi said during his visit to Phnom Penh less than a month after the election that 
China would firmly support Cambodia in preventing any disturbance from 
outside (Global Post, 2013). “China fully supports any measure taken by the 
Royal Government of Cambodia in order to secure stability, economic 
development and peace,” he added. According to Dr. Heng Narith, a lecturer in 
Asia Pacific Affairs, China supported the ruling government because it could 
count on Cambodia to do the same if the needs arose in China.  
 
“The political relation between China and Cambodia is mutually 
beneficial. China lends its support to Hun Sen and his closes allies and 
in return they are expected to return the favour by supporting China’s 
politic. For example, Cambodia is a strong supporter of one-China 
policy. Cambodia were also observed to be leaning to China’s side with 
regard to the South China Sea’s dispute,” he added. 
 
As elaborated above, China has been using similar foreign policy tools as it has 
been using in other countries by promoting investment, providing financial and 
economic assistance and offering diplomatic support to the Cambodian 
government. But does China’s resource diplomacy have the same motives (i.e. 
looking for resources) as in other countries? This question will be addressed in 
the next section.  
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5. 5. Resource diplomacy: a discussion 
While it is obvious that China is seeking for resources wherever it can, the 
authors argue that its primary motive for injecting huge amounts of cash and 
building good diplomatic relations with Cambodia is more strategic than 
economic. Cambodia resource reserves are relatively minute compared to what 
China can get from Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia. Cambodia has an 
estimated 400 million barrels of crude oil, three trillion cubic feet of gas (EIC, 
2008) and some unexplored minerals, but its oil and mineral sector is still in its 
infancy and actual production is yet to be determined. While China is the 
largest investor in Cambodia’s hydropower and coal power plants, no evidence 
currently suggests that it has imported electricity back to China. All energy 
projects financed by China are mainly carried out to meet domestic demand. 
Also, Cambodia’s market of just 14 million people is insignificant for China’s 
export. Therefore, from an economic perspective, Cambodia does not have 
much to offer to China. Why then does China charm Cambodia?  
 
Let us briefly revisit the concept of resource diplomacy. Following Zweig 
(2007) resource diplomacy is a strategy to insure a stable supply of energy and 
resources at acceptable prices while ensuring the transfer of those resources to 
fixed locations where they are processed or consumed. When it comes to 
insuring a stable energy supply for acceptable prices, China’s resource 
diplomacy is led by constant efforts to strengthen ties with oil-producing 
nations in competition with oil-importing nations. At the same time, in order to 
reduce its dependency on Middle Eastern countries, China is diversifying both 
its importing sources and its energy sources by reaching out to Africa, Russia, 
Central Asia and the Americas as earlier elaborated. Both diversification 
strategies necessitate careful manoeuvring in order to secure oil transport 
routes, and access to alternative energy sources (Lai, 2007).  
 
As far as these alternative energy sources are concerned, China has come to 
diversify import sources to states in Africa (Angola, Sudan, the DRC and 
Gabon) that are avoided by the European Union and the United States, and has 
come to court rogue states such as Sudan and Myanmar (Lai, 2007). China’s 
energy strategy is supported by its soft power tactics also dubbed as “charm 
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offensive”. This approach favours the establishment of political and cultural 
strings, instead of military intervention, emphasizing mutual benefits and 
promoting China’s benign international image of a “responsible nation”.  Its 
most visible expression is frequent high-level leadership visits. Such visits 
confirm and strengthen personalised relations, with the strongmen running the 
countries of interest and their families and cronies.  
 
The ties between China and Cambodia are longstanding and well-maintained 
and have sustained through diverse changes of leadership. The friendship 
between China and the current regime in Phnom Penh was confirmed after the 
1997 coup. The coup saw the leader of the Cambodian People’s Party, Hun Sen, 
oust then Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh, undoing the efforts of the 
international community to administer peace and good governance in the 
country since the Paris peace agreements in 1991. While many countries 
including, the United States imposed sanctions on Cambodia for breaching the 
carefully brokered peace agreement, China sent an unconfirmed amount of aid. 
China has always offered instant rewards for displays of loyalty. By doing so, 
China avoids the necessity to resume to an actor-reversed issue linkage (Biba, 
2012), but secures Cambodia’s persistent loyalty. This loyalty was blatantly 
displayed on the world stage in 2012 when Cambodia, as ASEAN Chair, 
refused to address the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. 
 
Undeniably, from a Chinese perspective, there are economic rewards for 
China’s unrelenting support to Cambodia. There is easy access to Cambodia’s 
cheap labor for China’s garment industry, to arable land, agricultural products 
and natural resources (such as valuable timber), and to Cambodia’s networks 
extending into US and EU markets – all brokered through Cambodia’s political 
elite (Dahles, 2013). However, compared to other developing countries - where 
access to cheap labor, land and natural resources come in abundance - 
Cambodia’s assets are quite limited and rapidly declining. But what Cambodia 
has to offer - other than many resource-rich countries that China charms - is its 
strategic geopolitical position.  The first priority is China’s concern about 
access to energy reserves in the South China Sea. Second, is securing safe 
transport routes for its oil supplies from the Middle East and Africa. And third, 
is its dam building projects in the Mekong River. In the following sections, 
Cambodia’s strategic role will be further analyzed. 
 
 
First, China’s interest in Cambodia has to be analyzed in terms of Cambodia’s 
geographical location that is strategically vital for China to strengthen its own 
security, and maintain its influence in Southeast Asia. China needs Cambodia as 
an ally in dealing with the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. China 
together with six other countries, namely Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei, 
Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia have claimed overlapping territories in this 
ocean areas which is believed to have vast reserves of natural resources such as 
fish, crude oil and natural gas. China, which has the largest claim of the 
territory, has recently increased its maritime prowess to exercise its claims on 
potential resources in the area. China has consistently said it did not believe that 
the Southeast Asian group was a proper forum for dealing with the issue, and 
has wanted to deal with the issue on the basis of bilateral negotiations rather 
than multilateral talks. In the ASEAN summit 2012, Cambodia, the chair of the 
meeting, was accused of siding with China when it agreed that the issue of 
South China Sea would not be discussed during the meeting. 
 
Second, the Indian Ocean and Malacca Straits are important strategic routes for 
China’s import of energy and food. The Achilles heel is the Straits of Malacca. 
Over 75 per cent of China’s oil imports (from the Middle East and Africa) go 
through the Straits (Lai, 2007). One of China’s important initiatives in oil 
diplomacy is the ‘string of pearls strategy’ to avoid possible disruption to the 
route by competitors or terrorist attacks. China secures its oil routes by finding 
alternatives in land pipelines and railway links (Lai, 2007). This strategy entails 
building close ties along the sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China 
Sea including Bangladesh, Pakistan, Myanmar, Thailand, and Cambodia (Lai, 
2007) following the soft power approach as earlier outlined. Situated in the 
center of mainland Southeast Asia, Cambodia is part of a railway route across 
mainland Southeast Asia and its port of Sihanouk Province offers an excellent 
base for China to secure vulnerable sea-lanes of communication and protect 
seaborne energy supplies. Gaining access to this port allows China to project its 
maritime power and exert greater influence in Southeast Asia. For example, 
should conflicts arise in the South China Sea, China may need Cambodia as a 
strategic, sea-accessible location from which to launch a response.  
 
Third, in view of China’s quest for alternative sources of energy, the large-scale 
hydro-power project consisting of eight consecutive dams in the Mekong River 
is of critical importance. As Biba (2012, 604) points out, the Chinese dams will 
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most likely have adverse effects on downstream countries. However, the 
Mekong River Commission (constituted by the member countries of Thailand, 
Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam) has not made the faintest attempt at legally 
challenging China on its dam building in the river (Biba, 2012). China 
embarked on a counter-strategy that Biba (2012) describes as ‘actor-reversed 
issue linkage’: China as the beneficiary, has sought to tie its hydropower 
projects to broader issues of common development in an attempt to pre-empt 
any objections. One has to keep in mind the highly asymmetrical nature of this 
conflict. 
 
The position of Cambodia, in view of its long-standing friendship with China, is 
of particular significance in this case. The Mekong issue is of utmost 
importance to Cambodia as China’s dams seriously threaten Cambodian 
ecosystems and jeopardize the livelihoods of millions of Cambodians. Instead 
of pushing the issue in the Mekong River Commission, Cambodia pledges 
loyalty to China in international relations issues and, in return, received Chinese 
investments in dam-building projects, like the Kamchay dam, on Cambodian 
territory. As Cambodia accepted these investments, the country was silenced as 
an accomplice of China’s resource diplomacy. Conversely, for China, sustained 
freshwater and energy provision and access to supply routes is of critical 
importance for its future economic growth; it is of more critical importance to 
China than friendly relations with the Mekong River Commission or any other 
international institution. Biba describes the Mekong case in terms of an 
‘upstream-downstream Rambo situation’ (2012, 612) putting environmental and 
human security at risk. However, it seems that the diplomacy approach falls 
short of explaining why this Rambo situation has not resulted in any 
confrontations as China has not resumed to any Rambo-style display of power.  
Instead, China works its soft power, playing the patronage card. The dams 
represent a potentially powerful tool to exercise influence over the member 
countries of the Mekong River Commission as China so far has declined to 
become a member of the Commission and commit itself to any formal 
agreement on a water management policy.  In line with patronage arrangements, 
China prefers to deal with the stakeholders unilaterally on dam building, such as 
it does with Cambodia. Deals are closed at the highest political level and sealed 
during high level visits. These deals benefit the Cambodian political clique in 
manifold ways and it is through downward delegation in the Cambodian 
patronage pyramid that land is cleared for the Chinese investments (Verver and 
Chinese investment and aid in Cambodia’s energy sector: impacts and policy implications
119
 
most likely have adverse effects on downstream countries. However, the 
Mekong River Commission (constituted by the member countries of Thailand, 
Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam) has not made the faintest attempt at legally 
challenging China on its dam building in the river (Biba, 2012). China 
embarked on a counter-strategy that Biba (2012) describes as ‘actor-reversed 
issue linkage’: China as the beneficiary, has sought to tie its hydropower 
projects to broader issues of common development in an attempt to pre-empt 
any objections. One has to keep in mind the highly asymmetrical nature of this 
conflict. 
 
The position of Cambodia, in view of its long-standing friendship with China, is 
of particular significance in this case. The Mekong issue is of utmost 
importance to Cambodia as China’s dams seriously threaten Cambodian 
ecosystems and jeopardize the livelihoods of millions of Cambodians. Instead 
of pushing the issue in the Mekong River Commission, Cambodia pledges 
loyalty to China in international relations issues and, in return, received Chinese 
investments in dam-building projects, like the Kamchay dam, on Cambodian 
territory. As Cambodia accepted these investments, the country was silenced as 
an accomplice of China’s resource diplomacy. Conversely, for China, sustained 
freshwater and energy provision and access to supply routes is of critical 
importance for its future economic growth; it is of more critical importance to 
China than friendly relations with the Mekong River Commission or any other 
international institution. Biba describes the Mekong case in terms of an 
‘upstream-downstream Rambo situation’ (2012, 612) putting environmental and 
human security at risk. However, it seems that the diplomacy approach falls 
short of explaining why this Rambo situation has not resulted in any 
confrontations as China has not resumed to any Rambo-style display of power.  
Instead, China works its soft power, playing the patronage card. The dams 
represent a potentially powerful tool to exercise influence over the member 
countries of the Mekong River Commission as China so far has declined to 
become a member of the Commission and commit itself to any formal 
agreement on a water management policy.  In line with patronage arrangements, 
China prefers to deal with the stakeholders unilaterally on dam building, such as 
it does with Cambodia. Deals are closed at the highest political level and sealed 
during high level visits. These deals benefit the Cambodian political clique in 
manifold ways and it is through downward delegation in the Cambodian 
patronage pyramid that land is cleared for the Chinese investments (Verver and 
 
Dahles, 2015). China never gets its hands dirty. If anybody is displaying Rambo 
behaviour it is the firms subcontracted by Cambodian okhna (business tycoons) 
to clear the land and dislocate rural communities. At a diplomatic level, there is 
no issue over dam building as the Chinese and Cambodian leadership and their 
political elites share the same interests. The rhetoric of a joint regional goal of 
shared development in which the dam building issue is commonly wrapped, 
suits the political elites of both countries well.  
 
5. 6. Conclusion 
China’s growing outward investment, no-strings-attached economic assistance 
and political support to resource-rich developing nations are elements of its 
diplomacy to secure important resources to sustain its expanding economy.  
While the mainstream literature tends to prove the resource-oriented nature of 
such diplomacy, this paper argues there are exceptions to this common belief. 
Using Cambodia as a case study, this paper critically analyzes the motivation of 
China’s resource diplomacy from an institutional perspective, and finds that 
China charms Cambodia not for short term economic benefits, but rather for 
long term strategic and political gains. China is indifferent to Cambodia’s 
limited resources, but finds Cambodia’s strategic geographical location vitally 
significant to increase its influence in the region. Specifically, China needs 
Cambodia on its side in dealing with South China Sea dispute, in securing a 
safe transport routes for its oil supply from the Middle East and Africa and in its 
effort to control the region’s waterway through its dam construction in the 
Mekong. The finding of this paper offers another angle of analysis on the ways 
in which China employs its diplomacy and soft power in different countries 
around the world. While its quest for resources to gratify its insatiable demand 
is obvious, it should not be generalized that China’s diplomatic motive applies 
to all contexts. China is predicted to become the next superpower and other than 
resources, it needs friends and allies to stay on its side on the international 
stage. Therefore, it can be assumed that China establishes relationship with 
various nations for different reasons, and in some situations the motive is not 
about extracting energy and natural resources, but about securing strategic 
geopolitical gain, as in the case of Cambodia. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The debate on China’s controversial role in Cambodia’s critical energy sector 
motivates this Ph.D research. The overall aim of this research is to explain the 
underlying rationale for Chinese investments and aid in Cambodia’s energy 
sector, and explore how these financial injections affect the livelihood and 
development of local communities. To achieve this goal, this research asks four 
specific questions (1) What are the economic, political and social implications 
of Cambodia-China relations? (2) What role does China play in Cambodia’s 
energy sector? (3) How has the China-funded Kamchay Dam project affected 
the livelihood of local community? (4) In the context of China’s global resource 
diplomacy, what motives does China have for its relation with Cambodia? This 
topic is highly relevant for a number of reasons.  
 
On a theoretical level, this research contributes to narrowing the gap in the 
literature on the impact of China’s investment and aid by emphasizing in 
particular the impact on a local community. Building on relevant theories, this 
study proposes a useful and replicable framework to study the impact of 
hydropower by focusing on the community, and linking the livelihood of the 
affected people directly to the impact of the dam. This research also contributes 
to the theoretical debate among economists about the type of development that 
China brings to Cambodia by examining both exploitative and beneficial 
aspects, and by focusing on the interface of concrete investment projects, and 
the affected local communities. The findings of this research also offers another 
angle of analysis on the way China employs its diplomacy, and soft power in 
different countries around the world. 
 
At a policy level, this research contributes to the development of the national 
sustainable energy policy. Cambodia’s energy insecurity is harming its 
competitiveness and the government needs to put in place proper policies to 
remedy the situation. This research used scientific methods to study the pros 
and cons of hydropower, the most important source of energy which, according 
to the national plan, will contribute more than 50% to the total power supply by 
2020. The findings of this research provide concrete evidence from the 
 
community level, and offer useful recommendation for policy makers to 
promote sustainable energy development in Cambodia. 
In the subsequent sections, I will synthesize the empirical findings, provide an 
integrated discussion on the dissertation’s contributions to existing literature 
which is followed by the policy implications of this research. In last part of the 
chapter, I will discuss the dissertation’s limitations, reflect on its methodology 
and draw some suggestions for future research.  
 
6.1. Empirical Findings 
 
The findings of this research were presented in four separate but interconnected 
articles. The first article answers the first research questions “What are the 
economic, political and social implications of  Cambodia-China relations? The 
paper finds that the relationship between Cambodia and China is mutually 
beneficial. Cambodian benefits economically from China’s inflow of 
investment and generous donations, while China benefits politically and 
strategically for having Cambodia as an ally. China is indeed leaving a large 
economic footprint in Cambodia. China’s investment and aid has boosted 
export, created local employment, improved local infrastructure and contributed 
to poverty reduction. However, the way that China’s money is being used is 
also causing unwanted social and environmental consequences, including loss 
of forest and biodiversity, loss of local livelihood, and corruption.  On the 
political front, both countries have been supporting each other’s political 
agenda. Cambodia, for example, has been a strong adherent of the one-China 
policy, and backs China at regional and international level on issues such as the 
South China Sea dispute. China, in return, has supported Cambodia’s ruling 
party on its internal matters such recognizing the contested 2013 election result. 
Culturally, China’s values are prominent and can be witnessed in many aspects 
of Cambodian society, including but not limited to, language and education, 
food and eating, media and entertainment, and beliefs and festivals. To ensure 
that the Cambodian–Chinese cooperation will ultimately turn out to be a 
positive-sum game it requires good leadership and accountable governments 
with a long-term vision of achieving sustainable development. 
 
The first paper serves as the background for the second article which narrows 
down the focus of the study to explore the roles that China plays in Cambodia’s 
energy sector. The article concludes that China is playing a critical role in the 
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sector. Its multimillion-dollar investment is transforming the country’s energy 
sector, helping to reduce reliance on foreign energy, increase the rate of 
electrification, and potentially reduce the cost of energy. However, China-
funded energy projects, particularly hydropower dams, have met with 
widespread suspicion and harsh criticism for failing to meet international 
standards and for imposing social and environmental damage. China has the 
potential to be a catalyst for sustainable energy development in Cambodia if it, 
together with the local government, puts more effort to embrace the 
international best practices and significantly improve the transparency of their 
investment projects. China’s money can also be channeled to support energy 
efficiency initiatives, and fund less controversial renewable energy projects 
such as solar power, micro hydropower, biofuel and biogas which contribute to 
sustainable energy development and improve the livelihood of the poor rural 
population. 
 
Following the discussion in the previous paper, the third article delves into 
effects of China’s involvement in Cambodia’s hydropower development. The 
article uses the Kamchay dam as a case study and addresses how the project has 
affected the livelihood of the local community. The Kamchay project was built 
and operated by Sinohydro Corporation, China’s largest hydropower company, 
at the cost of US$ 280 million which was financed by Exim Bank of China. The 
project was reported to be the single largest investment by a foreign company in 
Cambodia at that time. This study found that the dam had reduced the price of 
the electricity, created short-term employment opportunities and improved local 
infrastructure. However, inadequate planning and stakeholder consultation have 
caused the project to fall short of international standards. The limited benefits 
come at a greater cost for the environment and livelihood of the local 
communities. The dam destroyed productive forests, endangered animal 
species, lowered  water quality and harmed local livelihoods. After the 
construction of the dam, local villagers lost their  main source of income, 
causing their living standard to decline. Therefore, even though the price of the 
electricity has been reduced, access remains limited since the community 
cannot afford it. While there was no relocation of villagers, the compensation 
for the loss of income for the affected families was not provided. It is clear that 
if hydropower is to contribute to solving Cambodia’s energy crisis in a 
sustainable way, a comprehensive and inclusive mechanism of good 
hydropower development must be developed and rigorously implemented. 
 
 
The fourth article concludes the empirical findings by discussing Cambodia-
China relation in the global context of China’s resource diplomacy. China’s 
growing outward investment, no-strings-attached economic assistance and 
political support to resource-rich developing nations are elements of its 
diplomacy to secure important resources to sustain its expanding economy.  The 
mainstream literature tends to suggest that China uses its resource diplomacy 
around the world to obtain energy and other importance resources, but this 
paper finds that China charms Cambodia not for short term economic benefits, 
but rather for long term strategic and political gains. China is indifferent to 
Cambodia’s limited resources but finds Cambodia’s strategic geographical 
location vitally significant to increase its influence in the region. Specifically, 
China needs Cambodia on its side in dealing with the South China Sea dispute, 
in securing a safe transport routes for its oil supply from the Middle East and 
Africa and in its effort to control the region’s waterway through its dam 
construction in the Mekong. 
 
The findings of the four papers pieced together the puzzle and revealed the 
underlying rationale for Chinese investments and aid in Cambodia’s energy 
sector and the impact of these large financial injections on the livelihood and 
development of local communities. While it can be assumed that China will 
seek to acquire as many resources as it possibly can to fuel its domestic growth, 
China’s interests vary from country to country depend on what each country has 
to offer. In the case of Cambodia, securing resources is not the main reason for 
China’s generous donation and large investment. Thanks to Cambodia’s 
strategic location, China is attracted to Cambodia primarily for political and 
diplomatic gains, rather than for economic reasons. Empirical evidence from 
the ground also indicates that China’s financial contribution in Cambodia’s 
energy sector has benefited Cambodia’s economy, but unfortunately such 
economic gains have not been shared with the local community. In fact, in 
many investment projects, particularly the ones related to hydropower, the 
livelihood of the local communities has been negatively affected due to the lack 
of planning, participation and transparency. 
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seek to acquire as many resources as it possibly can to fuel its domestic growth, 
China’s interests vary from country to country depend on what each country has 
to offer. In the case of Cambodia, securing resources is not the main reason for 
China’s generous donation and large investment. Thanks to Cambodia’s 
strategic location, China is attracted to Cambodia primarily for political and 
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the ground also indicates that China’s financial contribution in Cambodia’s 
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6.2. Theoretical implications 
 
This research contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. First, 
while a large amount of the work has been done to analyze the aggregate impact 
of China’s investment and aid at global, regional and country level (See 
Kaplinsky, McCormick, & Morris, 2007; Jenkins, Peters,, & Moreira, 2008; 
Kubny, 2010) this research focuses in particular on the impact of China’s 
investment and aid at the community level. There is a gap between what has 
been found by using aggregate data at macro level and what happens at the 
local community level. The current research, therefore, has contributed to 
narrowing this gap by emphasizing the community when exploring the ways in 
which Chinese investment and aid is affecting the sustainability of local 
villagers livelihood in Cambodia. The outcome of this study provides 
additional insights into the current debates on the effect of China’s investment 
in the host country. 
 
Secondly, the study brings together relevant theories and adopts a unique 
framework to study the impact of hydropower. The World Commission on 
Dams and the International Hydropower Association (IHA) have published a 
set of guidelines to promote greater consideration of environmental, social and 
economic aspects in the sustainability assessment of new hydro projects and 
the management and operation of existing power schemes (see Imhof, Wong, 
Bosshard, 2002; the International Hydropower Association, 2004). However, 
the guidelines are too broad and do not place great emphasis on the community. 
Around 40-80 million people globally have been displaced from their 
community because of dam construction (WCD, 2000). It is thus critically 
important that the community have ownership of the process and decision 
making in the planning and development of hydropower. This study proposes a 
framework that places the community at the center of the investigation and 
links the livelihood of the affected people directly to the impact of the dam. The 
framework is a replicable tool and can be used to study dam projects in other 
locations. 
 
Thirdly, this research has also contributed to the debate among economists 
about the type of development that China brings to Cambodia. One theory 
suggests that China brings the socialist market model which is exploitative and 
makes a small party elite richer. The other theory claims that Chinese 
 
investments are good for Cambodia as they come with no strings attached, 
while other investments decline; these investments may not empower all 
Cambodians equally at once, but will contribute to everybody’s well-being 
through trickle down effect in the long run – an example of neo-liberal 
reasoning. My research contributes to this debate by examining the exploitative 
and beneficial aspects of hydropower and by focusing on the interface of the 
investment project and the local effected community.  
 
Fourthly, this research presents an interesting case of China-Cambodia relations 
in the broader context of China’s rise globally. The mainstream literature 
suggests that China’s foreign policy is driven by its strong appetite for energy 
and resources, and China is believed to have used its overseas investment, trade 
and aid to acquire important resources to fuel its economy (Downs, 2004; 
Zweig and Jianhai, 2005; Daojiong, 2006). However, this research hypothesizes 
that China’s motive for its relation with Cambodia is not energy-oriented but 
rather strategically and politically motivated. The finding of this paper offers 
another angle of analysis on the way China employs its diplomacy, and soft 
power in different countries around the world. While its quest for resources to 
satisfy its insatiable demand is obvious, it should not be generalized that 
China’s diplomatic motive applies to all contexts. China is predicted to become 
the next superpower and other than resources, it needs friends and allies to stay 
on its side on international stage. Therefore, it can be assumed that China 
establishes relationship with various nations for different reasons, and in some 
situations the motive is not about extracting energy and natural resources, but 
about securing strategic geopolitical gain like in the case of Cambodia. 
 
Finally, this PhD research project is part of a large Cambodia Research 
Programme, “Competing Hegemonies: Foreign-Dominated Processes of 
Development in Post-Conflict Cambodia”, a collaborative project between 
Dutch and Cambodian academic institutions and funded by the Netherlands 
Organisations for Scientific Research (NWO). One of the main objectives of the 
programme is to “analyse the diverging ways in which the main stakeholders in 
Cambodian development (government, civil society, foreign investors, and the 
Cambodian diaspora and business community) position themselves vis-à-vis 
one another and the development models that emerge in their wake” (Cambodia 
Research Programme, 2010). My project looks at China as one of the main 
foreign players, and studies its role in Cambodia’s development. Being the 
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largest foreign investment and a generous donor, China is indeed a key 
stakeholder that has exerted strong influence on Cambodia’s development 
practice. Its generous financial support has provided alternative funding for the 
Cambodia’s government, allowing it to reject any funding from the West that 
comes with reform requirements. The flexibility of China’s development 
assistance enables the money to be used where it is most needed, but the lack of 
effective planning, monitoring and evaluation to ensure transparency and 
accountability suggests the model is inefficient, unsustainable, and unlikely to 
replace the Washington Consensus.  
6.3. Policy Implications 
 
This study provides evidence-based inputs for the development of sustainable 
energy policy for Cambodia. Cambodia’s energy security is at risk. The lack of 
physical infrastructure and investment means the country depends largely on 
the import of foreign electricity for domestic use. Currently, millions of people 
still lack access to affordable electricity. Unless a proper policies is put in place, 
Cambodia’s competitiveness and growth will decline. To address the energy 
shortage, the government has an ambitious plan to increase the power output by 
promoting investment in hydropower which, it hopes, will contribute at least 
50% of the total energy mix by 2020. 
 
Cambodia’s desire for energy is obvious but how to get it remains controversial. 
Seeing hydropower as the most viable option to meet the increasing energy 
demand, the government has turned to China for loans and encouraged Chinese 
firms to invest in dam projects across the country. Experiences in other 
countries have shown that hydropower can provide economic benefits but, 
without careful planning and study, it can also do harm to the environment 
and the community. This research used scientific methods to study the pros 
and cons of hydropower investment from the community’s perspective. The 
study gave the community a voice to express their views about the effects of 
the investment on their everyday lives. Based on the empirical findings, the 
study proposes the following policy recommendations to stakeholders to 
promote sustainable energy development in Cambodia. 
  
 
Assess alternative energy options 
While dam building is one of the most likely approaches to generate of 
additional energy for Cambodia, too much emphasis and dependence on 
hydropower may be counter productive. Other less controversial energy options 
should be extensively explored. With a tropical climate and an average sunshine 
of six hour per day, Cambodia offers favorable conditions for solar energy. As 
the cost of solar technology continues to fall, solar energy is a promising  
alternative. Biomass, mainly in the form of wood and charcoal, is the main 
source of energy in Cambodia. It has been used for domestic cooking and also 
extensively by industries, but is currently not used for power generation. The 
preliminary assessment of the potential for using biomass as a source of 
renewable energy reveals a large unexploited potential which Cambodia can tap 
into (Akgün, Korkeakoski, Mustonen, Luukkanen, 2011). It is important that all 
options are explored and carefully assessed to identify the most feasible and 
sustainable way to meet current and future demand. 
Promote energy efficiency 
The efficient use of energy is one of the most effective and sustainable ways to 
deal with the current energy challenge in Cambodia. Energy efficiency means 
using less energy to provide the same services such as for lighting, cooling, 
cooking, processing of food, and manufacturing of industrial products. If the 
same services can be provided and products be produced with less energy, this 
will boost social and economic development and contribute to the protection of 
the natural environment. Currently, Cambodian’s energy use is highly 
inefficient, with energy consumption per unit of output higher than in many 
countries in the region, and more than double that of the developed countries. 
Initial research suggests that there are considerable energy savings available in 
various sectors in the economy. For example, the saving potential ranges from 
20% to 70% in industry, 20-30% in construction, 50% for end users, and up to 
80% in rural electricity production and generation (MIME, 2013). Having 
policies in place to promote energy efficiency is critical for Cambodia’s long 
term growth. 
 
Strengthen regulatory frameworks 
Many energy projects produce negative impacts due to the absence of strong 
regulatory frameworks to govern the investment. To ensure that the project will 
benefit the country and the people, local government must enhance its 
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Many energy projects produce negative impacts due to the absence of strong 
regulatory frameworks to govern the investment. To ensure that the project will 
benefit the country and the people, local government must enhance its 
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regulatory role by putting in place clear investment regulations especially on 
environmentally sensitive investment projects and compliance should be strictly 
monitored. Policies to promote responsible investment must be implemented. 
This entails respecting human rights, supporting a precautionary approach to 
environmental challenges, encouraging the development and diffusion of 
environmentally friendly technologies, stopping corruption in all its forms, 
including extortion and bribery.  Government should systematically monitor the 
companies in accordance with the ethical standards, and punish those who 
violate such standards.  
 
Conduct a comprehensive social and environmental impact assessment 
A feasibility study should be comprehensively conducted before the 
implementation of energy projects to thoroughly assess their costs and benefits. 
Such study should be applied to all development proposals that may have 
negative effects and as early as possible in the decision making and throughout 
the life cycle of the proposed activity. A comprehensive social and 
environmental impact assessment is the one that is carried out with rigor, 
fairness, objectivity, impartiality and be subject to independent checks and 
verification. It should provide appropriate opportunities to inform and involve 
the interested and affected sectors of the public, and their inputs and concerns 
should be addressed explicitly in the documentation and decision making. The 
process should also consider all relevant information on the affected 
environment, the proposed alternatives and their impact, and on the measures 
necessary to monitor and investigate residual effects. 
Optimize the relationships with China 
China is playing a vital yet controversial role in Cambodia. Its relationship with 
Cambodia is now closer than ever, but to ensure that such relationship result in 
a win-win scenario, it is of great importance that the two countries work 
together to improve the management of investment and aid. Scores of literature 
empahizse that aid, if not well managed and if given in the wrong context, will 
do more harm than good. Aid delivered over long periods to nations with weak 
institutions has the potential to undermine good governance and to reduce local 
ownership, accountability and democratic decision-making, and it does very 
little to promote economic growth (Graham and O’Hanlon 1997; Easterly 2003; 
Tangri and Mwenda 2006). Cambodia should think of ways to make the best of 
use of China’s investment and aid to contribute to its sustainable growth. For 
 
example, Chinese’s money can also be channeled to support energy efficiency 
initiatives and fund less controversial renewable energy projects such as solar 
power, micro hydropower, biofuel and biogas. These off-grid energy projects 
will not only contribute to sustainable energy development of Cambodia but 
also significantly improve the livelihood of the poor rural population. 
Cambodian–Chinese cooperation can be optimized when there is good 
leadership and accountable governments with a long-term vision of achieving 
sustainable development.  
6.4. Limitations and suggestions for further research 
Every effort was made to ensure the quality of the study. Rigorous scientific 
research methods were employed and ethical standards were respected. 
However, each research methodology has its pros and cons, and as with most 
research projects, unexpected constraints always occur during the course of the 
research, resulting in some imperfections. These limitations have left some 
room that future research can investigate further.  
 
The first issue has to do with the adopted methodology. This research employs 
a qualitative method to seek the answers to the research questions. This method 
is useful for describing complex situation, and can best be used to generate rich 
detail about a phenomena as they are situated and embedded in local contexts. 
However, such method is time consuming and costly to collect and analyze the 
required data. And by design, qualitative methods work best with smaller, 
highly targeted samples to get rich, in-depth data laden with insight 
unobtainable from quantitative method. However, the small sample size limits 
the ability to generalize from the findings. One of the objectives of this research 
is to explore the impact of Chinese investment in hydropower, but this research 
only focuses on one case study in a particular geographical location due to the 
fact that it is the only case available for investigation at the time of the research. 
  
The second limitation of this study is the lack of comprehensive access to the 
Chinese stakeholders. During the course of this research, a wide range of 
stakeholders were consulted. They include government representatives at 
national  and local level, non-governmental organizations, development 
partners, academics, researcher, independent analysts, and representaives from 
the local community. The researcher also talked to Chinese researchers and 
Chinese investment and aid in Cambodia’s energy sector: impacts and policy implications
129
 
regulatory role by putting in place clear investment regulations especially on 
environmentally sensitive investment projects and compliance should be strictly 
monitored. Policies to promote responsible investment must be implemented. 
This entails respecting human rights, supporting a precautionary approach to 
environmental challenges, encouraging the development and diffusion of 
environmentally friendly technologies, stopping corruption in all its forms, 
including extortion and bribery.  Government should systematically monitor the 
companies in accordance with the ethical standards, and punish those who 
violate such standards.  
 
Conduct a comprehensive social and environmental impact assessment 
A feasibility study should be comprehensively conducted before the 
implementation of energy projects to thoroughly assess their costs and benefits. 
Such study should be applied to all development proposals that may have 
negative effects and as early as possible in the decision making and throughout 
the life cycle of the proposed activity. A comprehensive social and 
environmental impact assessment is the one that is carried out with rigor, 
fairness, objectivity, impartiality and be subject to independent checks and 
verification. It should provide appropriate opportunities to inform and involve 
the interested and affected sectors of the public, and their inputs and concerns 
should be addressed explicitly in the documentation and decision making. The 
process should also consider all relevant information on the affected 
environment, the proposed alternatives and their impact, and on the measures 
necessary to monitor and investigate residual effects. 
Optimize the relationships with China 
China is playing a vital yet controversial role in Cambodia. Its relationship with 
Cambodia is now closer than ever, but to ensure that such relationship result in 
a win-win scenario, it is of great importance that the two countries work 
together to improve the management of investment and aid. Scores of literature 
empahizse that aid, if not well managed and if given in the wrong context, will 
do more harm than good. Aid delivered over long periods to nations with weak 
institutions has the potential to undermine good governance and to reduce local 
ownership, accountability and democratic decision-making, and it does very 
little to promote economic growth (Graham and O’Hanlon 1997; Easterly 2003; 
Tangri and Mwenda 2006). Cambodia should think of ways to make the best of 
use of China’s investment and aid to contribute to its sustainable growth. For 
 
example, Chinese’s money can also be channeled to support energy efficiency 
initiatives and fund less controversial renewable energy projects such as solar 
power, micro hydropower, biofuel and biogas. These off-grid energy projects 
will not only contribute to sustainable energy development of Cambodia but 
also significantly improve the livelihood of the poor rural population. 
Cambodian–Chinese cooperation can be optimized when there is good 
leadership and accountable governments with a long-term vision of achieving 
sustainable development.  
6.4. Limitations and suggestions for further research 
Every effort was made to ensure the quality of the study. Rigorous scientific 
research methods were employed and ethical standards were respected. 
However, each research methodology has its pros and cons, and as with most 
research projects, unexpected constraints always occur during the course of the 
research, resulting in some imperfections. These limitations have left some 
room that future research can investigate further.  
 
The first issue has to do with the adopted methodology. This research employs 
a qualitative method to seek the answers to the research questions. This method 
is useful for describing complex situation, and can best be used to generate rich 
detail about a phenomena as they are situated and embedded in local contexts. 
However, such method is time consuming and costly to collect and analyze the 
required data. And by design, qualitative methods work best with smaller, 
highly targeted samples to get rich, in-depth data laden with insight 
unobtainable from quantitative method. However, the small sample size limits 
the ability to generalize from the findings. One of the objectives of this research 
is to explore the impact of Chinese investment in hydropower, but this research 
only focuses on one case study in a particular geographical location due to the 
fact that it is the only case available for investigation at the time of the research. 
  
The second limitation of this study is the lack of comprehensive access to the 
Chinese stakeholders. During the course of this research, a wide range of 
stakeholders were consulted. They include government representatives at 
national  and local level, non-governmental organizations, development 
partners, academics, researcher, independent analysts, and representaives from 
the local community. The researcher also talked to Chinese researchers and 
Chinese investment and aid in Cambodia’s energy sector: impacts and policy implications
130
 
Chinese workers at the dam site, but the researcher’s repeated request to meet 
with the Chinese embassy, general manager of Sinohydro, the representative of 
China Chamber of Commerce were rejected. To deal with this challenge, the 
research analyzed various articles the local and Chinese media to represent the 
opinion of the Chinese stakeholder. The difficulty to meet with Chinese 
representatives is not unique to this research. Previous studies on similar topics 
often face this challenge. It would be very useful if future studies on this matter 
can have better access to Chinese stakeholder and capture their views. The 
ability to communicate in Chinese and a well-connected network will be very 
helpful in reaching out to the Chinese. 
 
As more dams will be operational in the coming years, it is interesting to find 
out if the impact of other dams is in line with the findings of this research. 
Hydropower is often associated with the negative impacts such as destruction of 
forest, biodiversity and loss of livelihood. While all of these problems are real, 
they are not inherent to hydropower. Project developers, together with the local 
government, have a critical role to play in ensuring that a dam is well planned 
and managed and that proper mitigation measures are put in place to minimize 
the undesirable impact. In this regard, future research should conduct 
comparative case analysis between dams built by two different Chinese 
companies, and between China-backed dams with dams invested by other 
countries. The findings of these studies will further contribute to the debate 
whether all Chinese dam builders are the same with regard to quality, 
transparency and standards or whether dams built by other countries are any 
better than those built by China. 
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ANNEX 
 
ANNEX 1:  
List of people interviewed in this research 
 
Stakeholder representatives Number of interview 
National Government 1. Ministry of Mine and Energy (MME) 
2. Ministry of Environment (MoE) 
3. Electriicty Authority of  Cambodia (EAC) 
4. Electricité du Cambodge (EdC) 
5. Rural Electrification Fund (REF) 
6. The Council for the Development of 
Cambodia (CDC) 
Local Government 1. Snam Prampi village head 
2. Touch deputy village head 
3. Moet Peam Community Council Member 
4. Deputy chief of Kampot Tourism 
Department 
5. Chief of Kampot Department of Industry, 
Mining and Energy 
Academic, Research 
community, Independent 
analysist 
1. Dr. Heng Narith (Pseudonym)  
2. Ms. Yan Nary ( Pseudonym) 
3. Mr. Han Phal (Pseudonym ) 
4. Mr. So Hoeun (Pseudonym ) 
5. 1 Chinese researcher 
Development Partner 1. The World Bank 
2. UNDP 
3. JICA 
4. ADB 
Non-governmental 
organization 
1. The NGO Forum on Cambodia 
2. International River 
3. Culture and Environment Preservation 
Association (CEPA) 
4. Fisheries Action Coalition Team (FACT) 
5. Flora and Fauna International (FFI) 
6. 3S Rivers Protection Network (3SPN) 
7. ADHOC (Kampot) 
8. LIHCADO (Kampot 
Chinese company 1. Bank of China 
2. Sinohydro  
Local communty 25 villagers 
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ANNEX 2:  
Interview Questions for villagers 
 
 
1. What do most people in your village do for a living? 
2. How many people are there  in your family? 
3. What do they do for a living? 
4. How long have you lived in this community? 
5. How much did you know about Kamchay dam before it was 
constructed?  
o Who built it? 
o Why was it built? 
6. How much do you know about it now? Where did you get the 
information from? 
7. Have you ever been consulted about the dam? 
8. Do you know if the community has been consulted? 
9. What consequences do you think the dam will have on the community? 
10. Do you know about advantages and disadvantage of dam?   
11. How has your family’s life changed after construction of the dam? 
o Source of Income  
o Health 
o Personal right 
o Family’s wellfare 
o Safety 
o Others 
 
12. How do you feel about having this dam in your community? 
13. Can you describe the changes that you observed in your community as 
a result of the dam? 
 
o Economic conditions (employment, new product and 
service,…) 
o Environmental Conditions (pollution, natural resources, natural 
habitat) 
o Social conditions (inequality, crimes, education, health, human 
right,….) 
 
14. Do you think the community is happy with the dam? 
15. If not, what have they done so far? 
 
16. What kind of changes do you want to see? 
Personal Details 
 
Village Name: _____________________________________________ 
Respondent is a  wife  husband  Grandma  Grandpa      
 son   Daughter   Relatives  In- laws 
Respondent’s sex:   Male  Female 
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ANNEX 3: 
Key Actors in Cambodia’s Hydropower Development 
 
Actor Role 
Ministry of Industry, 
Mines, and Energy 
(MIME) 
Responsible for setting and administrating the 
government policies, strategies and planning in the 
power sector” The mandate of the MIME related to 
hydropower includes: conducting research on the 
hydropower distribution networks; estimating 
hydropower potential in order to develop 
hydropower projects; and monitoring and evaluation 
of existing hydropower projects.  
The Ministry of 
Environment (MoE), 
MoE is broadly responsible for issues related to 
environmental protection and natural resources 
management. An important function of the MoE 
relevant to hydropower development is the 
evaluation of Environmental Impact Assessments 
(EIA). 
Electricité du Cambodge 
(EdC) 
EdC is responsible for the generation, transmission 
and distribution of electric power throughout 
Cambodia and operates as a commercial business  
Electricity Authority of 
Cambodia (EAC) 
EAC’s responsibilities include: to issue regulations; 
to issue licenses to electric power service providers; 
to review cost and approve tariff rates; to resolve 
disputes; and to regulate and impose penalties.  
The Council for the 
Development of Cambodia 
(CDC) 
CDC is the highest decision-making level of the 
Cambodian government for private and public 
sector investment. The CDC is intended as a “one-
stop service” for investment review and decision- 
making in Cambodia  
China Export-Import 
Bank (China Exim) 
China Exim is one of China’s two official export 
credit agencies. China Exim works to finance the 
overseas operations of Chinese businesses and 
promote Chinese exports.  
Sinohydro Corporation  China’s largest hydropower company. It has 20 
wholly owned subsidiaries, four holding companies, 
16 overseas divisions, and around 35,000 
employees. It built the Kamchay Dam in Cambodia. 
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